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Abstract
Although many works exist on the role of ethnicity in the domestic securitisation 
processes in Malaysia, far less attention has been given to the significance ethnicity has 
in shaping the country’s external security outlook. The central aim of this thesis is to 
analyse the relationship between national security and ethnic kinship. More specifically, 
it analyses whether ethnicity has had a major impact on Malaysia’s external security 
practices in Southeast Asia. In geographic terms, the thesis asks how the Malaysian 
government has approached the ethnic conflicts in (1) southern Thailand, (2) Aceh, 
Indonesia, and (3) the Moro Region in the Philippines. In substantive terms, the thesis 
explores in particular to what extent the Malaysian government has been concerned 
about the societal security of the Malay’s ethnic kin. Societal security includes the 
protection of physical survival, economic well-being and in some instances their 
political rights in their homeland.
The argument of this thesis is that Malaysia’s approach towards the ethnic 
conflicts in southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro region is best understood with 
reference to the role that shared ethnicity has played for Malaysian policy-makers. This 
thesis concludes that the Malaysian government has not only promoted the Malays’ 
ethnic interests within its own territorial boundaries, but also sought to protect the 
distinct identity of ethnic kin groups in cases where the latter have been caught up in 
conflict in Malaysia’s immediate regional neighbourhood. However, contrary to 
arguments by many scholars - whereby involvement in ethnic conflicts by third parties 
being of the same ethnicity as one of the conflict parties tends to both make such 
conflicts more intense and create tensions that are likely to increase the probability of 
interstate conflict - Malaysia’s “involvement” has neither led these conflicts to 
deteriorate nor fomented major interstate tensions, let alone war.
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Chapter 1: National Security and International Relations
Introduction
National security is normally linked to the protection of the country’s core values, which 
include, among others, the survival of the people and the state’s territorial integrity.' 
Societal security, on the other hand, only concerns the ability of a society to maintain its 
essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual risks.2 Due to the 
concern by the Malaysian government for the Malay ethnic group’s societal security in 
the country, the preservation of their interests has been identified as one of Malaysia’s 
main national security objectives. This thesis explores whether the concern by the 
Malaysian government for the societal security of the Malay ethnic group is limited to 
Malays residing in Malaysia or also extends to their ethnic kin living in neighbouring 
countries; especially those in southern Thailand, Aceh, Indonesia,3 and the Moro Region 
in the Philippines (please refer to Map 1). The thesis examines in particular how the 
objective of protecting the Malay ethnic group’s societal security has been pursued and 
applied vis-a-vis their ethnic kin located in all of the respective bordering countries. 
Besides analysing in general terms Malaysia’s security practice in relation to the ethnic 
conflicts in the aforementioned areas, the thesis also examines how the Malaysian 
government has related to the major ethno-nationalist movements operating in these 
countries, such as the Patani United Liberation Front (PULO) in Southern Thailand, the 
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka -  GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia, and the
1 Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework fo r  Analysis (London: Prentice-Hall International, 
1995), pp. 124-27.
2 Ole Waever, "Societal Security: The Concept," in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in 
Europe, ed. Ole Waever, et al. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 17-40.
3 It should be noted that the Indonesian government and the Acehnese ethno-nationalist organisation 
signed a peace treaty (the Helsinki Peace Accord) in August 2005.
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Moro Nationalist Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) in the Moro Region in the Philippines. In short, the thesis analyses whether the 
ethnic factor has an effect on the Malaysian security practice in South-East Asia, and in 
so doing, it examines the relationship between ethnicity and the international relations o f 
Southeast Asia.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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This chapter begins by outlining the significance and the contribution of the 
study to International Relations. The second section reviews the basic concepts that will 
be used in the thesis. The third section highlights the rationale and the argument of the 
study. The fourth section analyses the literature on Malaysia’s approach towards all the 
conflict areas, and discusses the limitations of this literature for addressing these issues. 
The fifth section introduces the methodological approaches applied in this research. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis structure.
1.1 The Significance and the Contribution o f the Study
The thesis attempts to make four main contributions. First, it seeks to make an empirical 
contribution to the literature on the influence of the ethnic factor on Malaysia’s security 
practice. Although many works exist on the role of ethnicity in either the domestic 
securitisation process or ethnic politics in Malaysia,4 little attention to date has been 
given to the role of ethnicity in shaping the country’s external security outlook, 
particularly as regards the ethnic conflicts in Malaysia’s regional neighbourhood. The 
thesis systematically discusses the ethnic factor with reference to Malaysia’s security 
practice towards ethnic conflicts and to some of the major ethno-nationalist movements 
in Southeast Asia.
Second, the thesis contributes to the research of the role of ethnicity in 
international relations, especially in Southeast Asia. Although ethnic groups, ethnicity 
and ethnic issues are favourite subjects among anthropologists and sociologists, political 
scientists and especially International Relations experts have in the main tended to pay
4 See for example, David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 
1994), M. Shamsul Hague, "The Role o f the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia," American 
Behavioral Scientist 47, no. 3 (2003), K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," in Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), pp. 5 1 3 -4 8 .
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little attention to these issues.5 Third, the thesis aims to make a contribution to the 
analysis of the international politics of Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s security practice 
towards these ethno-nationalist movements has regional implications since the country 
is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which still 
requires all member states to adhere to the principle of non-interference in each other’s 
affairs. Some works on this regional grouping have focused on apparent breaches of the 
non-interference principle, but not so much on the transnational-ethnic alliance.6 In 
spite of the dominant ethnic group in Malaysia and the membership of the ethno- 
nationalist movements struggling against their government’s shared common ethnic 
identity, there are very few scholars who have analysed in detail how the Malay kinship 
has influenced Malaysia’s security practice. The fourth contribution of the thesis is that 
it examines to some extent the interaction of the ethno-nationalist movements with the 
national governments they are in conflict with and, more importantly, also the former’s 
interaction with the Malaysian government.
1.2 Basic Terms and Concepts
National security has been perceived by almost all sovereign countries as the highest 
priority issue in their national agendas. Before the end of the Cold War, the focus of 
national security was primarily directed towards the protection of the state from foreign 
threats, which were considered to be primarily military in nature. In response to these
5 For exceptions, see David Davis and Will Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and 
Foreign Policy Behavior," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997), Stephen M Saideman, Beth K 
Dougherty, and Erin K Jenne, "Dilemmas o f  Divorce: How Secessionist Identities Cut Both Ways," 
Security Studies 14, no. 4 (2005).
6 See for example, John Funston, "ASEAN and the Principle o f Non-Intervention - Practices and 
Prospects," in Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific, ed. David Dickens and Guy 
Wilson-Roberts (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies in association with the China Centre for 
International Studies and Institute o f Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 9-22, David Martin 
Jones and Mike Lawrence Smith, "The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New  
Terror, and the Delusions o f Regionalism," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (2001): pp. 271-88, 
Samuel Sharpe, "An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?," The Pacific Review 16, 
no. 2(2003): pp. 231-50.
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threats, states had to have sufficient military capability to defend their national
sovereignty. However, there is also a non-military definition of national security.
Robert McNamara, for instance, defines national security as follows:
Security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it 
may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; 
security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. 
Security is development, and without development there can be no security.7
The term ethnicity, on the other hand, derived from the Greek ethnos, originally 
meant heathen or pagan.8 Ethnicity implies a sense of a shared common descent, 
political solidarity vis-a-vis other groups, and common customs, language, religion, 
values, morality and etiquette that always has a ‘political dimension’.9 In addition, 
ethnicity functions both as an interest resource and as an emotional loyalty.10 In other 
words, shared ethnicity or ethnic identity by its very nature creates loyalty, interest, and 
fear of extinction, which even international boundaries do not dilute.11 It has been 
argued, therefore, if the ethnic group’s kin across international borders are being ill- 
treated and oppressed, and their right of self-determination is being violated by their 
governments, due to the ethnic affinity between them, the people in that particular ethnic 
group would then offer external support to their ethnic kin.'2 According to Gurr, the 
concept of external support refers to the entire range of active and passive support an
7 Robert S McNamara, The Essence o f  Security: Reflections in Office (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1968).
8 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f  Culture and Society (London: Fontana/Croom Helm, 
1976).
9 Max Weber, C. Wright Mills, and Hans Heinrich Gerth, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 159-74.
10 Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, p. xviii.
11 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985), 
Chapter 4.
12 Raj at Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 14, Stephen M Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign 
Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), Astri Suhrke and Lela 
Gamer Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (London: Praeger, 1977).
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ethnic group can receive from outside the country.13 Ethnic groups may receive support 
from other states, from kindred groups in neighbouring states, or from international 
movements such as the Indigenous People’s Movement.14 Major types of support 
include access to weaponry and supplies, mercenary and military advisers, the provision 
of safe havens for exiles and refugees, financial support and verbal encouragement and 
advice.15
The term ethno-nationalist movement generally refers to a movement that is
based on a regionally concentrated ethnic group having a history of organised political
autonomy. Usually, an ethno-nationalist movement aims at seeking either complete
withdrawal from state-imposed socio-economic and political arrangements or seeking
ethnic autonomy, and in some cases, political independence and self-determination.16 In
order to achieve its objective, the ethno-nationalist movement tends to seek assistance
from their ethnic kin.17 Ganguly defines the ethnic kin state as follows:
Ethnic kin states are typically those states which border or are close to the 
secessionist region and which contain co-nationals of the secessionists with 
whom the secessionists share and maintain strong ethno-cultural and ethno­
religious bonds.18
According to King and Melvin, the kin state may establish cultural centres, consulates, 
or quasi-govemmental support institutions in foreign territories with sizeable ethnic




16 Wan Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  
Southern Thailand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Deepa Khosla, "Third World States as 
Intervenors in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Stability," Third World 
Quarterly 20, no. 6 (1999): p. 1146.
17 In this thesis, the terms ‘ethnic kin’ and ‘ethnic group ’are used interchangeably because they refer to the 
same thing. The only difference is that the term ‘ethnic kin’ specifically refers to those who are separated 
from their ethnic group by international borders.
18 For the purpose o f this thesis, the term ethno-nationalist is regarded as synonymous with the term 
‘secessionist’ and ‘insurgents’. Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South 
Asia, p. 9.
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brethren populations.19 In addition, the kin state may advocate the rights of its ethnic 
brethren in international forums, or may intercede directly with the host state to ensure 
that the cultural and political rights of the ethnic kindred are respected.20 The attitudes 
of the kin state, where the ethnic group in question is more empowered, tend to be more 
hostile toward the country where their ethnic kin are disadvantaged or persecuted.21
The reasons for such intervention however, are varied. Analysts such as Byman 
have argued that the primary motivation for states to support ‘insurgents’ (or for the 
purpose of this thesis, ethno-nationalist movements) is based on geopolitical 
considerations rather than on ideology, ethnic affinity, or religious sentiment.22 The 
geopolitical motivations include a search for regional influence as well as a desire to 
destabilise neighbourhood rivals. According to Carment, in conflicts where ethnicity is 
salient, the leaders in kin states are influenced by a combination of factors: political 
pressures from domestic constituencies, affective and instrumental motivations, and 
uneven and underdeveloped domestic political structures.23 Affective motivations 
include considerations of justice, humanitarian, ethnic and religious concerns, and the 
leadership’s ideological affinity with the ethno-nationalist organisations.24 The 
instrumental motivations for supporting an ethnic kin group, on the other hand, are 
rooted in realpolitik. In other words, an ethnic kin state may decide to support its ethnic 
brethren’s political objectives in another state in order to promote its own self-interest.25
19 Charles King and Neil J Melvin, "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in 
Eurasia," International Security 24, no. 3 (1999-2000): p. 114.
20 Ibid.
21 See, for example, Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," 
in Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management o f  Ethnic Conflict, 
ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
22 Daniel Byman, Trends in Outside Support fo r  Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 
p. xiv.
David Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics," Third World Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1994): pp. 
551-82.
24 Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination o f  Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 
1991), n. 3 p. 52.
25 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), n. 4, p. xvi.
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The conventional perception on this issue is that when ethnic kin groups are threatened 
in another state, this could lead to interstate tensions and third party intervention.
/ . 3 Rationale and A rgument
As stated by Sandler, the pursuit of Malaysia’s national security not only emphasised 
state survival, requiring such strategies as deterrence and the balance of power, but also 
ethno-national security doctrines that evolved from long-term considerations of group 
survival, which inform the nation’s mission in domestic and international relations.26 
Malaysia engages in serving above all the interest of the majority ethnic group, the 
Malays, by implementing policies that are favourable to them.27 Consequently, 
Malaysia’s security doctrines are overwhelmingly translated into policies and strategies 
that are shaped to advance the interests of the Malay ethnic group.28 Generally, each 
ethnic group tends to develop its own collective identity based on its ethnic values and 
interests instead of national ones. As mentioned earlier, by nature, ethnic identity creates 
feelings of loyalty and common interest among its members regardless of international 
boundaries.29 In other words, if the interests of their ethnic brethren are threatened, the 
ethnic group is likely to press their government to intervene.30 However, it should be 
noted that the Malaysian government has not defined which ethnic groups living outside 
its borders as its ethnic kin. The view of who is Malaysia’s ethnic kin is actually based 
on the perception by the country’s political leaders and the Malay ethnic group in 
Malaysia. These perceptions are normally based on both historical and anthropological
26 Shmuel Sandler, "Ethnonationalism and the Foreign Policy o f Nation-States," Nationalism and Ethnic 
Politics 1, no. 2 (1995): p. 263.
27 See, for example, Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Suzaina Kadir, "Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and 
Management: The Malaysian Case," in Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia, ed. W. Scott Thompson and 
Kusuma Snitwongse (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), Matthew Hoddie, Ethnic 
Realignments: A Comparative Study o f  Government Influences on Identity (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2006), pp. 87-105.
28 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 517.
29 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Chapter 4.
30 Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," pp. 89-103.
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accounts. In other words, any ethnic groups that are located outside Malaysia’s 
territories but are native to the region and have established historical links and also share 
a very akin ethnic identity with the Malays in Malaysia, can be classified as their ethnic 
kin. Following this reasoning, one would expect Malaysia to become engaged in these 
conflicts, since the country is an ethnic kin state to the Malay communities involved in 
some of the ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia.31
In fact, globally, it was a relatively common phenomenon during the 1990s for 
states to offer assistance to ethnic kin abroad. As a matter of fact, the kin states that 
extended support to insurgent groups due to ethnic ties during ethnic conflicts 
throughout the world in the 1990s are well documented.32 Throughout the decade, forty- 
four insurgencies benefited from foreign state support, and in seventeen of those cases, 
the fate of the ethnic kin was one of the key factors motivating this support. Among the 
most prominent cases is Rwanda’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire), which occurred in part to protect the Banyamulenge against Hutu 
repression. Other prominent interventions in the 1990s are related to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and include Uzbekistan’s support for Uzbeks in Afghanistan, Armenia’s 
support for Armenians in Azerbaijan, and Russia’s support for ethnic Russians in 
Moldova. Ryan reinforces this argument by showing that an ethnic kin state may decide 
to render assistance to its ethnic brethren’s movements in another state in order to
31 For a discussion on how these groups related to the Malay World/ethnic group, refer to Timothy P. 
Barnard, Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across Boundaries (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, National University o f Singapore, 2004), Clive J. Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: 
Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp. 140-41, 
Ganganath Jha, Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia and Quest fo r  Identity (New Delhi: National Book 
Organisation, 1997), p. 68.
32 Byman, Trends in Outside Support fo r  Insurgent Movements, Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: 
Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," pp. 148-63, David R. Davis, Keith Jaggers, 
and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity, Minorities and International Conflict," in Wars in the Midst o f Peace: The 
International Politics o f  Ethnic Conflict ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1997), Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," pp. 89-103.
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promote its own self-interest.33 According to Ryan, the self-interest at stake may include 
both domestic and international political considerations, short and long-term economic 
gains, and reasons of security (both internal and external security) and short and long­
term military advantages.34 In addition, Ryan has argued that external involvement by 
other states in ethnic conflict will escalate rather than de-escalate this type of conflict.35 
According to Moore and Davis, the level of conflict between states will be elevated if 
both states contain people of the same ethnic group, and one of the co-ethnics is 
politically and/or economically advantaged in its society, in comparison to its ethnic kin 
in the other state.36
On the basis of the point put forward by the scholars mentioned above, one 
would expect the involvement of the ethnic kin state in ethnic conflict to possibly 
capture Malaysia’s experience insofar as Malaysia is expected to advance the interest of 
the Malay ethnic group and its status as an ethnic kin government/state. Indeed, one 
might expect the government to be very likely to intervene in all the ethnic conflicts in 
which Malays are caught up. As it happens, Malaysia has indeed been involved in these 
conflicts. However, Malaysia’s “involvement” has neither led the conflict to deteriorate 
nor has it led to war. As such, its involvement defies the understanding and predictions 
by many scholars whereby third party involvement in ethnic conflicts tends to intensify 
these conflicts and create tensions that are likely to increase the probability of interstate 
conflict.37 Significantly, existing explanations of Malaysia’s security practice have not 
been persuasive. The scholars mentioned above only analysed the role and motivations 
for ethnic kin states in ethnic conflicts that took place in their neighbouring countries.
33 Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, n. 4, p. xvi.
34 Ibid.
35 Stephen Ryan, "Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations," Ethnic Racial Studies 13, no. 1 (1990): pp. 24- 
28.
36 Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 
174.
37 See, for example, Ibid, Ryan, "Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations," pp. 24-28.
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Their studies did not examine the role of a regional grouping, either in restraining its 
members from becoming involved in ethnic conflicts or in whether it has any influence 
over the behaviour of its member countries especially with regard to ethnic conflicts 
involving their ethnic kin.
One of the possible ways to explain Malaysia’s behaviour towards these ethnic 
conflicts - which is indeed very different from what was predicted by scholars - is the 
constraints imposed by ASEAN on Malaysia. Malaysia attaches great significance to 
ASEAN in the sense that the government has listed its commitment to ASEAN as the 
first priority of its foreign policy.38 However, despite the existence of ASEAN’s norms - 
which basically aim at preventing all member states from interfering in the domestic 
affairs of other members - Malaysia has been involved in these conflicts. The thesis 
seeks to analyse why Malaysia has been engaged in these conflicts despite ASEAN’s 
norms. Officially, Malaysia has been actively engaged with all of the respective 
governments in finding solutions to the conflict. In the case of the conflict in the Moro 
Region, for instance, Malaysia has been leading the International Monitoring Team 
(IMT) that has aimed to maintain the agreement on the cessation of hostilities between 
the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) since 22 June 2001. Malaysia was also among the core members of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM) after the Acehnese separatist movement agreed to accept a 
political settlement with the Indonesian government on 15 August 2005. The AMM was 
in Aceh until December 2006. In addition, Malaysia has also been actively approached
38 See, for instance; Mahathir Mohamad, Reflections on ,4S£!<4ATSubang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications (M) 
Sdn Bhd, 2004), Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: 
Islamic Brotherhood Versus National Interests," in Malaysia and the Islamic World, ed. Baginda Abdul 
Razak Abdullah (London: Asean Academic Press, 2004), pp. 218-19.
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by the Thai government to attain a peaceful resolution to the conflict in southern 
Thailand.39
The thesis also seeks to examine whether there are any other forms of support 
that Malaysia has offered to the Malays in these conflict areas in addition to those 
mentioned above. However, it should be noted that rather than analysing the impact of 
Malaysia’s support on security policy, as influenced by the ethnic factor, the thesis 
examines how the ethnic factor has shaped Malaysia’s actual security practice toward 
the ethno-nationalist movements in the region. The reason for this is that although 
Malaysia has officially identified the objectives of its foreign policy and the ways in 
which the country is supposed to achieve these policies, the federal government in Kuala 
Lumpur, on the other hand, does not have any officially documented security policy.40 
The thesis argues that, despite being a member of ASEAN, where members are expected 
not to “interfere” in other member states’ domestic affairs, Malaysia somehow has 
played some role in assisting the Malay ethnic kin located in neighbouring countries. 
The various form of assistance extended to them are the derivative of the Malaysian 
government’s concern about their societal security (physical survival, economic well­
being and in some instances their political rights in their homeland). However, such 
assistance has not resulted in interstate armed conflict between Malaysia and all of its 
neighbouring countries.
39 See, for instance; "KL W illing to Help in Talks with Thai Rebels'" Straits Times Interactive, 23 March 
2007 , Ian Storey, "Malaysia's Role in Thailand's Southern Insurgency," Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 5 
(2007), "Thai PM Seeks Peaceful End to Insurgency," Straits Times Interactive 19 October 2006, "Thai 
PM Urges Malaysians to Invest in Troubled South," The Nation, 24 February 2007.
40 Interview with the Director General, National Security Division, Prime Minister’s Department, Dato’ 
Muhammad Hatta Abdul Aziz, 12 March 2007.
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1.4 Literature Review
Within the existing literature on Malaysia’s position on the ethnic conflicts involving the 
Malay ethnic group in the region, there are primarily two strands of argument. The first 
argues that since movements in all the three respective countries are religiously 
motivated, and the Malays in Malaysia share a sense of common religion with the 
members of these movements, Malaysia has offered some assistance.41 However, these 
forms of assistance are said to be limited more to welfare-oriented programmes rather 
than expressing political concern.42 By contrast, the second argument claims that 
although the Malaysian government is said to sympathise with its fellow Malays, who 
have separatist leanings in neighbouring countries, their existence and activities are 
unable to divert Malaysian foreign policy from the promotion of regionalism through 
ASEAN.43 In other words, the argument is that, for Malaysia, the most important 
concern is to secure cordial bilateral and multilateral relations with all the individual 
ASEAN member states, including the three countries chosen as case studies here 
(Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines). This position is supported by Yegar, who 
argues that due to the sensitive inter-ethnic relations that happen to be characteristic of 
the relationships between many ASEAN members, all member states are expected to 
favour the maintenance of a rigorous territorial status quo, as the region would become
41 See, for example, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability o f  
Southeast Asia (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), p. 82, Baiq Wardhani, "External Support for Liberation 
Movements in Aceh and Papua" (paper presented at the 15th Biennial Conference o f the Asian Studies 
Association o f Australia, Canberra, 29 June - 2 July 2004), Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations 
in Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p. 
34.
42 Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: Islamic Brotherhood Versus National 
Interests," p. 217.
43 See, for example, David Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia 
Experience," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 4 (1995): p. 16, Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The 
Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern Thailand, p. 202, Guy J. Pauker, "Government 
Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination o f Failures and Their 
Implications for the Future," in Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun 
(Singapore: Institute o f  South East Asian Studies, 1985), p. 90, Weatherbee, International Relations in 
Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy, p. 34.
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unstable if member countries accepted the principle of ethnic self-determination to be 
“practised” in the region.44
ASEAN is a regional grouping that was formed with the signing of the Bangkok 
Declaration in August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand.45 ASEAN was established with the aim of creating a loose structure of 
regional cooperation that would help to prevent or at least contain tensions and conflicts 
among the member states, without infringing member states’ national sovereignty. 
Among the main objectives of ASEAN are the enhancement of the social, economic, 
and political stability and the cohesion of its member states.46 As a member of ASEAN, 
Malaysia is a signatory of the regional grouping’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC). The Treaty stipulates that member countries “shall not, in any manner or form, 
participate in any activity, which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic 
stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of another member.”47 Any unfavourable 
policies towards them will be perceived as an act that violates the treaty. In fact, one of 
the key founding principles of ASEAN is that of non-interference in domestic affairs by 
outside powers, including even (or especially) close neighbours.48
As outlined by Haacke, ASEAN operates in such a way that all of its member 
states adhere to the six main norms of the organisation which are: sovereign equality; 
the non-recourse to use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict; non-interference
44 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002),
p. 166.
45 Currently, ASEAN has 10 members after the admission o f Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar, as well as two countries with observer status (Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea).
46 William T. Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990), p. 37.
47 See Article lOto 15 in the Text ofthe ASEAN Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation (TAC), Bali, 1976. For 
further detail discussion, see Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance o f Power in ASEAN and 
the ARF (London: Routledge, 2003), Jtirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, 
Development and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
48 Bjom Moller, Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia (Vermont: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 1998), p. 83.
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and non-intervention; the non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral 
conflict between members, quiet diplomacy; mutual respect and tolerance.49 In other 
words, ASEAN should be regarded as a form of cooperative security because the 
organisation “has promoted norms and principles leading to an intramural code of 
conduct and established a mechanism for conflict management based on conflict 
avoidance rather than resolution.”50 In fact, ASEAN can be considered as the most 
successful Third World regional organisation because it has developed a tangible set of 
informal but effective procedures for achieving continuity in policy behaviour by the 
leaders of its respective member-states and has been built on shared visions and 
expectations related to regional security.5' The success of ASEAN can be proven by 
analysing the ability of the organisation to ensure that member countries have not settled 
their disputes by military force since the organisation was created.
Furthermore, most of the members of ASEAN, especially Malaysia, perceive 
ASEAN as “a form of political defence for constraining a potential menacing 
neighbour”.52 Malaysia believes that the existence of ASEAN has encouraged patterns 
of behaviour that reduce risks to security by enhancing multilateral relations as well as 
fostering habits of open dialogue on political and security matters including establishing 
confidence building measures. Consequently, Malaysia has made ASEAN the main 
priority in its foreign policy.53 In fact, Weatherbee argues that at the state-to-state level, 
the Malaysian government has acted properly by denying any official interference in the
49 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects, p. 1.
50 Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance o f  Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p. 39.
51 Tow, Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World, p. 14.
52 One o f the original reasons that contributed to the establishment o f ASEAN was political reconciliation 
between Malaysia and Indonesia. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance o f  Power in ASEAN 
and the ARF, p. 55, Hari Singh, "Malaysia’s National Security: Rhetoric and Substance," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2001).
53 See, for instance, Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: Islamic Brotherhood 
Versus National Interests," p. 217.
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affairs of its ASEAN partners.54 However, at the same time, as in many developing 
countries, several ‘irreducible identities’ such as religion and ethnic group may spur 
citizen’s interest in the formulation of the foreign policy making of their country.55 
When a state loses its ability to regulate an ethnic conflict, the problem can become a 
regional security dilemma because it invites external intervention. In this context, this 
thesis will analyse to what extent ASEAN has shaped the behaviour of Malaysia when it 
comes to the issue of ethnic conflict in the region. This is an important question 
because, although Malaysia is an active member of ASEAN, the majority of the 
Malaysian population share the same ethnic identity with those facing ethnic conflicts in 
several ASEAN member states. Also, many of these states have become suspicious of 
Malaysia’s role in these conflicts. In short, with respect to ASEAN, this thesis will 
analyse whether this regional organisation has imposed any constraint on Malaysia’s 
security practice towards these conflict or whether Malaysia has circumvented the 
hindrance by securing the Malay interests in these areas under the ASEAN framework 
itself.
The following sub-sections will briefly illustrate the bilateral relations between 
Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines respectively, especially the affect 
the ethno-nationalist movements in these countries have had on the bilateral relations 
with Malaysia.
Malaysia’s Bilateral Relations with Thailand
Both Thailand and Malaysia are strong supporters of ASEAN and bilateral relations 
between the two states remain cordial. In fact, historically, the good level of 
cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok led the Communist Party of Malaya to
54 Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy, p. 34.
55 Steven Friedman, "The Forgotten Sovereign: Citizens, States and Foreign Policy in the South," in 
Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes, ed. 
Maurice A. East and Justin Robertson (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 241.
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end its insurgency in 1989.56 However, despite the cementing of bilateral relations and 
the importance of ASEAN for both parties, mutual suspicions over the problems in 
Southern Thailand have been an enduring source of bilateral friction between the 
governments.57 The lasting tensions between these two countries stem partially from 
Thailand’s repeated condemnation of Malaysia for its lack of assistance in suppressing 
Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations and its failure to prevent sympathetic 
elements in Malaysia from extending support to the Thais of ethnic Malay origin across 
the border.58 These tensions persist, although it was reported that there is a “quid pro 
quo” understanding between Thailand and Malaysia, whereby the former would deny 
sanctuary to communist guerrillas and the latter would not support the irredentist cause 
of elements of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations to "reunite" with 
Malaysia.59 In other words, both countries are obliged to respect each other's territorial 
integrity, a principle that was to become a part of ASEAN norms. At the same time, it 
should also be noted that there is an argument according to which Thailand’s 
cooperation with Malaysia has been based on Kuala Lumpur’s willingness to withhold 
support for Thai Muslim secessionists in southern Thailand.60 This argument is 
substantiated by a few scholars who argue that although many Malaysians sympathise 
with the Thais of ethnic Malay origin and have also supported political interference of
56 See, for example, Saroja D. Dorairajoo, "Violence in the South o f Thailand," Inter-Asia Cultural 
Studies 5, no. 3 (2004).
57 For detailed discussion on how the ethnic conflict in southern Thailand had affected Malaysia-Thailand 
bilateral relations, see, Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia 
Experience.", Surin Pitsuwan, "The Ethnic Background o f Issues Affecting Bilateral Relations between 
Malaysia and Thailand," in Ethnicities and Nations: Processes o f  Inter-Ethnic Relations in Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, ed. S. J. Tambiah, Remo Guidieri, and Francesco Pellizzi (Houston: 
University o f Texas Press, 1988).
58 See, for example, Joseph Chinyong Liow, "The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an 
Understanding o f Domestic and International Dimensions," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), 
Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 175, Yegar, Between 
Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and 
Western Burma/Myanmar,^. 166.
59 Anthony L Smith, "Trouble in Thailand's Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global Terrorism," Asia- 
Pacific Security Studies 3, no. 10 (2004): p. 2.
60 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 328.
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their country in the conflict, the Malaysian government has not offered any tangible 
support to the Southern Thailand insurgents.61 In addition, Storey has argued that since 
the Malaysian government worries about the possibility of the spillover effect of the 
conflict in Southern Thailand to the country and the risk of regional terrorist groups such 
as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) becoming central to the conflict, the Malaysian government 
does not support the Thai Malays’ insurgency.62
Malaysia’s Bilateral Relations with Indonesia
In 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement ending the state of “Konfrontasi ” 
(confrontation) between the two countries that had lasted from 1963 - 1965.63 For 
ideological and domestic political reasons, President Sukamo objected to Sabah and 
Sarawak’s merger with Malaya in 1963 and sought to prevent this “neo-colonist plot” by 
military force that involved Indonesian commandos in infiltration, sabotage and terrorist 
attacks in Malaysia.64 A year after the ending of konfrontasi, ASEAN was established. 
Ever since then, bilateral relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have often been 
characterised as ‘special’ due to similarities based on common roots of racial grouping, 
Islam and a common history.65 The basis of this ‘special’ relationship can be traced to 
the Indo-Malay history written by nationalist ideologues and local historians that attempt
61 Aruna Gopinath, "International Aspects o f the Thai Muslim and Philippine Moro Issues: A Comparative 
Study," in Internationalization o f  Ethnic Conflict, ed. R. J. May and K. M. de Silva (London: Pinter, 
1991), p. 139, S. P Harish, "Changing Conflict Identities: The Case o f the Southern Thailand Discord," in 
IDSS Working Paper Series (Singapore: 2006), p. 15, Andrew T. H. Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the 
Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 15.
62 Storey, "Malaysia's Role in Thailand's Southern Insurgency," pp. 7-10.
63 For detailed discussions on Konfrontasi, see, J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia 
Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis o f  
Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia, 1945-1965 (Bathurst [N.S.W.]: Crawford House 
Publishing, 1997).
64 For discussions on this issue, see, Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, 
Development and Prospects, pp. 36-38,40-43, Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East 
Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation o f  Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).
65 A1 Baroto, "Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives," 
Indonesia Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1993).
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to highlight commonalities of race, ethnicity, and culture from a historical vantage 
point.66 However, although the notion of kinship that often revolves around the idea of 
‘blood brotherhood’ has been a prominent feature in the discourse of bilateral relations 
of the two countries,67 the existence of the Acehnese ethno-nationalist movement has 
caused occasional irritations in Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur relations. In fact, it was reported 
that Indonesia has long harboured suspicions that Malaysia has discreetly supported the 
Acehnese ethno-nationalist organisation.68 This was primarily due to Malaysia’s 
unwillingness to launch crackdowns on Acehnese refugees, or to support directly the 
Indonesian government over Aceh despite repeated pledges by Malaysian government 
authorities that the country has not supported the cause of the Acehnese ethno- 
nationalist movement. A number of scholars have reflected on the phenomenon 
whereby the Acehnese were able to seek refuge in Malaysia. However, while most of 
them have not specified why the Acehnese were able to do so,69 there are some who 
have highlighted religion as a factor. For instance, Tan has argued that, “Malaysia’s 
refusal to surrender those accused of rebelling against the Indonesian government belied 
considerable sympathy in Malaysia for its Acehnese co-religionists”.70 Barber shares the 
same view when he argues that Malaysia has been made by the Acehnese as their place 
for sanctuary due to the “history of religious links” with the Malay Peninsula.71
66 Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Politics o f  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 2.
67 Ibid.
68 N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Regional Strategic and Political 
Studies Programme, Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 31.
69 See, for example, Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  Peace in 
Aceh? (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2005), Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," 
Third World Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2001).
70 Andrew T. H. Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and 
Implications," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (2000): p. 278.
71 Richard Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh 
(Bangkok: Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), 2000), p. 40. Kingsbury 
also claims that the Acehnese have traditionally close links with their “Muslim counterparts” on the Malay 
Peninsula. Damien Kingsbury, The Politics o f Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 152.
30
Malaysia’s Bilateral Relations with the Philippines
In the past, territorial disputes between the two countries have been the most serious 
sources of bilateral tension between Malaysia and the Philippines. The Philippines, 
during the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal, claimed Sabah in 1962, 
when it learned that Sabah was to become part of the Malaysian federation.72 The claim 
resulted in the abrogation of diplomatic relations between the two countries from 1963- 
1966. Historically, the Sultan of Sulu, Mohammed Jamalul Alam, leased Sabah to 
Messrs. Overbeck and Dent, both British nationals, on 22 June 1878. According to the 
lease agreement, both of them were required to make some payment of money annually 
“till the end of time,” for the lease. In fact, the Malaysian government still adheres to its 
financial obligations to the Sulu heirs for the lease of Sabah because Malaysia made a 
distinction between sovereignty and proprietary rights over the state.73 In other words, 
while Malaysia acknowledges that the Sulu Sultanate has the proprietary rights over 
Sabah, it claims sovereignty over Sabah.74 Sabah joined the Malaysian Federation in 
1963 together with Sarawak after Britain decided to relinquish its right over both states 
to Malaysia, and this decision was supported by international bodies such as the United 
Nations.75 In addition, the international community has recognised Sabah as part of 
Malaysia.76 In fact, ASEAN had facilitated reconciliation between the two countries
72 Paridah Abdul Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue o f  
Sabah," Asian Survey 32, no. 6 (1992): p. 554, Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a 
New World, p. 329.
73 Interview with Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar, 21 December 
2006. See, for example, Abdul Samad and Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of 
Sabah," p. 567, Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Aristocrats o f  the Malay Race: A History ofthe Bangsa Moro in 
the Philippines (Marawi City: N.A. Marohomsalic, 2001), p. 161.
74 Interview with Syed Jaafar Albar.
75 For a more detailed explanation, see, Frances L Stamer, "Malaysia and the North Borneo Territories," 
Asian Survey 3, no. 11 (1963): pp. 513-34.
76 For example, the International Court o f Justice awarded Sipadan and Ligatan islands near Sabah to 
Malaysia at the end o f 2002. The decision was made based on the “effective occupation” displayed by 
Great Britain and the absence o f any other superior title. The Philippines had intervened in the 
proceedings on the basis o f its claim to Northern Borneo, but the Court turned down its request in early 
2001 .
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mandating President Suharto of Indonesia to play the role of third party mediator 
seeking to move Kuala Lumpur and Manila toward a consensus.77
Although the claim to Sabah has not been resolved, both countries seem to be 
cooperating well with each other. For instance, Malaysia is said to have played an 
instrumental role in the signing of the peace agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and one of the key Moro ethno-nationalist 
organisations in 1996 (the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front - MNLF), and is currently 
sponsoring the peace talks between the GRP and another Moro ethno-nationalist 
organisation (the Moro Islamic Liberation Front -  MILF). However, it should be noted 
that similar to the case in Southern Thailand and Aceh, the ethnic conflict in the Moro 
region has also become one of the biggest irritants in the relationship between Malaysia 
and the Philippines. This is mainly brought about by the fact that although Malaysia 
acknowledges that the conflict in the Moro region is a domestic affair of the Philippines, 
the Malaysian government has repeatedly expressed concerns over the Moros’ 
predicament, especially during the height of the conflict in the 1970s.78 In addition, 
there were also accusations that the Malaysian government had indeed supported both 
the key Moro ethno-nationalist organisations against the Philippine government. Some 
scholars have sought to explain the reasons why Malaysia or, in some cases, Malaysian 
citizens offer assistance or sympathise with the Moros. Rabasa, for instance, claims that 
Malaysia is supporting the Moros mainly because turning against “co-religionists” in the 
Southern Philippines would be a very unpopular government decision.79 This is mainly
77 Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, p. 329.
78 Mohamad Abu Bakar, "Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Three Decades (1957-1987)," in 
Malaysia and the Islamic World, ed. Baginda Abdul Razak Abdullah (London: Asean Academic Press, 
2004), p. 24, "Muslim in Southern Philippines," Foreign Affairs Malaysia 7, no. 2 (1974): p. 148, Lela 
Gamer Noble, "Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations," Asian Survey 15, no. 5 (1975): p. 462.
79 Rabasa and Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability o f  Southeast Asia, p. 82.
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because the Moro cause has been seen as legitimate in Muslim circles in Malaysia.80 
However, there is also an argument that claims that although the Moros have looked to 
Malaysia as a possible source of support, for the regional stability of Southeast Asia, the 
ASEAN norms reinforce the Malaysian government’s determination to refrain from 
activities that could cause conflicts with the Philippines.81
1.4.1 The Limitations of the Literature
By adhering fully to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, Malaysia would be 
expected not to engage in any direct activities that are perceived as interfering in another 
ASEAN member’s internal affairs, as this could jeopardise the cooperation of the 
regional grouping. However, if this is the case, how can one explain the fact that in 
addition to the ordinary members, a number of key leaders of the Acehnese, Thai Malay 
and Moro ethno nationalist organisations have been able to find refuge in Malaysia? In 
addition, questions also arise concerning the ability of these movements to carry out 
their activities for such long periods and the possibilities of their receiving external 
assistance - especially from their ethnic kin state. However, despite offering assistance 
to its ethnic kin in the manner expected of an ethnic kin state, there have been no 
incidences of interstate military conflict involving Malaysia and any of these three 
countries. This phenomenon has not been explained by most of the analysts who have 
previously examined the possible outcomes resulting from intervention by an ethnic kin 
state. In addition, so far there is no comparative case study conducted that links all of 
these three ethnic conflicts with Malaysia’s external security practice.
80 T an, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago; Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 247.
81 Pauker, "Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination 
o f Failures and Their Implications for the Future," p. 90.
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In addition, most scholars classify all the ethno-nationalist movements in 
neighbouring Malaysia as religiously motivated. Since the Malays in Malaysia are 
Muslims, these scholars argue that the Malays have rendered assistance to the other 
Malays in the conflict areas based on religious grounds. To some extent, the analyses 
made have some validity, mainly due to the fact that those who are involved in separatist 
movements in Southern Thailand and the Moro Region are indeed in conflict with non- 
Muslims. However, this argument cannot be applied to the case of the Acehnese 
movement because here the conflict is not with non-Muslims, given that Indonesia is 
recognised as the state with the largest Muslim population in the world. In other words, 
there are other elements besides common religious faith that link the Malays in Malaysia 
to the Acehnese. In fact, this thesis argues that most of the key separatist organisations 
in these conflict areas are not religiously motivated but are instead motivated by their 
distinct ethnic identity. In other words, the thesis argues that Malaysian assistance, both 
official and unofficial provided by state and non-state actors, have not been motivated 
solely by religious considerations. Instead, such assistance is primarily the consequence 
of the common ethnic identity between the Malays in Malaysia and their ethnic kin in 
the conflict areas.
1.5 Methodology
The main methodological approach of this research is based on a comparative study. 
The ethnic conflicts in Southern Thailand, Aceh, Indonesia, and the Moro Region are 
selected as case studies. There are two main reasons for choosing these particular cases. 
First, the conflicts in these areas involve people who are ethnically very close to the 
Malaysian Malays. Second, the aforementioned three ethnic conflicts are in effect the 
only conflicts involving the Malay ethnic group in South East Asia. Therefore, the
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focus of the thesis is comprehensive, especially when it comes to explaining the 
influence of ethnic factors in Malaysia’s security practice. In order to ensure that a 
comprehensive view of the voices of the various Malay ethno-nationalist 
organisations/movements is taken into account in the research; interviews were also held 
with the key leaders of the major ethno-nationalist/separatist movements. The 
interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Malaysia, the Philippines and Sweden. 
The main purpose for the fieldwork in Sweden was to hold discussions with key leaders 
of the ethno-nationalist organisations from Aceh and Southern Thailand who are now 
living in exile there. The fieldwork took the form of interviews, which were primarily 
semi-structured. In Malaysia, interviews were conducted with Malaysian government 
officials, such as the former Prime Minister, the current Foreign Minister and senior 
government officers dealing with both security and foreign policy issues, including 
officials from the National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Department. 
Interviews and discussions were also carried out with academics from the National 
University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia -  UKM) and with government 
officials from the Philippines and Thailand.
These interviews constitute valuable primary sources on Malaysia’s assistance 
specifically towards the Malays in the region and the ethno-nationalist movements in 
general. The thesis is also supplemented by the examination and analysis of secondary 
sources including documents from the governments, international development 
organisations and civil society, and international conferences. The relevant information, 
particularly on the Malaysian government’s assistance to the Malays in these conflict 
areas, could not be gathered from the government officials although interviews were 
also conducted with them. This is primarily because the government’s “official policy”
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is that Malaysia adheres fully to the norm of non-intervention as prescribed by 
ASEAN.82
There is perhaps one main limitation of this research. The research only focused 
on a very limited number of actors, i.e. the Malaysian government and the main Malay 
opposition party, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Partai Islam SeMalaysia - PAS) and 
also to some extent, the Malaysian-based Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Although the thesis also looked at other actors such as the armed forces, the police and 
the diaspora communities, the thesis does not explore in extensive detail their role in 
influencing Malaysia’s security practice towards these conflicts. The thesis does not 
analyse the attitude of the armed forces and the police primarily because both of these 
forces operate as part of the government agencies whose attitude towards the conflict 
will be in conformity with the government’s stance. In addition, both of these - 
especially the armed forces and in some measure the police - are simply the main 
agencies that implement the government’s security policy. In other words, their actions 
with respect to these ethnic conflicts are actually derives from the government’s 
instructions. With respect to the diaspora communities, the thesis does not examine the 
level of pressure that they have on influencing the government’s security practice 
towards all the respective conflicts mainly because it is rather difficult to distinguish 
them from the rest of the Malays in Malaysia. All of these diaspora communities in 
Malaysia are citizens of the country and they are actually categorised as belonging to the 
Malay ethnic group. Chapter 3 will explain in detail the characteristics of Malays in 
Malaysia.
82 It should be noted that information on this issue are classified as secret and government officials are not 
allowed to disclose any o f this information because o f the Official Secret Act (OSA).
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1.6 Thesis Structure
The following 6 chapters are organised as follows. Given the general observations made 
above, the following chapter presents in detail the analytical framework by laying down 
the definitions of the key concepts and terms used in the thesis. Specifically, Chapter 2 
explores the relationship between national security, ethnic politics and foreign policy. 
The chapter briefly looks at the origins, development and meaning of national security. 
In addition, the chapter also reviews the concept of foreign policy as perceived by both 
the developed and the developing countries and examines the definition of ethnicity and 
its formation. Finally, the chapter analyses the theory of ethnic politics and foreign 
policy. Chapter 3 analyses Malaysia’s conception of national security. This chapter 
analyses the formation and elite reconstruction of the Malay identity and examines how 
ethnicity informs the country’s internal security practice. The chapter also illustrates 
how the Malaysian government has protected the interests of the Malay ethnic group in 
the country against foreign threat.
Chapter 4 marks the first of the three chapters that looks specifically at 
Malaysia’s external security practice by analysing the nature of ethnic ties that exist 
between the Malays in Malaysia and those residing in southern Thailand, Aceh and in 
the Moro Region and examining whether the Malaysian government has been concerned 
about their societal security. The first case study, discussed in Chapter 4, analyses the 
conflict in Southern Thailand. The second, examined in Chapter 5, addresses the 
conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. Finally, Chapter 6 explores Malaysia’s stance towards the 
conflict in the Moro Region of the Philippines. All of the case study chapters offer a 
brief historical overview of the Thai Malay (Chapter 4), Acehnese (Chapter 5) and the 
Moro ethnic groups (Chapter 6) in their respective countries and also analyses their 
ethnic ties with the Malays in Malaysia.
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Moreover, all the respective case study chapters also discuss the ethno- 
nationalist movements operating there and focus particularly on the relations that these 
movements have with Malaysia. Above all, however, these cases examine in 
considerable depth the significance of the ethnic factor in shaping Malaysia’s security 
perceptions towards these conflicts. In addition, these chapters analyse how the ethnic 
conflicts affect Malaysia’s bilateral relations with all the respective countries. In this 
context, the three chapters also examine the influence of ASEAN norms on Malaysia’s 
approach towards the conflicts in the three case studies. Chapter 7 summarises the major 
findings of this study and evaluates the differences and the similarities in terms of 
Malaysia’s security practice towards the ethno-nationalist conflicts involving the Malays 
in the region.
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Chapter 2: Ethnic Politics and Foreign Policy
Introduction
The central theme of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between national security, 
ethnic politics and foreign policy. Insights of the literature on ethnic politics are 
particularly valuable for the development of the analytical framework applied in this 
thesis, given that in Malaysia almost all domestic policies have been influenced by the 
ethnic factor. This chapter therefore examines the theory of ethnic politics and foreign 
policy. The chapter is divided into five major sections. The first section [2.1] briefly 
reviews the origins, development and concept of security and also the notion of societal 
security.1 Rather than analysing all the different schools of thought on security, this 
section only focuses on conceptions of security in the western or western-influenced 
literature (particularly by the Realist theorists) and the developing countries/Third 
World. In general, the developing countries’ conceptions of security stand in contrast to 
the western countries. The second section [2.2] reviews how both the western countries 
and the Third World countries perceive the concept of foreign policy. The third section 
[2.3] explores the meaning and the definition of ethnicity and the formation of ethnic 
identity. Against the backdrop of these definitions and illustrations, the section defines 
the concept of ethnic politics. The fourth section [2.4] summarises the different 
perspectives of ethnic separatism and relates the issue to the concept of ethnic kinship. 
Finally, this section examines the basic assumptions that evolve around the theory of 
ethnic politics and foreign policy.
1 For detailed analysis, see, Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational 
Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de 
Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), Peter J. 
Katzenstein, The Culture o f  National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996).
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2.1 National Security
National security has been perceived by almost all sovereign countries as the utmost 
issue in their national agendas. However, there is no agreement on a single definition of 
the concept. As several scholarly investigations of the usefulness of the national 
security concept have indicated, the phenomenon of security is hardly precise. The term 
“security” is a contested concept, i.e. there is no universally accepted definition.2 
According to Alagappa, the contestation relates to the components relative to security 
such as the referent, the core values, the type and the nature of threats, and the approach 
to security.3 In short, the lack of agreement on the nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation adds more complexity to an already ambiguous and complex subject; it is 
one of the reasons why according to Al-Mashat, “national security theory is less 
advanced and less coherent than other areas of the theory of International Relations”.4
2.1.1 Concept of National Security
A group of Americans who served in the U.S. military during World War II coined the 
term national security.5 Consequently, when they first introduced the term, the concept 
evolved around American circumstances whereby the Soviet military threat was 
perceived as the primary threat to national security, especially during the height of the 
Cold War era. Therefore, when the term ‘national security’ was first introduced, it did 
not include a domestic component and only referred to the assessment of external threats
2 See, for example, Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, p. 28, Barry 
Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security in the Post-Cold War Era (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 7, Robert Mandel, The Changing Face o f  National Security: A 
Conceptual Analysis (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 16, Caroline Thomas, "Third World 
Security," in International Security in the Modem World, ed. Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (New 
York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p. 93.
3 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, p. 28.
4 Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 
pp. 17-19.
Stephen Philip Cohen, "Leadership and the Management o f National Security: An Overview," in 
Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience, ed. Mohammed Ayoob 
and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 29-56.
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to the state and the marshalling of various instruments of power to counter those threats.6 
This particular interpretation of national security has become the main perspective, 
especially among Realists (traditionalist). According to the latter, there are two major 
assumptions of what constitutes a threat to national security. First, threats to a state’s 
security principally arise from outside its borders, and second, these threats are 
primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military response if 
the security of the target state is to be preserved.7
In fact, the concept of security in International Relations, up to the end of the
1980s, was in essence a product of the Realist School. The concept was given its classic
formulation in 1943 by Walter Lippmann. According to Lippmann;
A state is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to 
sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to 
maintain them by victory in such war.8
The “core values” include in particular the survival of a state’s inhabitants, the survival 
of a state itself as a sovereign and territorial entity, economic welfare, the preservation 
of its socio-political institutions, ideology and culture, and national unity.9 These values 
are referred to as the “core values” mainly because these are the values that states would 
be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to preserve.10 Values are also emphasised by 
Wolfers when he defines security as the “protection of values previously acquired.”11 In 
addition, Wolfers classifies two different views; namely the objective and the subjective 
view. According to him, in the objective view, security “measures the absence of threats
6 Ibid.
7 For detailed analysis o f the traditional conception o f national security, see, Mohammed Ayoob, "The 
New-Old Disorder in the Third World," in The United Nations and Civil Wars, ed. Thomas G. Weiss 
(Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 13-30, Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon,National 
Security in the Third World: The Management o f  Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 
1988), pp. 277-80.
8 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield o f  the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p. 51.
9 Holsti, International Politics: A Framework fo r Analysis, pp. 124-27.
10 Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management o f  Internal and External 
Threats, p. 2.
11 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 147-65.
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to acquired values” whereas in the subjective view, security is “the absence of fear that 
such values will be attacked”.12 These perceptions have made the concept of security 
synonymous with the protection of a state’s vital interests and core values from external 
threats. As a result, the dominant strands of security thinking (in their many variations) 
define the concept of security in external or outward-directed terms that consequently 
has led to the state as the commonly accepted unit of analysis in International 
Relations.13
However, after the Cold War, the perceptions of what needs to be protected have 
been broadened. Many scholars have reached a broad consensus that with the end of 
the Cold War came a shift in focus of national security to a multidimensional one.14 
Accordingly, there are numerous suggestions that the security of a nation, which was 
once devoted to coping with external military threats, now incorporates non-military 
threats such as domestic poverty, educational crisis, industrial competitiveness, drug 
trafficking, crime, international migration, environmental hazards, resource shortages, 
global poverty, and so on.15 In general, most of the diverse contributions to the debate 
on ‘new thinking on security’ can be classified in one of three themes. The first theme 
attempts to broaden the conception of security from simply safeguarding the state’s core 
values from outside threats to including a wider range of potential ‘threats’ ranging from 
economic and environmental to human rights or migration.16 The second theme
12 Ibid., p. 150.
13 Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic o f the Third World," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991).
14 Tobias Debiel, "Human Security: More Than Just a Good Idea? Comments on the Need for an 
Integrated Security Concept" (paper presented at the BICC 10-year Anniversary Conference Promoting 
Security: But How and For Whom?, Haus der Geschichte, Bonn, 1-4 April 2004).
15 See Graham T. Allison et al., Rethinking America’s Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
16 Inter alia, see, Keith Krause, "Theorizing Security, State Formation and the Third World' in the Post- 
Cold War World," Review o f  International Studies, no. 24 (1998): pp. 125-36, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 
"Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989): pp. 162-77, Theodore Moran, "International 
Economics and National Security," Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5 (1990/1): pp. 74-90, Richard Ullman, 
"Redefining Security," International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): pp. 129-53, Myron Weiner, "Security, 
Stability and International Migration," International Security 17, no. 3 (1992/3): pp. 91-126.
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embraces attempts to deepen the agenda beyond its state-centric focus by moving either 
down to the level of individual or human security, or up to the level of international or 
global security (with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points).17 
The third theme has remained within a state-centric approach, but deploys diverse terms 
(e.g. common, cooperative, comprehensive) as modifiers to ‘security’ in order to assess 
different multilateral forms of interstate security cooperation.18 One example is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum that includes ASEAN’s dialogue partners such as the EU, the 
United States, Japan, China, Australia and Russia, and aims to discuss security issues 
within the Asia-Pacific region.19
Despite efforts to expand the concept of security, there is no existing theory that 
can capture and explain every aspect of the practice of security in Asia, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore, this thesis synthesises multiple theories from the fields of 
International Relations and Politics to address the central research question. Alagappa, 
for instance, has argued that research on Asian security practice must be more broad- 
based, thereby integrating history, culture, economics, domestic politics, and 
international politics, than the concept of security used in the developed world (i.e. 
western countries).20 In addition, according to Ayoob, ‘the three major characteristics of 
the concept of state security as developed in the western literature namely its external 
orientation, its strong link with systemic security, and its binding ties with the security 
of the two major alliance blocs during the Cold War, have meant that the explanatory
17 Contributions to this include: Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security in 
the Post-Cold War Era, United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 1994," 
(New York: 1994), Waever, "Societal Security: The Concept," pp. 17-40.
18 For overview, see, David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security," The Pacific 
Review 7, no. 1 (1994): pp. 1-15.
19 For detailed discussion o f the ARF, see, Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance o f  Power in 
ASEAN and the ARF.
20 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences.
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power of the concept has been vastly reduced when applied to Third World context’.21 
Therefore, he proposed that ‘security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities 
(both internal and external) that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken 
state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes’.22 While an 
external threat is normally best understood as a threat that originates from outside the 
country’s borders and is normally military in nature and consequently requires a military 
response, internal threats, on the other hand, are most of the time derived from within a 
state’s borders. The kind of response towards the internal threat normally depends on 
what kind of values are at risk. For example, if a country’s social harmony is at risk due 
to grievances over distributive justice, the government may tackle the issue by 
formulating a new policy that aims to address the issue.
Since the central topic of this thesis is Malaysia’s security practice, it will adopt 
a concept of national security that is more appropriate to the Third World or a 
developing country’s situation.23 The term ‘Third World’,24 originally coined by 
Frenchmen Alfred Sauvy in 1952, is supposed to refer to a bloc of countries. Despite 
the diversity of its members, the bloc is recognised as sharing enough common 
characteristics to merit being considered as a group.25 The common characteristics and 
similarities that the Third World countries share are: the experience of conquest and 
domination, a particular sort of economic development, a fractured social order, and
21 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 
International System , Emerging Global Issues (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 9.
23 In this chapter, the terms Third World’, ‘developing country’, ‘small state’, and ‘new states’ are used 
interchangeably mainly due to the fact the Malaysia satisfies all the characteristics o f the term. However, 
it should also be noted that there is literature that argues that Malaysia is a middle power. See, for 
example, Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
24 For a discussion o f the meaning o f the term ‘Third World’ see, Joseph Love, "Third World: A Response 
to Professor Worsley," Third World Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1980), L Wolf-Phillips, "Why Third World?," 
Third World Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1979), P Worsley, "How Many Worlds?," Third World Quarterly 1 
(1979).
25 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, The Foreign Policies o f  the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual 
Frameworks (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003), p. 4.
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extreme weakness vis-a-vis the developed world on most indices of economic, military 
or technological capabilities.26 According to Collins, the term “Third World” is not 
purely an economic one relating to issues of underdevelopment, resource scarcity and 
poverty, but also refers to the primacy of internal threats to security and the dependence 
on external actions for security guarantees.27 The term has also come to be used 
interchangeably with terms such as ‘South’, ‘developing countries’ and ‘underdeveloped 
countries’.28 Although Malaysia is an emerging market, it still shares important 
characteristics of a Third World country. In addition, the concept of national security in 
developing countries fits better for Malaysia than the traditional concepts. Therefore, 
the following section analyses in more detail how the Third World countries conceive 
national security.
2.1.2 National Security in the Developing Countries
According to Azar and Moon, since the traditional concept of national security of a
nation state is largely founded on the historical evolution of the modem western state
system,29 the concept is based on the aggregation of homogenous individual securities.30
This has led to the understanding that national security is security for a nation-state,
which is composed of citizens who share a common destiny through extended nation
building and political socialisation.31 However, this perception is inapplicable to many
developing countries. This is mainly because the “national security” policy makers in
the developing countries have to look inward towards domestic threats and the mixture
of domestic vulnerability and outward meddling primarily because they are faced with a
26 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System, pp. 14-15.
2 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Co.: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003), p. 9.
28 Thomas, "Third World Security," p. 91.
29 Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management o f  Internal and External 
Threats, pp. 277-80.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., pp. 277-80.
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combination of weak political institutions, heterogeneous societies, wide disparities in 
income and predatory neighbours (or at least the perception of predatory neighbours).32
Since many of the developing countries have a heterogeneous society, the issue
of integration has been one of the main concerns in these countries. However, according
to Azar and Moon, the issue of integration has not been given adequate attention in the
traditional conception of national security.33 The issue of integration is considered vital
to developing countries as this is a means to ensure harmony within their multiethnic
societies, given that ethnic clashes have the potential to threaten the collapse of the
state.34 The issue of integration is normally traced to conflict over two issues: national
identity and political legitimacy.35 Even though national identity has several
components, only two components are important here, namely: the identity of the nation
(the nation has become the accepted basis for political community) and the political
ideology of the state. According to Alagappa,
The identity of the nation defines the basis for the collective self as well as 
the national purpose, heritage, symbols, and character, whereas the political- 
legal organizing ideology of the state (democratic, socialist, secular, 
theocratic, and so on) defines the structure of political domination.36
In other words, national identity serves as a symbol that distinguishes the particular 
nation-state from the rest of the international community that would significantly affect 
its international orientation and its definition of national interest. National identity is a 
powerful character and basis for classification that commands deep passion, extending 
to the sacrifice of lives. However, national identity is a conscious construction rather
32 Cohen, "Leadership and the Management of National Security : An Overview," pp. 29-56.
33 Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side 
o f the Third World National Security," in National Security in the Third World: The Management o f  
Internal and External Threats, ed. Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 
pp. 86-90.
See, for example, Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 514.
35 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, p. 611.
36 Ibid., p. 36.
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than a given, and the process of the construction of a national identity has in some cases 
led to intense conflict.37
The fragmentation and disintegration of a nation-state into several ethnic groups 
adds new dimensions to the complex Third World national security question, mainly 
because deep-rooted ethnic division does not provide any unified national values and 
interests.38 Each ethnic group develops its own collective identity based on their ethnic 
values and interests instead of national ones. If the ruling elites do not take into account 
the ethnic minorities’ values and interests in the construction of a national identity, the 
very formation of the state’s national identity may also lead to instability. For example, 
if there were a dominant group in a country that constituted the majority of the total 
population, the ethnic identity formation of this group would eventually shape the 
national identity formation process of the nation.39 This process of nation building, 
however, will be resisted especially if the minority ethnic group view this exercise as a 
threat to their own identity. Subsequently, the dominant ethnic group in power will be 
perceived as a threat to the minority ethnic groups.40 This is because the national 
identity, which is invariably defined in terms of the dominant group’s values and 
culture, will tend to leave out the values of the other ethnic groups, especially those of 
the minority.41 Among the cases where minority ethnic groups have organised 
themselves to challenge the legitimacy of their government’s assimilation policies by 
forming their own ethno-nationalist/separatist organisations are those such as the Tamils 
in Sri Lanka, the Thai Malays in Southern Thailand and the Kurds in Turkey.
37 Ibid.
38 Azar and Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side o f the Third World 
National Security."
39 For this definition see, Ma Shu-yun, "Reciprocal Relation between Political Development and Ethnic 
Nationalism," Social Science Journal 36, no. 2 (1999): pp. 369-79.
40 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 12.
41 Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," 
pp. 267-88.
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The existence of ethnic separatist movements in these countries indicates that the
governments’ efforts to assimilate, accommodate and contain them do not work and
consequently have led to violent secessionist or partition movements.42 Contending
ethnic values often erupt into explicit political actions, especially in the form of
secessionist or separatist movements demanding a separate territorial identity in terms of
independence or autonomy from a larger territorial unit.43 Such political moves then
pose immediate threats to the core values shared by the majority of the national
population. They endanger the territorial and political integrity of the state. Thus, in
addition to the reduction in order and stability, threats from ethnic division and political
disintegration constitute the core concern in maintaining the ‘internal security’ of many
developing countries. Caroline Thomas is one of the first authors to explore the need to
move toward state making and nation building and away from focusing on external
threats to the state -  military threats in particular -  in order to appreciate Third World
security problems. She writes:
Security in the context of the Third World [...] does not simply refer to the 
military dimension, as is often assumed in the Western discussion of the 
concept, but to the whole range of dimension of a state’s existence which 
are already taken care of in the more developed states[...] for example, the 
search for internal security of state through nation building, the search for 
secure system of food, health, money and trade.44
Acknowledging the diversity of the dimensions in Third World security, this thesis also 
looks at the dimension of nation building. According to Collins, nation building entails 
the creation of common cultural traits among the populace, which in turn produces a 
sense of community and solidarity.45
42 Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns o f  Ethnic Separatism," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23 
(1981): pp. 165-95.
43 Azar and Moon, "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side o f the Third World 
National Security."
44 Caroline Thomas, In Search o f  Security: The Third World in International Relations (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1987), p. 1.
45 Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 12.
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In view of the different ethnic groups within these Third World states, successful
nation building usually involves a degree of acculturation where an overriding national
identity is adopted to supplement the ethnic groups’ traditional identities.46 In addition
to Collins, the importance of the construction of national identity through nation-
building is also highlighted by Bloom when he defines the term as follows:
By nation building we mean both the formation and establishment of the 
new state itself as a political entity, and the processes of creating viable 
degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement, and a sense of national identity 
among the people.47
However, one should be reminded that nation building, or the process of national 
identity construction, is a long process because according to Bloom, “there are always 
individuals and ethnic groups who, for one reason or another based in previous 
identification, do not identify with the nation-state”.48 In effect, in many Third World 
states, the lack of domestic political consensus means that core values of the populace 
can be hard to identify, and even the territorial boundaries of the state may come under 
challenge from groups within the state as well as from outside. Therefore, one cannot 
speak of national security in most of the Third World because there are instances 
whereby nations and states do not coincide in these countries.49 In sum, in many Third 
World countries, particularly those that have multiethnic groups within their society, the 
issue of nation building can be considered as the most important aspect of national 
security, given the fact that disgruntled ethnic groups in the country would want to see 
the nation-state disintegrate.
46 Ibid.
47 William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 55.
48 Ibid., p. 63.
49 Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, The State and Instability in the South (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989).
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The question of nation building in the Third World thus relates directly to what the
Copenhagen School calls societal security.50 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever first
introduced the concept of societal security in 1993.51 The concept places emphasis on
society rather than on the state. In other words, the Copenhagen School has identified
an alternative referent for security. Instead of emphasising only the security of the state,
which primarily concerns territorial integrity and sovereignty, societal security looks at
how a society is threatened. For the Copenhagen school, society is a social unit that is a
large, self-sustaining identity group. Since identity is the most important aspect to the
concept of society, the Copenhagen School treats societal security as synonymous with
identity security.52 In addition, societal security concerns the sustainability, within
acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and
religious and national identity and custom.53 Therefore, concerning ethnic security
problems, the referent object in security is identity. Since identity security lies at the
heart of the Copenhagen School’s notion of societal security, it is particularly useful in
understanding the dynamics behind ethnic security problems. Barry Buzan writes:
Societal Security can be threatened in ways ranging from the suppression of 
its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce [...] The 
reproduction of a society can be threatened by sustained application of 
repressive measures against the expression of its identity. If the institution 
that reproduces language and culture are forbidden to operate, the identity 
cannot be transmitted effectively from one generation to the next.54
The concept of societal security, which is formulated by the Copenhagen School, works 
very well with the concept of comprehensive security that is now being practised in 
many Third World countries, especially among the countries in Southeast Asia.
50 For detailed analysis on societal security, see, Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework 
fo r  Analysis, Chap. 6, Waever, "Societal Security: The Concept."
51 Ole Waever, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1993).
52 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis, p. 120.
53 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 19.
54Barry Buzan, "Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization," in Identity, Migration and the 
New Security Agenda in Europe, ed. Ole Waever, et al. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 43.
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The members of ASEAN adopted the concept in the mid-1980s; a decade after 
the Japanese introduced it. As in Japan, the idea of comprehensive security among the 
ASEAN member states is broader than the more traditional concept of security. Under 
the concept, threats towards states are not limited to external ones, such as the traditional 
military threat, but also include internal violence and disorder, such as threats that arise 
out of ethnic conflicts.55 In should be noted that the concept of comprehensive security 
can be viewed as part of a broader approach based on the concepts of national resilience 
and regional resilience. In the concept of national resilience, countries are required to 
strengthen themselves not only to their security instruments, but also in other aspects 
such as in their economics, politics, psychology and social.56 Regional resilience, on the 
other hand, referred to the strength of the region as a whole through national resilience, 
avoidance of bilateral conflicts, and regional cooperation.57 With regards to the concept 
of comprehensive security, Mohamad Jawhar Hassan has proposed that it should 
encompass the security of individual persons and their families and communities, as 
well as the security of the state.58 Rolfe, who also looks at the linkage between national 
and regional concepts of comprehensive security, proposes that comprehensive security 
should include political and social stability, economic development, migration and the 
health of the population.59 The Southeast Asian concept of comprehensive security thus 
acknowledges the potential of both internal and external sources, military and non­
55 Zarina Othman, "Human Security Concepts, Approaches and Debates in Southeast Asia" (paper 
presented at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference on "Constructing World Order", 
The Hague, Netherlands, September 9-11 2004).
56 Daljit Singh, "ASEAN Counter-Terror Strategies and Cooperation: How Effective?," in After Bali: The 
Threat o f  Terrorism in Southeast Asia, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: Institute of 
Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 202.
57 For an analysis o f the concepts o f national and regional resilience, see, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "National 
Versus Regional Resilience," in Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security, ed. Derek Da Cunha 
(Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 81-97.
58 Mohamad Jawhar Hassan, "The Concept of Comprehensive Security," in Conceptualizing Asia-Pacific, 
ed. Mohamad Jawhar Hassan and Thangam Ramnath (Kuala Lumpur: Institute o f  Strategic and 
International Studies, 1996).
59Jim Rolfe, "Pursuing Comprehensive Security: Linkages between National and Regional Concepts, 
Some Application," in Conceptualizing Asia-Pacific, ed. Jawhar Hassan and Thangam Ramnath (Kuala 
Lumpur: Institute o f Strategic and International Studies, 1996).
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military, as threats to their survival.60 All Southeast Asian states have identified 
domestic matters as important to meet their national security goals, and those goals 
generally include political stability, economic wellbeing and social harmony.61
While the concept of national security in developing countries consists of many 
different dimensions, the scope of this thesis will be limited to the issue of foreign 
security policy. The term ‘security’ in this thesis will be discussed in a broader sense 
whereby threats to ‘security’ are not seen merely as threats to the physical existence of a 
state but also as threats to ethnic identity.
2.2 Foreign Policy
Foreign policy has been given various definitions by scholars in International Relations.
Holsti, for example, conceives foreign policy as follows:
Ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote 
some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states or states, in 
non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups), in the international economy or in the 
physical environment of the world.62
Cohen and Harris have warned that no two people define foreign policy in the same way 
mainly because of the varying approaches and methodologies used.63 For instance, 
some scholars see foreign policy as the interplay of domestic and external forces and 
others see it simply as an extension of domestic policy.64 As a result of having various 
definitions, foreign policy may also be approached in a number of different ways. 
Central to the western or western-influenced literature is the assumption that states are
60 Othman, "Human Security Concepts, Approaches and Debates in Southeast Asia".
61 Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Asian Security 
Issues: Regional and Global, Research Papers and Policy Studies; 26, ed. Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley: 
University o f California Institute o f East Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 50-78.
62 Holsti, International Politics: A Framework fo r Analysis, p. 83.
63 Bernard Cohen and Scott A Harris, "Foreign Policy," in Handbook o f  Political Science, ed. Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W oolf Polsby (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1975), p. 318.
64 See, for example, Francis Pym, "British Foreign Policy: Constraints and Opportunities," International 
Affairs 59, no. 1 (1982), Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories o f Foreign Policy," World 
Politics 51 (1998): p. 15.
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the primary actors in world politics (if not the only actors), and that foreign policy is 
pursued by governments on behalf of the state and that a sharp distinction exists 
between domestic policy making and foreign policy making.65
2.2.1 Concept of Foreign Policy
In terms of the objectives of foreign policy, since the international system is viewed by 
the western-influenced literature as being in a state of anarchy characterised by distrust 
and competition, the most important objective according to this perspective is enhancing 
the state’s national security.66 In fact, during the Cold War era there was a strong 
tendency in many countries to identify foreign policy very closely with ‘national 
security policy’, and to see the military security of the state as the principal if not the 
only objective of foreign policy. However, scholars have also generally agreed that 
foreign policy has objectives other than security. For example, according to Holsti, 
these objectives include maintaining autonomy, welfare, status and prestige, although 
the premium placed on these concerns varies from state to state.67 In order to achieve 
all of these objectives, Hill has listed seven main expectations that any country’s foreign 
policy is supposed to accomplish. These are: protecting the country’s citizens abroad, 
projecting the country’s identity abroad, homeostasis or the maintenance of territorial 
integrity and social space against external threats, advancing prosperity by promoting
65 See, for example, Maurice A. East and Justin Robertson, Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post- 
Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes (London: Routledge, 2005), p.6, Kenneth 
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 7-9, Mark Webber 
and Michael Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 11.
66 See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 
John J. Stremlau, The Foreign Policy Priorities o f  Third World States (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1982), p. 1, Webber and Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World, p. 341.
67 Holsti, International Politics: A Framework fo r  Analysis, p. 84.
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the country’s economic well being, making decisions on interventions abroad, 
negotiating a stable international order and protecting the global commons.68
Acknowledging that foreign policy is supposed to achieve a number of different 
objectives, International Relations scholars have generally reached a consensus that 
there should also be other factors that have to be taken into consideration when 
formulating a country’s foreign policy, besides the systemic/structural factors. In other 
words, it is generally agreed that various geographical, historical, social and political 
determinants may contribute to shaping a country’s foreign policy and the conduct of the 
country’s international relations. One influential approach in this vein is Keohane and 
Nye’s notion of ‘complex interdependence’.69 According to this approach, world 
politics are increasingly characterised by an agenda of ‘multiple issues’ which 
consequently move foreign policy towards economic, social, environmental and other 
concerns rather than simply its traditional concern (i.e. military and security matters).70 
The emergence of these new issues has led to a higher level of inter-dependency among 
governments. Consequently, links between governments have multiplied and areas of 
cooperation have emerged resulting in a rise to new forms of international organisation 
and regional cooperation.
Another key characteristic of this context is that international issues affect much 
wider parts of domestic populations, and thus a range of ‘private’ or non-governmental 
organisations can become interested in foreign policy making. As a result, the pressure 
groups such as the non-governmental organisations, organised interest and other 
domestic forces can gain a role in the shaping of foreign policy, particularly on
68 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics o f  Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), pp. 
44-46.
69 Robert 0  Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence (London: Longman, 2001).
70 Webber and Smith, Foreign Policy in a Transformed World, p. 22.
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economic and social issues.71 The attempt to understand the domestic influence on 
foreign policy making was first introduced by Robert Putnam’s theory of the two level 
game.72 The two level game analyses foreign policy making as the outcome of interplay 
between the domestic and international context of decision making.73 Overall, foreign 
policy is now seen in many ways as the ‘international dimension’ of domestic policies. 
Ostrom and Job, for instance, argue that domestic political factors are more important in 
explaining foreign policy choices than international factors.74 Although James and 
Russett subsequently claimed that international factors have a larger impact than Ostrom 
and Job initially estimated, they also conclude that domestic factors have the largest 
impact on foreign policy decision-making.75 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson also argue 
that political leaders shape their foreign policy choices with a view towards keeping 
themselves in office.76 As put by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson:
The leader, whether President, Prime Minister, or President for Life, who 
adopts policies that reduce the security of the state does so at the risk of 
affording his or her political opponents the opportunity of weakening the 
leader’s grasp on power. Put differently, a leader’s search for the security 
of the state intertwines with the search for policies that will maintain the 
leader in power against domestic opposition. The desire to remain in power 
hence provides the linchpin between the threats and uncertainties of the 
international system and the inevitable imperatives of fending off domestic 
opposition.77
71 Ibid.
72 Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games," International 
Organisation 42, no. 3 (1988).
73 Jom Dosch, The Changing Dynamics o f  Southeast Asian Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2007), p. 21.
74 Charles W. Ostrom Jr and Brian I. Job, "The President and the Political Use o f Force," American 
Political Science Review 80 (1986): pp. 541-66.
75 Patrick James and Bruce Russett, "The Influence o f Domestic and International Politics on the 
President's Use o f Force," Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 35 (1991): pp. 307-32.
76 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival o f Political Leaders," 
American Political Science Review, no. 89 (1995).
77 Ibid.: pp. 853.
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In short, according to Bueno Mesquita and Siverson, if a leader of a country wants to 
formulate a particular foreign policy, the leaders would have to consider domestic 
factors.
Persaud argues that foreign policy is not only about what states do outside their 
territorial borders because to begin with, the division between the external and internal 
aspects of policy is always blurred.78 According to Persaud, the category “intermestic” 
was specifically developed to deal with this amorphous area, which is neither inside nor 
outside the nation-state boundary.79 More directly, there is increasing recognition that 
foreign policy is as much about development within the nation-state as it is about the 
outside world. As Van Klaveren puts it, “In some sense, a state’s foreign policy is the 
international expression of a society, but it also serves to integrate the world at large into 
that society”.80 While recognising that domestic politics may be one of the sources for 
shaping a country’s foreign policy, many of the scholars (especially among the neo­
realists) do not agree that this factor has a role among the small states.81 This is mainly 
due to their perception that small states are more preoccupied with survival than the 
great powers, and in turn, the international system offers the most plausible point of 
entry for explaining their foreign-policy choices.82 The next section illustrates the 
foreign policy of small states/developing countries.
78 Randolph B Persaud, "Reconceptualizing the Global South's Perspective: The End o f the Bandung 
Spirit," in The Foreign Policies o f  the Global South: Rethinking Conceptual Frameworks, ed. Jacqueline 
Anne Braveboy-Wagner (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2003), pp. 48-63.
79 Ibid., p. 52.
80 Alberto Van Klaveren, "Understanding Latin America Foreign Policies," in Latin American Nations in 
World Politics, ed. Heraldo Mufioz and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 35- 
60.
81 For detailed discussion on the definition o f small states, see, Jeanne A. K. Hey, Small States in World 
Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 
Robert Keohane, "Lilliputions' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International 
organisation 23, no. 2 (1969): pp. 210-19, Roderick Pace, "Small States and the Internal Balance o f the 
European Union," in Enlarging the European Union: The Way Forward, ed. John Redmond and Jackie 
Gower (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 107-19, Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29.
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2.2.2 Foreign Policy in the Developing Countries
The received wisdom in International Relations suggests that the foreign policies of
small states can be best explained by simply examining structural/systemic rather than
domestic level factors. Miriam Elman, however, argues that to explain small state
foreign policy, scholars should look to domestic institutional choices rather than
international determinants.83 Domestic institutions, she claims, are more important than
international or individual forces because they define the paths of available options open
to a government in a foreign policy situation. This argument had already been brought
forward earlier by Stremlau when he wrote that:
Among many variables that may be salient in shaping a developing 
country’s foreign policy the following checklist is suggested. At domestic 
level the analyst needs to consider: political/ethnic/religious cleavages; 
economic disparities; resources endowment; the stage of industrial 
development; the effectiveness of governmental institutions -  civilian and 
military; the country’s size and location; and the personal characteristics of 
key members in the ruling elite. Regionally there are important relations 
among states and ethnic groups that need to be carefully identified in terms 
of the: historical record of conflict and cooperation; the prevalence and 
intensity of civil strife; interstate disparities of political/military/economic 
power; the extent of major power involvement in regional affairs.84
In other words, Stremlau argues the variables mentioned above will determine the core 
of the foreign policy of the Third World countries rather than just the international 
environment.85
Contrary to the developed countries where their foreign policy aimed at 
manipulating the external environment in ways suitable to the “national interest”86, 
foreign policy in the developing countries predominantly seeks to affect the internal 
environment in ways favourable to the building of the state and to the maintenance of its
83 Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own 
Backyard," British Journal o f  Political Science 25, no. 2 (1995).
84 Stremlau, The Foreign Policy Priorities o f  Third World States, p. 1.
85 Ibid., p. 2.
86Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System, pp. 23-27.
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government’s power. Furthermore, according to Waltz, the small state is likely to take 
international constraints for granted, since nothing it does can significantly affect the 
international system.87 Since great powers tend to focus their attention towards states 
that are most likely to pose security threats, they will be less interested in small states. 
Consequently, the developing countries will face fewer external constraints and their 
behaviour will be more likely to reflect domestic political influences.88 Since the main 
preoccupation of the Third World states is nation building, their foreign policy tend to 
focus towards obtaining internal order, bridging economic and social disparities, 
repairing ethnic, religious and regional fissures, building unconditional legitimacy of 
state boundaries, institutions and governing elites, managing internal and inter-state 
conflicts, or correcting distorted and dependent patterns of economic and social 
development.89
In countries where the ruling elites are still preoccupied with their own nation 
building, any external interference in their domestic affairs is always perceived as 
endangering the stability of the country.90 One of the main ways to ensure that there will 
be less external interference is by creating a regional grouping. A peaceful regional 
environment is expected to allow member states to devote their resources to domestic 
development aimed at enhancing their national stability, which in turn would contribute 
to the stability and security in the region. However, at the same time, a common ethnic 
identity among groups located in different countries may contribute to the ethnic group’s 
interest in the formulation of the foreign policy making of their country, especially when 
there is an ethnic conflict involving its ethnic kin. Since ethnic identity has been 
identified as being among the most powerful motives, especially among the developing
87 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, pp. 72-73.
88 Ibid.
89 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, pp. 1-13.
90 Mohammed Ayoob, Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 3.
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countries’ foreign relations, the next section analyses how ethnic identity influences the 
ethnic politics and foreign policy of a state.
2.3 Ethnic Identity
According to Esman, ethnic identity provides a set of meanings that individuals attribute 
to their membership in an ethnic community, including those attributes that bind them to 
that collectivity and which distinguish it from others in their relevant environment.91 
Ethnic identity normally conveys strong elements of continuity by evoking powerful 
emotional responses, although its properties can shift to accommodate changing threats 
and opportunities.92 As stated by Davies, ethnic identities are able to mobilise large 
numbers of people, evoking high degrees of allegiance and playing important roles at 
the sub-national, national, transnational and global levels.93 These common features 
among the ethnic groups create a sense of ethnic identity among the group. By nature, 
ethnic identity creates feelings of loyalty and common interest among its members, and 
fears of extinction.94
2.3.1 Ethnicity
Just like ‘security’, ethnicity is also a much-debated concept.95 For Max Weber, 
ethnicity implies a sense of a shared common descent, political solidarity vis-a-vis other 
groups, and common customs, language, religion, values, morality and etiquette.96 
According to Eriksen, the term ethnicity refers to the relationship between groups whose 
members consider themselves distinctive, and these groups maybe ranked hierarchically
91 Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 27.
92 Ibid.
93 Richard Davies, "Ethnicity: Inside out or Outside In?," in Identities in International Relations, ed. Jill 
Krause and Neil Renwick (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 87.
94 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Chapter 4.
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within a society.97 In other words, ethnicity becomes the character or condition of
belonging to an ethnic group, or it is the ethnic group itself.
However, ethnic group is a vague and general term. Numerous definitions appear
in anthropological and sociological works.98 Schermerhom, for example, defines an
ethnic group as follows:
An ethnic group is defined [...] as a collectivity within a larger society 
having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical 
past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the 
epitome of their people hood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: 
kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), 
religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, 
phenotypical features, or any combination of these.99
Despite the differences in terminology, most of the features of an ethnic group contained 
in this definition apply across the board. However, concerning religion and language, it 
must be acknowledged that not all people of the same ethnic group necessarily share a 
religion or speak the same language. According to Davies, ethnicity can be utilised as a 
justification, or as grounds for opposing various political projects; forced assimilation, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, self-determination, secession, irredentism, nation building, 
and demands for autonomy and equality.100 It is this political dimension of ethnic 
identity that becomes one of the most important identity communities for the
97 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Anthropology, Culture, and Society (London: 
Pluto Press, 2002), p. 7.
98 For detailed discussions on the definition o f ethnic group, see, for example; George DeVos, "Ethnic 
Pluralism Conflict and Accommodation," in Ethnic Identity: Cultural Communities and Change, ed. 
George DeVos and Lola Romanucci-Ross (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 5-41, 
Charles F Keyes, "The Dialectics o f Ethnic Change," in Ethnic Change, ed. Charles F Keyes (Seattle: 
University o f Washington Press, 1981), pp. 202-13, James McKay and Frank Lewins, "Ethnicity and 
Ethnic Group: A Conceptual Analysis and Reformulation," Ethnic and Racial Studies 1, no. 4 (1978): pp. 
412-27, Pierre L Van Den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective," Ethnic and racial 
Studies 1 (1978): pp. 401-11, Max Weber, Economy and Society (Los Angeles: University o f California 
Press, 1968).
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Copenhagen School.101 Since ethnic groups are bound up with their identity, they value 
the community’s preservation as an end in itself rather than just as a means to achieve 
other ends. For the Copenhagen school, this quality turns identity communities into 
security referents.102
Theories of ethnicity can be divided into two camps that represent different
perspectives on the nature of ethnicity. The first is the primordialist and the second is
variously termed situationalist, strategist, constructivist or instrumentalist.103 The
primordialist camp views ethnicity as an innate, primordial given, suggesting that
ethnicity is largely immutable.104 The anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, provides a
detailed definition of the primordial approach:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ or ... 
the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being 
bom into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language,
... and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, 
speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable,... overpowering 
coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s 
neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto, as the result not merely of 
personal affection, practical necessity, common interest..., but... by virtue 
of some unaccountable absolute attributed to the very tie itself.105
In other words, according to primordialists, each ethnic group has its own particular 
constitutive features (e.g. cultures, traditions, histories, physical traits, language 
repertoires and religion) that are stable and consistently distributed within the group.106
101 T. Theiler, "Societal Security and Social Psychology," Review o f  International Studies 29, no. 2 
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The situationalists, on the other hand, focus on the dynamic nature of ethnicity.107
According to this camp, ethnicity results from changes in social, economic and political
arenas. Situationalists see that the criteria to be part of any particular ethnic group tend
to change over time as people come and go and develop new traditions and ways of life,
but a group itself nevertheless endures as a way of structuring social life.108
Furthermore, many situationalists see ethnic identity as constant.109 The situational
approach is frequently associated with the anthropologist Federick Barth. Barth is aware
that boundaries between ethnic groups persist and that discrete ethnic identities are
maintained in spite of groups overlapping and cohabiting with one another, and people
moving between groups.110 As Barth has observed:
Boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them... categorical 
ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence of mobility, contact and 
information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation 
whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation 
and membership in the course of individual life histories...ethnic 
distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and 
acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundation on which 
embracing social systems are built. Interaction in such social systems does 
not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural 
differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence.111
From the statement above, it becomes obvious that Barth rejects the idea that ethnic 
groups have a permanent and fixed cultural and biological character, and instead argues 
that ethnicity is a dynamic form of social organisation. Ethnicity does not disappear 
despite the modernisation process that societies are experiencing, be it in terms of
107 For detailed discussion on this approach, see, for example; Association o f Social Anthropologists o f 
the Commonwealth. Annual Conference (1971: London) and Abner Cohen, Urban Ethnicity (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1974), Elaine Burgess, "The Resurgence o f Ethnicity: Myth or Reality?," Ethnic 
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improvement in socio-economic infrastructures, education, or the resultant increase in 
social and economic interactions.
However, many scholars tend to synthesise primordialist and situationalist 
approaches, usually by carving out more or less separate domains for each to operate in, 
explaining human behaviour.112 Both the primordialist and situationalist approaches can 
be seen to offer valuable insights as to the nature of ethnicity and its role in politics, but 
the adoption of either approach on its own appears to be misleading. This is mainly 
because ethnicity appears to exhibit both primordialist and situationalist attributes since 
it functions both as an interest resource and as an emotional loyalty.113 This thesis 
adopts both the primordialist and situationalist perspectives in dealing with the issue of 
ethnicity, especially when applying the concept of ethnicity to the Malay ethnic group 
both in Malaysia and in neighbouring countries. This perspective is adopted mainly 
because the Malay ethnic group has both primordial and situational characteristics. The 
characteristic of the Malay ethnic group in Malaysia will be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Ethnic Politics
Ethnicity, according to Brown, acts as a political resource, promoting group cohesion 
and thereby facilitating the political articulation of both group and individual interests.114 
He argues that cultural affinities are certainly only one of several bases for political 
affiliation from which people may choose, but people rarely seem to perceive 
themselves as choosing their ethnic group; and compared for example to class or 
ethnicity, ethnicity often appears to offer a more all-embracing and emotionally
112 Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity," p. 461, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, David D. Laitin, Hegemony 
and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1986), Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981).
113 Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, p. xviii.
114Ibid.
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satisfying way of defining an individual’s identity.'15 Ethnicity, according to Jha, is not
a static predetermined category but a manifestation of the assertion of an ethnic group in
the political arena to defend or sustain economic, political and cultural interest and wrest
more concessions."6 In the process, it becomes a device as well as a focus for
mobilising the members of the group into social and political actions. Esman defines
ethnic political movements as follows:
An ethnic political movement represents the conversion of an ethnic 
community into a political competitor that seeks to combat ethnic 
antagonists or to impress ethnically defined interests on the agenda of the 
state. It purports to reflect the collective consciousness and aspirations of 
the entire community, though in fact the latter may be split into several 
tendencies or concrete organizations, each competing for the allegiance of 
the community and for the right to be its exclusive representative.117
Through the movements, the members of an ethnic group are able to better promote their 
interests, especially if they have to compete with other ethnic groups to obtain whatever 
resources they wish to secure. This is particularly true if they live in a country with a 
number of different ethnic groups.
In order to ensure that all the different ethnic groups within the states will
somehow be treated equally, these ethnic groups will seek to promote ethnic bargaining
among themselves. Ethnic bargains seek to specify the relationship between ethnic
groups and channel politics in peaceful directions.118 As a mechanism for managing
expectations and demands, it sets the parameters of resource allocation by laying out the
rights and privileges of the various ethnic groups. According to Tan,
The bargain establishes an understanding of the structure of society and the 
allocation of resources as a particularized social contract and the tacit
115Ibid.,p. 5.
116 Jha, Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia and Quest fo r  Identity, p. 1.
117 Esman, Ethnic Politics, p. 27.
118 Donald S. Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study o f  Minorities and 
Decolonization (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 3-27.
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understanding that each ethnic group does not transgress into the sphere of 
the other.1,9
For example, in the case of Malaysia, the essence of the bargain is that the Malays, as 
the indigenous people, have the rights and prerogative to political dominance. In turn, 
the ethnic Chinese, because of their foreign origin, are granted citizenship rights and 
retain their economic livelihood without interference from the state.
However, if an ethnic group becomes the dominant ethnic group in the country, 
the possibility arises that the ethnic group may be able to influence the state to adopt its 
ideology, which would consequently lead to the formation of an ethnocratic state. 
According to Brown, the term ‘ethnocratic state’ signifies the situation where the state 
acts as the agency of the dominant ethnic community in terms of its ideologies, its 
policies and its resource distribution.120 Brown lists three main criteria that make a state 
ethnocratic. First, the recruitment to the state’s elite positions either in the civil service 
or in the armed forces and government draws disproportionately and overwhelmingly 
from the majority ethnic group. Once recruited, they use their positions to promote their 
ethnic interests rather than serving the interests of the public. Second, the national 
identity and ideology of the state derives primarily from the dominant ethnic group’s 
culture. Lastly, the state’s institutions, such as its constitution, laws and political 
structures aim at maintaining and reinforcing the domination of the ethnic majority.121 
However, these policies tend to result in ethnic conflict, especially in Third World 
countries, because many of the state elites in these countries deny that their societies 
comprise a multiethnic character and attempt to construct mono-ethnic states (in terms 
of control of power structures and allocation of resources) that are dominated by a single
119 Eugene K.B. Tan, "From Sojourners to Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia 
and Malaysia," Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 6 (2001): pp. 949-78.
120 Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, p. 36.
121 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious group.122 Among the dominant ethnic groups that 
have been practising these policies are the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and the Burmans 
(Bamar) in Myanmar.123
2.3.3 Ethnic Conflict
Ethnicity, by itself, is not a cause of violent conflict. Most of the time, most ethnic 
groups pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels. 
However, when ethnicity is linked in a problematic way with the overall structural 
totality of national and global processes, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along 
which societies fracture.124 According to Geertz, the confrontation may revolve around 
several characteristics, namely blood ties, race, patterns of domination, language, 
religion, custom, geography and history.125 In its many forms, ethnicity is utilised as a 
justification for forced assimilation, genocide, ethnic cleansing, self-determination, 
secession, irredentism, nation building, and demands for autonomy and equality. 
Therefore, the concept of “societal security” is central in explaining these issues, 
although, it must be seen as complementary to, and not as a replacement for, the model 
of national security.126 Debiel acknowledges that one of the major advantages of the 
societal security approach is that the concept provides a substantive theoretical 
background, which enables it to relate to the significance of ethno-national, and
122 Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System, p. 38.
Ibid.
124 Maheswar Singh, "Ethnic Conflict and International Security: Theoretical Considerations," World 
Affairs 6, no. 4 (2002): pp. 1-8.
Geertz and Nations, Old Societies and New States: The Questfor Modernity in Asia and Africa: Essays 
by Members o f  the Committee fo r  the Comparative Study o f  New Nations, pp. 109-11.
1 Debiel, "Human Security: More Than Just a Good Idea? Comments on the Need for an Integrated 
Security Concept".
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religious, as well as political, ideological and socioeconomic identities, to the formation 
of social cohesion or, depending on the case, to the collapse of social structures.127
Generally, ethnic conflict usually centres on one of three general issues: the 
desire for “exit” or independence from the state, the demand for greater autonomy 
within the state, or the recognition and protection of minority interest within a plural 
society.128 The first two issues are normally considered as the product of ethnic 
separatist movements. Ethnic separatism generally refers to ethnic action aimed at the 
complete withdrawal from state-imposed socio-economic and political arrangements.129 
Such actions, which are frequently a reaction to assimilation attempts by the centre, aim 
at promoting cultural, linguistic, religious, geographical and economic autonomy within 
a specific state or to obtain complete political independence.130 By definition, separatism 
is also a species of nationalism, for it seeks to enhance ethnic autonomy and in some 
cases to gain political independence and self-determination.131
All these three general issues will be discussed in the case studies, particularly 
because there are a number of ethno-nationalist organisations in each of the conflict 
areas, and each of the organisations in southern Thailand, Aceh, and in the Moro region 
have a different objective for leading the struggle against their respective governments. 
The next section analyses how ethnic politics have an influence on a country’s foreign 
policy, especially if their ethnic kin is perceived as not being treated fairly by the state in 
which they are living.
127 Ibid.
128 Gurr and Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, pp. 95-116.






Conflicts involving the issue of ethnicity tend to attract external involvement.
According to Suhrke and Noble, an internal conflict that explicitly raises the question of
national self-determination stimulates international responses.132 Since ethnic identities
seldom coincide completely with state boundaries, ethnic conflict in one state has
implications in other states where there are ethnic kin. It provides motivation for the
involvement of external kin.133 Fishman defines kinship as follows:
It is a basis of one’s felt bond to one’s own kind. It is the basis of one’s 
solidarity with them in times of stress. It is the basis of one’s right to 
presume upon them in times of need. It is the basis of one’s dependency, 
sociability and intimacy with them as a matter of course.134
Hale, for instance, claims that kinship relations are usually said to be the critical element 
that holds each group together and imbues it with its emotive power.135 The ethnic tie is 
simultaneously suffused with overtones of familial duty and laden with depths of 
familial emotion. Therefore, even international boundaries do not cause members of 
ethnic groups to ignore the condition of those who are similar to themselves -  their 
ethnic kin.136
2.4.1 Ethnic Kin States
According to Ganguly, ethnic kin states are created in one of three different ways.137 
First, they are created during the period of colonisation after the colonial powers created 
administrative units in their colonies that cut across the ethnic divisions of these areas.
132 Astri Suhrke and Lela Gamer Noble, "Muslim in the Philippines and Thailand," in Ethnic Conflict in 
International Relations, ed. Astri Suhrke and Lela Gamer Noble (London: Praeger, 1977), pp. 3-5.
133 Ibid., pp. 5-7.
134 Joshua A Fishman, "Language and Ethnicity" (paper presented at the Ethnicity in Eastern Europe, 
University o f Washington, June 1976), p. 5.
135 Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity," pp 458-85.
136 David Carment and Patrick James, "Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from 
Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia " Canadian Journal o f  Political Science 29, no. 3 (1996):
521-54.
Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia, p. 9.
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Following the process of decolonisation, the status of these colonies was changed from 
administrative units to independent states. Many of these new states subsequently 
inherited artificial boundaries, which cut across ethnic lines. Second, population 
migrations over centuries, by scattering ethnic groups or communities, may also create 
ethnic kin states. Finally, ethnic kin states may be created because of the disintegration 
of states as demonstrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.138 Due to 
the manner in which modem territorial states have developed, ethnic groups are not 
neatly grouped within state territories, but find themselves being the majority or 
minority that straddles the boundaries of two or more states.139 Consequently, ethnicity 
becomes politicised and this has become a major aspect and issue of interstate 
relations.140
Esman, for example, illustrates how ethnic politics affect interstate relations by 
claiming that;
Significant expressions of ethnic politics are not [...] confined to domestic 
affairs. The demands of ethnic groups may spill over state borders; external 
actors may attempt to intrude into domestic ethnic conflicts; and some 
ethnic networks may operate as transnational actors within several states, 
often with scant regard to their governments.141
For some scholars, ethnic linkages across political borders may thus be considered the 
analogue of alliances between sovereign states, with dispersed ethnic groups likely to 
press their government to intervene when the interests of their ethnic brethren are 
threatened.142 According to Moore, “an ethnic tie exists whenever members of an ethnic 
group are divided across a border and members of the group form either a dominant
138 Ibid.
139 Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework, p. 173.
140 Ibid.
141 Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Actors in International Politics," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 
(1995): p. 112.
142 Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," pp. 89-103.
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majority or an advantaged minority in one of the two countries”.143 Support from across 
borders is generally instrumental, providing for example, money, weapons and a safe 
haven.
More specifically, one set of studies shows that the country in which an ethnic 
group is dominant or has been in an advantaged position, is more hostile toward the 
country where the group’s kin are disadvantaged or persecuted144. Holsti, for instance, 
finds that men
“sympathise with those whom they consider their ethnic, religious, and 
ideological kin. When these kin are threatened, persecuted, or physically 
harmed, their benefactors abroad may come to their assistance - sometimes 
with armed forces.”145
In addition, Holsti concludes, from these observations, that the “sympathy factor” 
(ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds) had played an important role in conflicts 
occurring between 1648 and 1989, and his studies reveal that this “sympathy factor” was 
a source of conflict in more than twenty per cent of the post-1945 wars.146 In addition, 
there are a number of empirical studies that have been conducted to explicate the 
linkages between ethnicity and the foreign policy orientation of states.147 According to 
Friedman, among the well known cases where ‘irreducible identities’ had been key 
motivators for citizen participation in foreign policy making of their country are
143 Will H. Moore, "Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy," SAIS Review  22, no. 2 (2002): pp. 77-91.
144 See, for example, Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign 
Policy Behavior," 171-94, David R. Davis, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity, Minorities and 
International Conflict," in Wars in the Midst o f  Peace, ed. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 1977), pp. 148-63, Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign 
Policy," pp. 89-103.
145 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 317.
146 Ibid., pp. 317-18.
147 For instance, Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study o f  Crisis (Ann Arbor: The University 
o f Michigan Press, 1997), Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Internal Dimensions o f Regional 
Conflict," in The International Dimensions o f  Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-31, David Carment and Patrick James, Wars in the Midst o f  Peace: The 
International Politics o f  Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburg, Pa.: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1997), Gurr and 
Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, The International 
Spread o f  Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1998), Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations.
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opposition to white domination in apartheid South Africa or Rhodesia for Africans, and 
Muslim solidarity in support of the Palestinians and Bosnians.148
According to Suhrke, although ethnic kinship ties may or may not influence the 
policy of outside parties toward ethnic conflict, in some cases the policies implemented 
can be explained by the priority given to non-ethnic factors, but they are also likely to 
reflect differences in the strength of ethnic ties. If a group that is divided by state 
boundaries has a common language, religion, and culture, for instance, the group is 
united by stronger ethnic ties than if it shares fewer symbols of ethnic identity. Strong 
ties are more likely to result in partisan alignments of ethnic identity.149 In conclusion, 
ethnic ties have been identified as one of the main factors that provoke interstate 
conflict, especially between neighbouring countries. The next section analyses how 
ethnic politics influence foreign policy, especially when the ethnic kin is being 
threatened by its host state. The section also outlines the assumptions in the theoretical 
framework that will be applied in the thesis.
2.4.2 Ethnic Politics and Foreign Policy
The theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy builds upon two basic assumptions about 
the motivations of states, the interests of politicians and their supporters, and the relative 
influence of these actors upon foreign policy. First, foreign policy is dependent on 
domestic politics because states respond to domestic pressure.150 In fact, according to 
Morgan and Palmer, all leaders/politicians, whether they are leading democratic ornon- 
democratic states; cannot repress everyone and must retain the support of some
148 Friedman, "The Forgotten Sovereign: Citizens, States and Foreign Policy in the South," pp. 241-42.
149 Suhrke and Noble, "Muslim in the Philippines and Thailand," p. 14.
150 This assumption has recently been invoked by a number o f scholars including, Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992), James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): pp. 577-91, T.C Morgan and K.M 
Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use o f Force," Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 
pp. 25-52.
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constituents.151 In other words, as politicians primarily care about gaining and 
maintaining office, they have to maintain the support from people in their 
constituency.152 Regardless of the particular support mechanism, incumbent politicians 
care most about preventing these supporters from leaving their coalition. Even if leaders 
do not want to intervene, they may not be in a position to restrain followers who do.153
Secondly, people who are affiliated with a particular ethnic group are mostly 
concerned with the welfare and conditions of other members of the ethnic group. 
Therefore, even if an international border divides members of an ethnic group, their 
ethnic affinity will serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential 
motivation for action. Therefore, it is assumed that if members of an ethnic group are 
dispersed across two or more states, they will monitor the status and behaviour of their 
brethren across the border. Davis and Moore, for instance, find that the existence of 
ethnic ties between an advantaged group in one state and a non-advantaged group in a 
second state increases the probability of interstate conflict.154 According to Saideman, 
ethnic identity shapes supporters’ preference in both domestic and foreign policy.155 The 
constituents may compel a politician to follow a particular foreign policy, the politician 
may anticipate their demands, or the politician may use foreign policy to emphasise 
particular identities and de-emphasise others.156 It is noted however that the theory does 
not specify whether politicians are manipulating the public or are being dictated to by 
public opinion. Ethnic politics can produce two kinds of dynamics; top-down or 
bottom-up. While one dynamic may produce different policies to the other, it may be
151 T. C Morgan and G Palmer, Room to Move: Security, Proaction and Institutions in Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making, ed. Randolph M. Siverson, Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy (Ann 
Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1998).
152 Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, pp.22-23.
153 Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience," pp. 1-22.
154 Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior," 
171-94.
155 Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, pp. 22-23.
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hard to distinguish the two in practice.157 Therefore, this framework does not develop 
this distinction here. Either way, if politicians can influence foreign policy, the 
existence of ethnic ties and antagonisms between the politicians’ supporters and external 
actors will shape the state’s foreign policy.
Specifically, since almost all separatist crises are ethnic conflicts, potential and 
existing supporters frequently have ethnic ties to one side of a secessionist crisis. 
Therefore, ethnic ties between politicians’ supporters and the combatants in ethnic 
conflict in other states help to explain states’ policies toward secessionist crises.158 In 
this case, the kin state may take up policies or strategies that can be categorised into 
three groups: supporting the state-centre against the ethno-nationalist/separatist 
movements, offering either covert or overt support for these movements, and involving 
itself in reconciliation between the state-centre and these movements.159 In short, the 
theory of ethnic politics argues that if a particular ethnic group dominates a state 
politically, then that group is likely to receive support from externally based kin, and 
that support is likely to be intense.160
2.5 Conclusion
In order to analyse the impact of ethnic politics on foreign policy, a concept of national 
security that is more appropriate to Third World countries will be used.161 The thesis 
adopts the national security approach of developing countries/Third World mainly
157 Since politicians may anticipate public opinion, what appears to be top-down may actually be a 
bottom-up situation where the pressure from the masses is the driving force, even if  it is only potential 
pressure.
Stephen M Saideman, "Explaining the International Relations o f Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability 
Versus Ethnic Ties," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): pp. 721-53.
159 Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience," pp. 1-22.
160 Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict, p. 168.
161 See, for example, Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: 
Material and Ideational Influences, Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, 
Regional Conflict, and the International System, Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World: 
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because Malaysia’s national security approach fits better in this category. In addition, 
the issue of ethnic conflict as a national security concern has not received adequate 
attention within the traditional approach compared to the approach taken by the 
developing countries.162 Contrary to this traditional approach, the concept of national 
security used in developing countries assumes neither a unitary national-state actor, nor 
the existence of commonly shared national values. The thesis also adopts the 
conception of foreign policy among the developing countries. Unlike the concept of 
foreign policy in the developed world, foreign policy in the developing countries may be 
influenced by several ‘irreducible identities’ such as religion and ethnic group in the 
formulation of their foreign policy making.163 In order to look at the linkages between 
the ethnic groups among all the separatist movements that have been chosen as the case 
studies with the Malaysian Malays, the thesis, however, adopts both the primordialist 
and situational perspectives. The main reason for this undertaking is elaborated upon in 
the following chapter. In short, this thesis adopts the theory of ethnic politics and 
foreign policy as its main analytical framework to address the question of how the 
Malaysian government has dealt with efforts to ensure the survival of the Malay ethnic 
group located in its neighbouring countries. Based on what has been argued in this 
chapter, the ethnic factor has influenced Malaysia’s security practice towards the ethnic 
conflicts in southern Thailand, Aceh, Indonesia and the Moro region of the Philippines. 
In fact, the ethnic factor is the reason why Malaysia has been engaged in all of the ethnic 
conflicts in its neighbouring countries despite being a member of ASEAN, which 
requires all member states to adhere to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of 
other ASEAN states. The following chapter analyses both how Malaysia has
162 Azar and Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management o f  Internal and External 
Threats, pp. 86-90.
163 Friedman, "The Forgotten Sovereign: Citizens, States and Foreign Policy in the South," p. 241.
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conceptualised national security and how the role of ethnic politics has shaped the
country’s domestic security policy.
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K a l i m a n t a n
M ap 2: M alaysia  - A d m in istra tive  D iv isions
(Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and asia/malaysia_adm98.jpg)
Introduction
This chapter examines M alaysia’s conception o f national security and particularly the 
role o f ethnicity in the country’s internal security practice. The purpose of the chapter is 
to provide the necessary background on the role o f the ethnic factor in M alaysia’s 
external security practice in relation to the conflict involving its ethnic brethren outside 
the country’s international borders. The chapter is divided into three major sections. 
The first section [3.1] analyses Malaysia’s perspective on national security. This section 
argues that one of the main objectives underpinning national security policy is to ensure
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that the Malay ethnic group will continue to dominate the country’s political life. The 
section also analyses the history of how the Malay ethnic group was constructed. The 
primary purpose of this section is to illustrate how the nature of the Malay ethnic group 
has the characteristics identified by both the primordialists and the situationalists. The 
second section [3.2] analyses the practice of ethnic politics in Malaysia. The objective 
of this section is to show how the Malays achieved and maintained their political and 
economic interests in the country. The third section [3.3] analyses how the Malaysian 
government has protected the Malay ethnic group against external threats.
3.1 Malaysia’s Security Practices
Like many post-colonial states, Malaysia1 might best be characterised as a “new” state 
because the country’s elite is still generally engaged in the process of nation building.2 
One of the main reasons why the leaders of the country are still engaged in this process, 
despite Malaysia being independent since 1957, is its multi-ethnic makeup. According 
to Abraham, Malaysia is a classic case of a country in which the major ethnic groups 
have learned to coexist while maintaining their distinct ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
cultural identities and perceptions.3 Historically, Malaysia became a multiethnic society 
because of the former colonial power’s policy that promoted immigration, especially 
from China and India. However, the lack of integration between the indigenous Malays 
and the immigrant population before Malaya gained its independence prevented any 
kind of solidarity among these ethnic groups.4 As stated by Alagappa, the development
1 Before 16 September 1963, the name o f the country was Malaya. The country changed its name after 
the merging o f the two Bornean states, Sabah and Sarawak, into the Federation.
2 See, Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 
International System, pp. 23-27.
3 C Abraham, "Political Elitism in Malaysia: The Case for Democratising Social Institutions" (paper 
presented at the 2nd International Malaysian Studies Conference, University o f  Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 1999).
4 A.J. Stockwell, "The White Man's Burden and Brown Humanity: Colonialism and Ethnicity in British 
Malaya," Southeast Asian Journal o f  Social Science 10, no. 1 (1982): pp. 59-62.
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of domestic political consensus is a formidable task in Malaysia due to its delicate ethnic 
composition.5
The British colonial policy of expanding the number of Chinese and Indian 
immigrants created an artificial occupational segregation along ethnic lines. The Malays 
predominantly formed the bulk of the peasantry, the Chinese were associated with 
commerce, and Indians worked in plantations. This division of labour consequently 
reinforced a sense of interethnic divisions.6 In facilitating colonial rule, the British 
planted seeds of fear among Malays about the threats and challenges from non-Malays, 
and assumed a role of self-proclaimed protector of Malay interests and rights in various 
spheres of society.7 Internal conflicts were created to prevent the formation of any 
consensus amongst the people living in the country. The ‘divide and rule’ policy 
continued for centuries and, thus, the roots of conflict became entrenched.8 Although 
British rule in Malaya amounted to indirect rule,9 the influence that the former colonial 
power had in determining the whole range of the country’s policies before the country’s 
independence was very substantial, especially with regard to immigration policies. The 
policies had a long-lasting impact on the characteristics of the ethnic composition of 
Malayan and subsequently Malaysian society. In order to ensure that all ethnic groups 
in Malaysia would live in peace and harmony, the Malaysian government had to 
introduce policies that have aimed to promote national unity among all ethnic groups.
5 Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," pp. 50-78.
6 See, for example, Firdaus Hj. Abdullah, "Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, 
to Eradicate Poverty," Ethnic Studies Report XV, no. 2 (1997): pp. 189-221, Rudiger Korff, 
"Globalisation and Communal Identities in the Plural Society o f Malaysia," Singapore Journal o f Tropical 
Geography 22, no. 3 (2001): pp. 270-83.
7 H.L. Mah, "Affirmative Action, Ethnicity and Integration: The Case o f Malaysia," Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 8, no. 2 (1985): pp. 250-76.
8 Jha, Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia and Quest fo r  Identity.
9 For discussions on the system o f ruling that the British imposed on Malaya, refer to J. de V. Allen, A. J. 
Stockwell, and L. R. Wright, A Collection o f  Treaties and Other Documents Affecting the States o f  
Malaysia, 1761-1963, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1980), p. 391, Cyril 
Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 
1960), pp. 323-24.
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However, the policies implemented by the Malaysian Government are not those 
associated with the ‘normal’ Weberian notion of the state as a legal-rational actor where 
governments are supposed to maintain some degree of neutrality and play the role of 
neutral arbitrator among contending interests of various ethnic groups, besides 
accommodating their diverse needs and demands.10 Rather, Malaysia is different from 
other countries that also have multiethnic societies because Malaysia purports to serve 
the interests of a majority ethnic group, in the first instance the Malays, by 
implementing policies that are favourable to them.11 Also, Malaysia’s security is 
overwhelmingly linked to policies and strategies that are shaped to advance the interest 
of the Malay ethnic group.12 In view of the above factors, it is possible to identify six 
objectives of Malaysia’s national security policy. The objectives of the security policy 
are, (1) to incorporate the notion of the preservation of the Constitution, including the 
position of the Malay rulers, Islam and the special rights of the Malays,13 and the 
legitimate rights of the other ethnic groups; (2) to preserve the national unity and 
harmony among various ethnic groups since the existence of open internal ethnic 
conflict could be destructive to the country’s development; (3) to promote equitable 
economic development among all the ethnic groups in society in order to strengthen the 
country's internal resilience; (4) to guard against internal security threats (such as those 
from armed communist rebellion, communal conflict and Islamic extremist groups); (5) 
to protect national sovereignty such as preserving the territorial integrity of the state; (6)
10 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), "Ethnic Violence, Conflict 
Resolution and Cultural Pluralism," in Report o f  the UNRSID/UNDP International Seminar on Ethnic 
Diversity and Public Policies (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994).
11 See, for instance, Haji Ahmad and Kadir, "Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and Management: The 
Malaysian Case," pp. 42-64, Hoddie, Ethnic Realignments: A Comparative Study o f  Government 
Influences on Identity, pp. 87-105.
12 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 517.
13 For the purpose o f this thesis, the protection o f the Malays’ special rights is synonymous with the 
protection o f the Malays’ societal security. On the Malays’ special rights, refer to Gordon P Means, 
'"Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case o f Malaysia," Comparative Politics 5, no. 1 
(1972): pp. 29-61.
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to maintain a stable and peaceful environment in the areas of its strategic interest (that 
is, in its immediate vicinity, regionally and globally).14
The following section analyses who the Malays are and how the identity of this 
ethnic group has been constructed over time. In addition, the section aims to explain 
why and how the ethnic groups that have formed the separatist movements in Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines are related to the Malays living in Malaysia. The 
objective of this section is to show that in the process of constructing the Malay 
ethnicity, the government has absorbed under this category all the other indigenous 
people in the region that were not originally from the Malay peninsula. Since the Malay 
ethnic group in Malaysia comprises all the indigenous people in the region, the thesis 
analyses whether the ethnic factor affects Malaysia security practice towards the 
Malays’ ethnic brethren in the conflict areas, particularly in southern Thailand, Aceh 
and the Moro region.
3.1.1 The Construction of the Malay Ethnic Group
As mentioned in the previous chapter, two major perspectives serve to explain the nature 
of ethnicity, namely the primordialist and situationalist. This thesis adopts a 
combination of both the primordialist and the situationalist perspectives in dealing with 
the issue of ethnicity, especially when applying the concept of ethnicity to the Malay 
ethnic group. The reason for this is that the Malay ethnic group is both learned or 
constructed and innate. According to Shamsul, the Malay (Melayu) ethnic group was 
initially constructed by colonial historiography.15 Subsequently, this construction was 
adopted uncritically by most historians of postcolonial Malaysia, both Malay and non-
14Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 140.
15 Shamsul A.B., "A History o f  Identity, an Identity o f  a History: The Idea and Practice o f 'Malayness1 in 
Malaysia Reconsidered," Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (2001): pp. 355-66.
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Malay.16 In addition, Milner also claims that the Malay ethnic group is a concept in 
‘motion’.17 In other words, it is an invented concept, one that is persistently subject to 
development and contest. It was promoted particularly in the colonial period by Malay 
and some European ideologues which, at times displaying real ingenuity, defined, 
redefined, and bestowed dignity upon “Malayness.”18
Reid, for instance, has sketched the different meanings and applications of the 
terms ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ in the history of the Malay Archipelago.19 He argued 
that the terms initially represented self-referential categories among the people 
inhabiting the archipelago. Later, they became social labels that were used by the 
peoples of South Asia and China, who were mainly traders. Finally, these social labels 
were used by Europeans, namely, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and British, who were 
travellers, traders and, eventually, colonisers. In the first and second instances, in a non- 
European context, ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ were associated with the following: (1) a 
line of kingship acknowledging descent from Srivijaya and Malacca (Melaka); (2) a 
commercial Diaspora retaining the customs, language and trade practices of Malacca in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.20 Since the term was used in at least two 
different contexts, namely the non-European and the European, there is an element of 
ambiguity surrounding which group of people can be classified as Malay.
Even in anthropology, the term Malay has both narrow and broad meanings. In 
its narrow sense, references to Malays are references to the ethnic group straddling the 
Malacca Straits, which shares a clear cultural and historical heritage dating back to the
16 Ibid.
17 Anthony C. Milner, "Ideological Work in Constructing the Malay Majority," in Making Majorities: 
Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States, ed. Dru C. 
Gladney (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 151-69.
18 Ibid., pp. 151-69.
19 Anthony Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source o f Diverse Modem Identities," Journal o f  
Southeast Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (2001): pp. 295-313.
20 Leonard Y. Andaya, "The Search for the 'Origins' o f Melayu," Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies 32, 
no. 3 (2001): pp. 315-30.
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maritime empire of Srivijaya of southern Sumatra that flourished between the seventh 
and eleventh centuries. In its broad sense, on the other hand, the word Malay can refer 
also to Malay-speaking Muslims on other islands of the Indonesian archipelago, notably 
Kalimantan (Borneo), who are indigenous to those islands but who have converted from 
a traditional religion to Islam.21 The term Malay is sometimes also used to refer to the 
Austronesian Diaspora in maritime Southeast Asia, including the Filipinos.22 In fact, the 
notion of Malayness is not only being subscribed by the Malays in Malaysia but also by 
all the people in all the respective conflict areas. In other words, the view of the Malays 
in Malaysia that these people belong to the same ethnic group is not unilateral but a two- 
way process. For instance, the people who formed as the majority in the southern 
provinces of Thailand not only view themselves as Malays but also maintain strong ties 
with the Malays in Malaysia. As for the Acehnese, not only they perceived themselves 
as Malays, Aceh has been identified as one of the birthplaces of the Malay-language 
Islamic culture.23 In addition, the Moros in southern Philippine classify themselves 
closely with the Malays in Malaysia24 mainly because they view that they are part of the 
“Dunia Melayu” (Malay World).25 Since this thesis analyses the ethnic factor in 
Malaysia’s security practice, especially its practice towards the separatist movements in 
its neighbouring countries, the term Malay will be used in the broadest of the three 
senses and not solely be based on the Malaysian constitution’s definition of who is part
21 See Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 140, 
Doug Miles, Cutlass and Crescent Moon: A Case Study o f Social and Political Change in Outer Indonesia 
(Sydney: Centre for Asian Studies, University o f Sydney, 1976), Anthony S. K. Shome, Malay Political 
Leadership (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4.
22 See, for example, Robert Cribb and Li Narangoa, "Orphans o f Empire: Divided Peoples, Dilemmas o f  
Identity, and Old Imperial Borders in East and Southeast Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Cambridge University Press 46, no. 1 (2004): pp. 164-87, Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) 
as a Source o f Diverse Modem Identities.", Shome, Malay Political Leadership, p. 5.
23 Anthony Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden o f History in Aceh," Asian Ethnicity 5, no. 3 (2004): p. 303.
24 Peter G. Gowing, "The Muslim Filipino Minority," in The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Minor, 
ed. Raphael Israeli (London: Curzon, 1982), p. 19, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: 
Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 269.
25 Interview with Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, 25 February 2007.
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of the Malay ethnic group. Although there are other ethnic groups in the country, the 
Malaysian constitution only defines those who are Malays, which indirectly means that 
this particular ethnic group has a special status in the country. A further discussion of 
how the constitution defines the Malay ethnic group will be analysed in the following 
sub-sections (Malay after Independence of Malaysia). The following section 
demonstrates how the identity of the Malay as an ethnic group underwent a process of 
construction from the pre-colonial to the postcolonial era.
The Malays during the Melaka Empire
Melaka was the greatest Islamic empire of Southeast Asia and, for many contemporary 
Malays, remains the font of Malay identity.26 Historically, prior to the foundation of 
Melaka in the early fifteenth century, ‘Malay’ referred solely to the kingdoms in 
Sumatra.27 For example, according to the Chinese records, in the seventh century, 
‘Malayu’ appears as a more specific kingdom to the north of Srivijaya before being 
absorbed into the latter in the 680s.28 In addition, the Tanjore inscription of 1030 and 
Marco Polo around 1290 also identify ‘Malayur’ as one of Sumatra’s ancient 
kingdoms.29 However, Melaka’s success as a centre of commerce, religion, and literary 
output made it synonymous with Malay civilisation in the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries. As a result, the Malay identity that had previously referred solely to the 
Kingdoms in Sumatra shifted to Melaka. Consequently, this became a major source of 
conflict in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the principal Malay
26 Graham K. Brown, "The Formation and Management o f Political Identities: Indonesia and Malaysia 
Compared," (Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of 
Oxford, 2005), pp. 1-35.
27 Andaya, "The Search for the 'Origins' o f Melayu."
28 Anthony Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source o f Diverse Modem Identities," in 
Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across Boundaries, ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2004), p. 3.
29 Ibid.
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contender in Sumatra: the kingdom of Aceh.30 In keeping with constructivist theories of 
group identity that situate it as a phenomenon of modernity, careful readings of Malay 
texts from the pre-colonial period, especially during the height of the Melaka sultanate 
in the Malay world in the fifteenth century, have concluded that the term Malay was 
originally not applied to an ethnic group identity, but instead referred to an elite identity 
of those of royal descent.31 If any group identity of ‘Malayness’ is to be surmised in this 
period, it was premised primarily on the notion of Kerajaan -  the condition of being a 
subject of the Sultan.32
The conquest of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511 and the ensuing flight of its 
rulers to Johor marked the beginning of the demise of a hegemonic, Sultan-centred 
Malay identity. The merchant traders of Melaka spread across Southeast Asia, creating 
a new, diasporic Malay identity in places as diverse as Aceh, Siam, and Cambodia.33 
Despite efforts by Aceh and other areas on Sumatra to reclaim the right to be regarded 
as the heart of the Malay lands, the identification of the Malays with the peninsula 
became increasingly entrenched. With the division of the Malay world into Dutch and 
British spheres by the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 and the subsequent creation of 
independent nation-states in the mid-twentieth century, the Malays finally became 
identified with the peninsula.34
30 See, Leonard Y. Andaya, "Aceh's Contributions to Standards o f Malayness," Archipel 61 (2001): pp. 
29-68.
31 Virginia Matheson, "Concepts o f Malay Ethos in Indigenous Malay Writings," Journal o f  Southeast 
Asian Studies 10, no. 2 (1979): pp. 351-71.
32 See, for example, Anthony C, Milner, The Invention o f  Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting 
Nationalism and the Expansion o f  the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
Anthony C. Milner, Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve o f  Colonial Rule (Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press, 1982).
33 Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source o f Diverse Modem Identities."
34 Andaya, "The Search for the 'Origins' o f Melayu."
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Malay during the Colonial Period
The establishment of British colonial rule on the ‘Malay’ peninsula in the late nineteenth
century reinforced the ideas that the homeland, and hence the centre of the political life
of the Malays was on the peninsula, and that the fifteenth-century kingdom of Melaka
was the cradle of Malay civilisation. Proper behaviour, customary laws, standards of
government, language, and literature derived from the oral and written traditions of
Melaka became the ‘primordial’ values of being Malay.35 There is no doubt that
Thomas Stamford Raffles’ view of the Malays had a great effect on the imaginings of
English-speakers. He was regarded as the most important voice in projecting the idea of
a ‘Malay’ nation that was not limited to the traditional Malay sultans or even their
supporters, but instead embraced a large, if unspecified part of the Archipelago. In
defining who the Malays are, Raffles wrote:
‘I cannot but consider the Malayu nation as one people, speaking one 
language, though spread over so wide a space, preserving their character 
and customs, in all the maritime states lying between Sulu Seas and the 
Southern Oceans’.36
If one were to use this statement, then all the indigenous people that live in countries 
such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Southern Thailand and Singapore 
are part of the Malay nation. This statement would not only have applied then, but also 
now because the region of Southeast Asia, particularly the maritime states, is often 
referred to as the Malay Archipelago.37
The idea that the Peninsula was particularly ‘Malay’ appears also to have been 
something that was constructed by the English. In his late-eighteenth-century work, The 
History o f Sumatra, William Marsden thought the idea of the Peninsula as ‘Malayan’ or
35 Ibid.
36 Cited in, Shamsul A.B (2001); Thomas Stamford Raffles, "On the Malayu Nation," Asiatic Researches 
12(1816): p. 103.
37 For example, see, Muthiah Alagappa, "Dynamics o f International Security in Southeast Asia: Change 
and Continuity," Australian Journal o f  International Affairs (1991): pp. 17-22, Tan, Security Perspectives 
o f the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, pp. 1-18.
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‘Malay’ was of exclusively European origin, which had thereby confused many into 
thinking of the Peninsula as the place of Malay origin.38 In fact, this was an almost 
exclusively English perception since other Europeans usually called the Peninsula 
‘Malacca’, after its most famous city.39 The term ‘Malaya’ goes back at least as far as 
Alexander Hamilton in the early eighteenth century, especially in his use of the phrase 
‘Coast of Malaya’ which indicated the ports of Kedah and Perak.40 English maps, like 
French and Dutch, more often referred to the Peninsula by the name of Melaka until 
around 1800, however. As the British became more concerned with the Peninsula after 
the founding of Georgetown in Penang in 1786, they appear to have generally adopted 
the usages ‘Malay’ or ‘Malayan’ for the Peninsula. Once the London Treaty of 1824 
restricted British activity to the Peninsula, they were much more disposed to see it as a 
coherent unit under one of these labels. The first book explicitly on the subject, which 
P.J. Begbie published in 1834, used ‘Malayan’ in the title but referred to the ‘Malay 
Peninsula’ in the accompanying map.41
In addition to conceiving the peninsula as Malay, the British subsequently played 
a major role in constructing the Malay ethnic group. According to Hirschman, the 
origins of the ethnic constructs or the homogenised ethnic categories that now divide the 
population of Malaysia can be traced back to the decennial census taken by the colonial 
government beginning in 1871.42 He points out that while the early colonial censuses 
conducted in 1871 and 1881 respectively listed Malays, Boyanese, Acehnese, Javanese, 
Bugis, Manilamen, Siamese, and others as separate groups, the 1891 Census demarcated 
the three racial categories of modem Malaysia as Chinese, ‘Tamil and other natives of
38 Marsden William, The History o f  Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 326.
39 Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source o f Diverse Modem Identities," p. 11.
40 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account o f  the East Indies, ed. William Foster, vol. II (London: Argonaut 
Press, 1930), p. 41.
41 Peter James Begbie, The Malayan Peninsula (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967).
42 Charles Hirschman, "The Making o f  Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology," 
Sociological Forum 1, no. 2 (1986): pp. 330-61, Charles Hirschman, "The Meaning and Measurement o f  
Ethnicity in Malaysia," Journal o f  Asian Studies 46, no. 3 (1987): pp. 555-82.
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India’, and ‘Malays and other natives of the Archipelago’, each elaborately subdivided. 
In short, Hirschman argues that Malay thinking about their ethnicity was “not a 
prehistorical residue”, but rather derived from a ‘new’ theory that accompanied the rise 
of European technological superiority and expansion.43 The usage of ethnic categories 
prevailed not only among the colonialist and other foreigners, but also among the 
different ethnic groups in Malaysia who were increasingly conscious of their 
differences.44
Malay after Independence of Malaysia
The Malaysian constitution defines “Malay” as a person who follows Islam, habitually 
speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay customs, and was bom in the Federation 
of Malaya or Singapore (before independence).45 There is, however, a broader ethnic 
category used in major policy matters, especially after the New Economic Policy was 
introduced in 1971.46 This category is known as “Bumiputera” or the “son of the soil”. 
In addition to the Malays, the federal government used the term to refer to other 
indigenous people, such as Sino-natives, natives of Sarawak, Ibans, and others, who 
constitute the majority of the population.47 The introduction of this term is actually not 
very innovative. It is merely a new term for what in the 1891 census, conducted by the 
British colonial government, had already been used as the category of “Malays and other
43 Hirschman, "The Meaning and Measurement of Ethnicity in Malaysia," p. 568.
44 Shamsul A.B., "Bureaucratic Management o f Identity in a Modem State: "Malayness" In Postwar 
Malaysia," in Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, 
and the United States, ed. Dru C. Gladney (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 135-50.
45 Snodgrass, R.R (1978). Summary evaluation o f policies used to promote Bumiputra participation in 
modem sector in Malaysia [Development Paper No. 38]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
Institute o f International Development.
46 A.B., "A History o f Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice of'Malayness' in Malaysia 
Reconsidered," p. 364.
47 Ibid, N.M. Mehta, "Ethnic Divisions and Growth Mandates in Southeast Asia: Irreconcilable 
Conflicts?" (paper presented at the International Conference on Chinese Overseas, Seoul, Korea, July 12- 
14 2000).
87
natives of the Archipelago”.48 However, unlike the other Bumiputera, the Malays have 
their sovereign rulers, who under the Malaysian constitution are required to extend their 
special powers and privileges to protect the Malays and the “natives of Borneo”.49
After the introduction of the new term, Bumiputera became one of the most 
common synonyms for the Malay. By using this term, Malay identity came to be 
dominated not by subtle differences that distinguish Malays from other indigenous 
people of Sumatra, such as Acehnese and Minangkabau, but by the simple facts of 
religion -  Islam as opposed to Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism among most of the 
Chinese ethnic group and the Hinduism of the Indians.50 In fact, any of the indigenous 
peoples of the Indonesian archipelago, as long as they were Muslim, could be 
considered ‘Malay’ in the context of Malaysian domestic politics. In this way, not only 
immigrants from Sumatra, but also those from Java and Sulawesi and even Muslim 
Cham who migrated from Cambodia to Malaysia to escape the genocide by the Khmer 
Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979 could quickly be assimilated as Malays.51 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the ethnic groups that are living outside Malaysia’s state borders 
but are indigenous to the archipelago, who have long standing historical links and also 
share a very similar ethnic identity with the Malays in Malaysia, are also considered to 
be Malays.
Unlike other ethnic groups, the Malays organised themselves to confront the 
former colonial power to protect their interest in Malaysia especially after the British 
founded the Malayan Union in 1946. By virtue of their indigenous status, the Malays 
believe they are entitled to greater rights and to enjoy a superior moral claim on
48 A.B., "A History o f Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice of'Malayness' in Malaysia 
Reconsidered."
49 Boon Kheng Cheah, The Challenge o f  Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish Academic, 2004), p. 46.
50 Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay Concepts o f  Democracy and Community, 1945-1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993).
51 Cribb and Narangoa, "Orphans o f Empire: Divided Peoples, Dilemmas o f Identity, and Old Imperial 
Borders in East and Southeast Asia."
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government than more recent arrivals.52 Whereas the Chinese and the Indians had 
migrated to Malaysia during British colonialism from 1891 to 1931, the Malays had 
already made their claim to the territory following the establishment of the Malacca 
Sultanate in 1402.53 In addition, even before the 13th century, the Malay Peninsula had 
been subject to territorial claims by various Malay kingdoms and empires in the region 
such as the Sumatran-based Srivijaya in the fifth and sixth centuries, the Patani-based 
Langkasuka in the sixth and the seventh centuries and the Java-based Majapahit in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries.54 In short, the Malays believe that Malaysia (and its 
precursor Malaya) is the land of the Malays -  a proprietary belief and principle, and that 
the non-Malays are “sojourners”.55 Malays overwhelmingly subscribe to this notion, 
which then also translates to mean that Malays should have primacy in the polity, 
economy and society of the country. Despite holding strongly to this notion, the Malays 
have also accepted that the non-Malays have a place in Malaysia if they accept the 
“rules of the game” as set by the Malays.56
3.2 Ethnic Politics
In Malaysia, ethnic politics can be considered as a means to an end whereby political 
stability, regime security, economic growth and development, and multiracial peace and 
harmony are all regarded as key values in the preservation and promotion of national 
security.57 Besides incorporating historical (during the period of colonisation) and 
ideological factors, ethnicity has always been a major factor in developing policies and
52 Milton J. Esman, An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict (Oxford: Polity, 2004), p. 10.
53 Hj. Abdullah, "Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty," 
pp. 192-94.
U Ibid.: pp. 189-221.
55 Haji Ahmad and Kadir, "Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and Management: The Malaysian Case," p. 48.
56 See also, Boon Kheng Cheah, Malaysia: The Making o f a Nation (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2002).
57 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation."
89
strategies for moulding the nation since Malaysia gained its independence. This
phenomenon is acknowledged by Crouch, who states,
Since the 1960s, almost all policy issues in Malaysia have been affected by 
ethnicity, including language, education, government, employment, 
business licences, immigration, internal security, foreign policy or virtually 
everything else.58
The implementation of various national policies tailored according to ethnic groups was 
actually aimed at addressing the economic, social and educational imbalance among the 
ethnic groups brought about by British colonisation. However, these national policies 
led to the further promotion of ethnic politics in Malaysia.59
3.2.1 Ethnic Politics in Malaysia
The Malaysian government through its main political party in the National Front 
(Barisan Nasional - BN), the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), has 
promoted the interests of the ethnic group that it has represented by implementing a 
wide range of policies and rules to influence various sectors in ways that are favourable 
to their ethnic group.60 Because of the ethnicity-laden nature of Malaysia’s policies, 
especially in terms of its role in practising preferential policies favouring the dominant 
ethnic group, the country has been characterised as an “ethnocratic state”61 and its 
political system as a “consociational democracy”.62 In fact, Malaysia qualifies for all 
three propositions that would make the country an ethnocratic state, as outlined in the
58 Harold A. Crouch, "Managing Ethnic Tensions through Affirmative Action: The Malaysian 
Experience," in Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia, ed. N.J. Colleta, T.G Lim, and A. 
Kelles-Vitanen (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001), pp. 225-62.
59 Cynthia Joseph, "It Is So Unfair Here...It Is So Biased: Negotiating the Politics o f Ethnic Identification 
in Ways o f Being Malaysian Schoolgirls," Asian Ethnicity 7, no. 1 (2006): p. 56.
60 See, for example, Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 50-78, 
Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 53, Donald L. Horowitz, 
"Cause and Consequence in Public Policy Theory: "Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in 
Malaysia"," Policy Sciences 22, no. 3/4 (1989): pp. 249-87.
61 Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, pp. 36-37.
62 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (London: Yale University 
Press, 1977).
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previous chapter. First, almost all the key positions in the Malaysian cabinet, such as 
the ministerial posts for Home Affairs, Defence, Treasury, Trade, and Education have 
been monopolised by the key leaders of UMNO. In fact, the UMNO General Assembly 
has been dubbed the ‘real’ general election in Malaysia because those who win the posts 
of president and vice president of UMNO assume the posts of prime minister and deputy 
prime minister respectively.63
Second, Malaysia employs the Malays’ cultural attributes and values as the core 
elements for the elaboration of its national identity/ideology.64 For instance, the Malay 
language is the national language. Islam, which is the religion that is embraced by all 
Malays in Malaysia, is the official religion. The Malay rulers are constitutional 
monarchs. Lastly, the state institutions in Malaysia, such as the constitution, its laws, 
and its political structure, all serve to maintain and reinforce the power monopoly held 
by the Malay ethnic group. As a matter of fact, the privileges of Malays are entrenched 
in Article 153 of the Constitution that provides “special rights” to Malays, which are to 
be safeguarded by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (i.e. the paramount ruler or King).65 The 
provisions relating to the special rights of the Malays include civil service positions, 
scholarships, certain permits or licenses, and Malay reservations.66 Questioning these 
rights and privileges is forbidden and would result in a trial for sedition.67 Despite 
having an ethnocratic character, Malaysia has enjoyed a relatively high degree of
63 Kamarulnizam Abdullah, "National Security and Malay Unity: The Issue o f Radical Religious Elements 
in Malaysia," Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999).
64 See, for example, M. Shamsul Haque, "The Role o f the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in 
Malaysia," American Behavioral Scientist 47, no. 3 (2003), Hock Guan Lee, Ethnic Relations in 
Peninsular Malaysia: The Cultural and Economic Dimension (Singapore: Institute o f  Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2000), Tan, "From Sojourners to Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia 
and Malaysia."
65 Government o f Malaysia, The Federal Constitution (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1977).
66 R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Singapore: Federal 
Publications, 1980), pp. 38-40.
67 See, for example, Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries.", Cheah, 
The Challenge o f  Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia, R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian 
Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999), Hari Singh, "Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia Revisited," 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39, no. 1 (2001).
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political stability. This was largely due to a power sharing arrangement among elites
representing all the major ethnic groups that formed the core political parties in the
Alliance party (later National Front) since the country gained its independence. Besides
UMNO, whose basis for its ‘goal-rational legitimacy’ is to serve the interests of the
Malays68, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC) have formed the other major political parties within the National Front, which has
been ruling the country since 1957. However, while these two political parties are
engaged in a power-sharing grand coalition, UMNO is the senior partner and quite
clearly “calls the shots”.69
Following Arend Lijphart, the practice of ethnic politics in Malaysia can be
considered a classical example of consociationalism. The model interprets such a
political system favourably as the structure of ethnic composition in society is reflected
or represented in the structure of political parties and institutions to reduce interethnic
tension and enhance social harmony.70 Scholars such as Milne and Mauzy71 have shown
that consociationalism can, with some modification, be applied to Malaysia. This
situation has been described as one in which:
Two or more ethnic blocs, roughly equal in power, cooperated, in spite of 
remaining substantially separate in their activities, through agreement 
between their leaders, who at the same time were able to retain the support 
of their followers.72
One of the modifications of the concept of consociationalism, as it has been practised in 
Malaysia, is that the accommodation of ethnic-based interest is subject to two 
conditions: Malay political hegemony and the preservation of class and ethnic harmony.
68 J.N Mak, "Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," in Asia-Pacific 
Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, ed. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 127.
69 Haji Ahmad and Kadir, "Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and Management: The Malaysian Case," p. 49.
70Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.
71 Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia.
72 Ibid., p. 355.
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“Malay political hegemony” refers to the exercise of Malay political power in a 
multiethnic setting.73 “Strong” Malay political power denotes predominance of the 
Malays in most of the key positions in the civil service and the armed forces.74 These 
arrangements are elsewhere described as “hegemonic consociationalism.”75 This kind of 
politics has been instrumental in promoting a consensus whereby sensitive issues are not 
raised. Consociationalism may have helped to enhance Malaysia’s internal security, but 
as it has been argued elsewhere, it has also helped to legitimise a political structure that 
sustains the longevity of the ruling elites.76
All three political parties reached a consensus among themselves that allowed 
the modified consociational system to work in Malaysia through what many scholars 
call an ethnic bargain. In general, the ethnic bargain seeks to specify the relationship 
between ethnic groups and to channel national politics in peaceful directions.77 As a 
mechanism to manage expectations and demands, they normally set the parameters of 
resource allocations by laying out the rights and privileges of the various ethnic groups. 
The bargain establishes an understanding of the structure of society and the allocation of 
resources as a particularised social contract and the tacit understanding that each ethnic 
group does not transgress into the sphere of the other.78 As for Malaysia, the ethnic 
bargain allowed the immigrants (such as the Chinese and the Indians) to effectively 
become citizens of Malaya, but on the condition that they acknowledge ketuanan 
Melayu, or Malay dominance. Malay dominance has meant that the other ethnic groups 
have to accept ‘special Malay privileges’ in education, and government services,
73 Haji Ahmad and Kadir, "Ethnic Conflict, Prevention and Management: The Malaysian Case," p. 48.
74 See, for example, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second 
Front in the War on Terrorism, Chapter 5.
75 Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 18.
76 Singh, "Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia Revisited."
77 See, for example, Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), p. 21, Means, '"Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case o f  
Malaysia," pp. 29-61, Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, pp. 79-85.
78 Tan, "From Sojourners to Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia and Malaysia."
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‘Malay’ royalty as their rulers, Islam as the official religion, and the ‘Malay’ language 
as the official language of Malaya.79 The ethnic bargain was then incorporated into the 
1957 Federation of Malaya. Malays continue to receive ‘special status’ treatment in 
matters of language, culture, and as regards the position of the sultans.
In other words, given the dominant role of the Malay ethnic group in domestic 
Malaysian political life, the idea of consociationalism from Lijphart has been modified 
to ‘hegemonic consociationalism’ whereby Malaysia’s security is translated into policies 
and strategies which are designed to accommodate and promote Malays’ ethnic 
interests.80 In short, this sub-section has argued that despite being a multiethnic state, 
Malaysia’s domestic politics is primarily concerned with safeguarding the interests of 
the Malay ethnic group in the country. Since the ethnic factor has indeed had an 
influence on Malaysia’s domestic affairs, the thesis asks whether these interests are 
extended towards other Malays living outside the country. To shed some light on this 
question, the following section examines the origins of Malay nationalism. This will be 
followed by a section analysing how the Malaysian government has defended Malay 
interests both against “internal and external threats”.
3.2.2 Malay Nationalism
Historically, Malay nationalism developed against the backdrop of the signing of the 
MacMichael Agreement with Britain by all the nine Malay sultans, which led to the 
creation the Malayan Union in April 1946.81 The opposition to the British-initiated 
Malayan Union provoked a huge Malay crowd to gather spontaneously at a protest
79 See, for example, A.B., "A History o f Identity, an Identity of a History: The Idea and Practice o f  
'Malayness' in Malaysia Reconsidered," pp. 355-66, Hussin Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 22-28, Tan, Security Perspectives ofthe Malay Archipelago: 
Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 113, Tan, "From Sojourners to 
Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia and Malaysia."
80 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 517.
81 Shome, Malay Political Leadership, p. 49.
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meeting in May 1946. This show of solidarity culminated in the formation of the 
country’s first united Malay political party, UMNO, a platform upon which Malay 
nationalism was consummated.82 The unprecedented display of Malay unity in the wake 
of the British plan to strip the Malay monarch of all but ceremonial power and grant 
broad citizenship rights to non-Malays has been identified as the birth of Malay 
nationalism.83 The Malays opposed the Malayan Union because they thought that the 
union would destroy the Malay states and their sultans’ sovereignty, which were the 
symbols of their community’s special status, and an affirmation of the fact that Malaya 
was a Malay country.84
In addition, the Malayan Union also aimed to allow a liberal citizenship 
provision that accorded immigrants equal political status with the Malays.85 According 
to Roff, although demographic concern was not the only factor that led to the emergence 
of Malay nationalism, it was a critical one.86 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the Malays comprised 90 per cent of the entire population of the Malay Peninsula, 
including the small island of Singapore. However, after the Chinese and Indians 
migrated in large numbers under British colonial rule to work in the tin mines and 
rubber plantations of British Malaya, the proportion of the Malays in the country 
decreased tremendously. The demographic change whereby the Chinese and Indian 
immigrants had outnumbered the Malays is illustrated in Table 1 below.
82 Ibid., p. 61.
83 See, for example, Cheah, Malaysia: The Making o f  a Nation, p. 2, Mak, "Malaysian Defence and 
Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," p. 132, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay 
Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 112.
84 Leong H. Liew, "Ethnicity and Class in Malaysia," in Ethnicity in Asia: A Comparative Introduction, 
Asia's Transformations, ed. Colin. Mackerras (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 88-100.
85 Mohamad Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit 
Universiti Malaya, 1974), pp. 13-21.
86 William R. Roff, The Origins o f  Malay Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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Table 1: Malaya: Population by Ethnic Group, 1911-47
(Number in Thousands, Percentage as a Proportion of Total Population)
'
Malaysians* Chinese Indians**
Year No. % No. % No. %
1911 1,438 54 917 34 267 10
1921 1,651 49 1,175 35 472 14
1931 1,962 45 1,709 39 624 14
1947 2,544 43 2,615 45 600 10
Notes: * ‘Malaysians’ include Malays and Indonesians.
** Includes Pakistanis after 1947 
The Table excludes ‘other’ ethnic groups.
Source: Malaya: Census Report 1911-1947 quoted in Kaur, Amarjit. "Refugees and 
Refugee Policy in Malaysia." UNEAC Asia Papers, no. 18 (2007): 77-90.
In fact, after the 1921 census, the Malays came to realise that they were outnumbered by 
the immigrant populations and hence had become a minority in their own “motherland”. 
The proportion of Malays vis-^-vis non-Malays which stood at 54 per cent in 1911, 
reduced to 49 per cent in 1921, declining further to 45 per cent in 1931. By 1947, the 
Chinese population of Malaya outnumbered the Malays, with the Indians in third place. 
To the Malays, it was clear that if all immigrants were accorded equal status, this could 
ultimately mean that non-Malays might be at the helm of political leadership.
In the event, the protest against the Malayan Union led by UMNO successfully 
pressured the British to abandon the Malayan Union plan and restored the pre-war 
arrangement that favoured the Malays.87 According to Stockwell, the formation of 
UMNO had long-lasting ramifications on the construction of ethnic politics in the 
country.88 This is mainly because the main objective and mission of UMNO, as stated
87 William F Case, "The New Malaysian Nationalism: Inform Beginnings, Crashing Finale," Asian 
Ethnicity 1, no. 2 (2000): pp. 131-47.
88A. J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1948 
(Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society, 1979), A.J. Stockwell, "The Formation 
of the First Years o f the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 1946-1948," Modem Asian 
Studies 11, no. 4 (1977): pp. 481-513.
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in the party’s constitution, is the protection of Malay rights and identity.89 After the 
British withdrew from implementing the Malayan Union in Malaya, they secured with 
UMNO the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948. Under the Agreement, Malay 
rights and privileges were safeguarded, especially with regard to key issues such as land 
ownership, citizenship, access to political offices, national language and religion.90 The 
agreement dovetailed with existing agreements. When the British signed treaties with 
the Malay rulers between 1874 and 1914, these treaties had implied a form of 
trusteeship on behalf of the Malay rulers and their subjects. While not mentioning 
special rights for Malays, these treaties had given rise to administrative rules marking a 
distinction between Malays and non-Malay immigrants.91 For example, the first explicit 
system of Malay special rights implemented by the British was the Malay right over 
land ownership. Between 1913 and 1941, the Malay states passed legislation 
designating large areas of land as “Malay reservations” where only Malays could own 
or lease land and non-Malays were prevented from holding mortgages or seizing land in 
discharge of debts.92
In short, UMNO not only succeeded in dismantling the Malayan Union, it also 
convinced Britain of its sole right to negotiate future constitutional matters since the 
party had successfully asserted its image as a political player representing the interests
89 See, for example, Mak, "Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," p. 
129, Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 17, Muhammad Ikmal Said, "Malay Nationalism and 
National Identity," Soumen Anthropologi 2 (1995): pp. 11-31.
90 See, for example, Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, pp. 27-28, Tan, "From Sojourners to 
Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia and Malaysia," pp. 949-78, Riwanto 
Tirtosudarmo, "The Orang Melayu and Orang Jawa in the 'Land Below the Winds'," in Crise Working 
Paper 14 (Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth 
House, University o f Oxford, 2005).
91 Gordon P Means, "Ethnic Preference Policies in Malaysia," in Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in 
Developing States, ed. Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 
96.
92 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development o f  Malaya: 
(Report o f  a Mission Organized by the International Bank fo r  Reconstruction and Development... At the 
Request o f  the Governments o f  the Federation o f Malaya,...Of Singapore and the United Kingdom) 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 311-13.
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of the majority of the indigenous people in Malaya.93 Consequently, ‘Malay 
nationalism’, promoted by UMNO, became the backbone of Malayan politics that aimed 
at ensuring Malay supremacy in relation to the other ethnic groups in the country. 
Given the circumstances of UMNO’s birth, it is not surprising that the party saw itself 
as the defender of Malay rights and interests, with the security perceptions of its leaders 
shaped around the objectives of Malay survival.94 In other words, the referent units of 
Malaysian security were to be principally Malay in character and determined almost 
exclusively by the Malays, to whom power was transferred constitutionally by the 
British colonial masters on August 31, 1957.95 Preserving this domination was the 
primary goal of Malaysian domestic security objectives.
Relations between the Malays and the Chinese are discussed in further detail in 
the next section. The objective is not to illustrate the long history of discontent between 
the two groups.96 Instead, the section demonstrates how the Malaysian government after 
independence has acted as a defender and protector of the Malay ethnic group and its 
interests against perceived internal and external threats. Internally, the fear of being 
overwhelmed by the Chinese ethnic group has remained as a primary concern of the 
Malay community. The Chinese are still viewed as posing a threat to the Malay 
community because although they only form the second largest ethnic group in the 
country, they have a bigger share in ownership of the country’s total wealth as compared
93 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y Andaya, A History o f  Malaysia (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 
256, Shome, Malay Political Leadership, p. 61.
94 T an, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 113.
95 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 516.
96 For detailed discussions on this issue, see Alan Collins, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and 
Malaysian Education," The Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005): pp. 567-88, Haque, "The Role o f the State in 
Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia."
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to the other ethnic groups.97 The external dimension of this threat is discussed in the 
next section.
3.2.3 Malay -  Chinese Relations
The increasing number of non-Malays, coupled with their rising control over the 
economy (especially by the Chinese ethnic group), has been a source of fear for the 
Malays, whose claims to the ownership of the land date back thousands of years. For 
instance, as discussed above, the census of 1931 showed that the Chinese had become 
more populous in British Malaya than the Malays (which included Singapore). Even the 
English historian A.J. Toynbee, after a tour of the region, predicted that eventually the 
country would (“by peaceful penetration”) become a Chinese province.98 It was this fear 
that aside from resentment against British colonialism gave birth to Malay nationalism 
in 1946. By 2006, according to the Department of Statistics, of the total population of 
nearly 22 million, the Malays and other indigenous groups constituted 65.1 per cent, 
whereas the Chinese made up 26 per cent, the Indians 7.7 per cent, and the remaining 
groups 1.2 per cent.99 However, despite the significant relative decrease of the Chinese 
population over the last few decades, Malay envy of the Chinese has remained an 
important factor in the political organisation of the Malays.100 This envy feeds on 
Chinese success, particularly due to their ability to dominate the country’s economy. 
The dominant position of the Chinese in the country’s economy will be discussed in 
further detail later in this section.
97 See, for example, Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), p. 63, Mah, "Affirmative Action, Ethnicity and Integration: The Case o f  
Malaysia.", Jomo Kwame Sundaram, A Question o f  Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in 
Malaya (Manila: Monthly Review Press, 1998), p. 254.
98 Kay Kim Khoo, "Sino-Malaya Relations in Peninsular Malaysia before 1942," Journal o f  Southeast 
AsianStudies 12,no. 1 (1981): pp. 93-107.KhooKayKim. 1981. “Sino-Malaya Relations in Peninsular 
Malaysia before 1942.” Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 12(1): 93-107
99 Department o f Statistics, Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics (Press 
Statement) (Department o f Statistics, Malaysia, 2006 [cited 24 March 2006]).




When UMNO managed to convince the British colonial rulers to drop the Malayan 
Union plan and to restore the special privileges to the Malays through the Federation of 
Malaya Agreement in 1948, it caused an embittered response from the non-Malays, 
especially the ethnic Chinese. This bitterness led some Chinese to feel that they had no 
choice but to turn to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) for justice.101 Still in 1948, 
alienated elements of the Chinese community, in part also galvanised by international 
communism, retaliated against the decision to restore the special privileges to the 
Malays with industrial stoppages, followed by the launching of a full-scale 
insurgency.102 The communist insurgency aggravated ethnic conflict in Malaya because 
the Malays viewed it as a Chinese challenge to their political power legitimised by the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948.103 Decision makers concluded that defeating 
internal communism and containing international communism would be given the most 
important priority in order to establish security in the country. Consequently, between 
1948 and 1960, the British launched the Malayan Emergency to contain communist 
activity in Malaya.104
The government’s apprehension towards the communist insurgency was 
strengthened by the ethnic composition of the Malayan communists, as nearly all of 
them were Chinese. Since the security forces were mainly Malay, this insurgency 
conflict carried an ethnic overtone.105 Furthermore, the presence of a sizeable ethnic 
Chinese population in Malaya fuelled official concern about their potential role as fifth
101 Mak, "Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," p. 113.
102 The best account is perhaps Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan 
Emergency, 1948-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
103 On the Emergency, see, Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (London: 
Muller, 1975). On the assertion that Malay political hegemony was implied in the Federation o f Malaya 
Agreement, refer to Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y Andaya, A History o f  Malaysia (London: 
Macmillan, 2000).
104 Tan, "From Sojourners to Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia and Malaysia,"
pp. 949-78.
columnists in the service of the CPM and the Communist Party of China (CPC).106 For
many Malays, this period cemented the perception that all Chinese were communists,
and all communists Chinese.107 This is because the insurgency gained little support from
the Malay community, giving rise to the perception that the struggle was actually
between the Chinese and the Malays.108 The anti-communal feeling towards the
overseas Chinese has been illustrated as follows:
The overseas Chinese are a unique phenomenon that often poses problems.
They have been frequently dubbed by innuendoes as the “fifth column” of 
the People’s Republic of China dedicated to the work of infiltration, 
subversion, and armed insurrection to overthrow the government of their 
countries of residence. They have frequently been portrayed as 
sentimentally and intellectually predisposed to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).109
In December 1989, a tripartite Peace Accord was signed between the CPM and the Thai 
and Malaysian governments, under which the CPM would lay down its arms.110 The 
CPM insurgency appeared to be buried for good, given the rapid economic development 
in Malaysia, which provided increased prosperity to significant sections of the 
population, including the Chinese. However, it had taken several decades of counter­
insurgency efforts to finally overcome the revolt. Significantly, the roots of the 
Malaysian conception of comprehensive security can be traced to the wide-ranging 
policy measures employed to counter the communist insurgency during the 1948-60 
period.111
106 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," pp. 513-48.
107 Boon Kheng Cheah, "Sino-Malay Conflicts in Malaya, 1945-1946: Communist Vendetta and Islamic 
Resistance," Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (1981): pp. 108-17.
108 Case, "The New Malaysian Nationalism: Inform Beginnings, Crashing Finale," pp. 131-47.
109 Ngor Chong Chan, "ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship," in ASEAN and China: An 
Evolving Relationship, ed. Joyce K. Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee, and Soedjati Djiwandono (Berkeley: 
University o f California, Institute o f East Asian Studies, 1988), p. 125.
110K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia in 1989: Communists End Armed Struggle," Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (1990): pp. 
210 -20 .
111 Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," pp. 50-78.
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Ethnic Riots - Mav 1969
In the 1969 general elections, Malaysia witnessed the most aggressive campaign ever 
staged by dominant Chinese opposition parties when they succeeded in making 
unprecedented electoral gains."2 In the election, the Alliance113 suffered a major 
setback, losing twenty-two of the seats it had held, and gaining less than 50 percent of 
the total vote.114 Although the ruling party retained power at the federal level, it lost its 
two-thirds majority, which the party had previously commanded in the Parliament.115 In 
addition, the Alliance lost control of the state assemblies in Penang, Perak, and 
Kelantan, while in Selangor, both the Alliance and the combined opposition tied at 
fourteen seats each.116 In a way, the election results symbolised the loss of Malay 
dominance in Malaysian politics, one of the key elements that was agreed upon in the 
ethnic bargain between the leaders of the two communities prior to independence. 117 
The Malays feared that the results would threaten the predominance of their culture and 
their privileged political position. John Funston captures the Malay’s fear when he 
writes,
Characteristically, such outbursts occur when the very identity if not 
existence of the community is felt to be threatened.... [The] Malays 
perceived a direct threat to their identity and retaliated with the fanaticism 
of the religiously possessed in a holy war.118
112 Liew, "Ethnicity and Class in Malaysia," pp. 88-100.
113 Alliance is the name of the coalition o f the ruling party which is comprised o f the main party 
representing each o f the three major ethnic groups i.e. the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)
114 Means, '"Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development: The Case o f Malaysia," p. 54.
115 William F Case, "Testing Malaysia's Pseudo-Democracy," in The State o f  Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity, 
and Reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 29-48, Liew, "Ethnicity 
and Class in Malaysia."
116 Stuart Drummond and David Hawkins, "The Malaysian Elections o f 1969: An Analysis o f the 
Campaign and the Results," Asian Survey 10, no. 4 (1970): pp. 320-35.
117 See, for example, A.B., "Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modem State: "Malayness" In 
Postwar Malaysia," pp. 135-50, Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global 
Issues, p. 54, John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study o f  the United Malays National 
Organisation and Party Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), p. 211, Singh, 
"Ethnic Conflict in Malaysia Revisited," pp. 42-65.
118 Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study o f  the United Malays National Organisation and Party 
Islam, p. 211.
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The result of the fear was the serious inter-ethnic rioting that erupted on 13 May 
1969.119 The riots between Chinese and Malay communities lasted over a period of two 
and a half weeks and, according to official figures, resulted in 196 fatalities and 409 
injured.120 The Malaysian government responded by suspending parliament and 
declaring a state of emergency, whereby the authority usually exercised by the cabinet 
was handed over to the director of the National Operations Council (NOC).121 In its 
effort to reduce ethnic tension, the NOC tightened political control by prohibiting public 
discussion on sensitive issues, even in parliament.122 Among the issues that were 
classified as sensitive were the special position of Malays and natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak, the status of the Malay language as the national language, citizenship, and 
sovereignty of the sultans.123 When the Parliament reconvened in February 1971, this 
prohibition was integrated into the Constitution (Amendment Act).124 Until today, any 
public discussion questioning these rights and privileges remains forbidden and would 
normally result in a trial for sedition.125 In other words, when the Malay dominance was 
seen as being challenged by the Chinese, the government (led by UMNO) reacted by 
further increasing Malay dominance and institutionalising Malay hegemony.126
Along with these constitutional changes, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
formulated. The Second Prime Minister, Tun Razak (1970-1976) asserted, “it (the
119 John Butcher, "May 13: A Review o f  Some Controversies in Accounts o f  the Riots," in Reinventing 
Malaysia: Reflections on Its Past and Future, ed. K. S. Jomo (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 2001), pp. 35-56.
120 Federation o f Malaysia. National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report (Kuala Lumpur: 
1969).
121 See, for example, Haque, "The Role o f the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia," pp. 240- 
66, Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, p. 23.
122 Ozay Mehmet, Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth and Trusteeship (London: Croom Helm, 
1986), p. 9, Takashi Torii, "The New Economic Policy and the United Malays National Organization - 
with Special Reference to the Restructuring of Malaysian Society," The Developing Economies XXXV, 
no. 3 (1997): pp. 209-39.
123 Torii, "The New Economic Policy and the United Malays National Organization - with Special 
Reference to the Restructuring o f Malaysian Society."
124 Ibid.
125 A.B., "Bureaucratic Management o f Identity in a Modem State: "Malayness" In Postwar Malaysia.", 
Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 50-78.
126 A.B., "Bureaucratic Management o f Identity in a Modem State: "Malayness" In Postwar Malaysia."
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NEP) was the last chance for the survival of the people and the country.”127 It contained 
a two-pronged development programme. The first prong aimed to reduce and 
eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment 
opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of ethnic group. The second objective 
aimed to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalances which would reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of ethnic 
group with economic functions. The NEP involved the modernisation of rural life, a 
rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial 
and industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation, in order for 
Malays and other indigenous people to become full partners in all aspects of the 
economic life of the nation.128
Before the NEP was implemented, there were serious inequalities among the 
three ethnic groups, especially concerning their average level of income. For example, 
in 1957, the average monthly income for the Malays was estimated to be around Ringgit 
Malaysia (RM) 139, for the Indians it was RM 237 while for the Chinese it was RM 
300.129 In terms of levels of poverty, according to estimates in 1966, nearly 65 per cent 
of all Malays lived below the official poverty line, compared with 26 per cent of the 
Chinese and 39 per cent of the Indian households.130 Collectively, the Malays held no 
more than 1.5 per cent of the country’s equity during the first decade of independence, 
while the Chinese held around 23 per cent and foreign investors the rest.131 The target of
127 Cited by Karl Von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in 
Malaysia (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 406.
128 See, for example, Edmund Terence Gomez, The State o f  Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity, and Reform 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), Malaysia., Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Kuala Lumpur: Printed 
at the Govt. Press, 1971), Robin Ramcharan, "Southeast Asian Security: Pitfalls o f  the Regional 
Approach," in PSIS Occasional Paper Number 1 (Geneva: Programme of Strategic and International 
Security Studies, 1998), Torii, "The New Economic Policy and the United Malays National Organization - 
with Special Reference to the Restructuring of Malaysian Society."
129 Mah, "Affirmative Action, Ethnicity and Integration: The Case o f Malaysia," pp. 250-76.
130 Gurr and Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, p. 63.
131 Sundaram, A Question o f  Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaya, p. 254.
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the NEP'32 was to reduce the percentage of the population living in poverty and to 
increase the equity ownership of the Malay community from under 2 per cent in 1970 to 
30 per cent by 1990. In short, the decision to implement NEP was made to redress the 
economic imbalances among the ethnic groups because the Malay political elites 
believed that poverty was one of the reasons for the eruption of the racial riots in 1969.
According to Tan, the riots prompted almost two years of emergency rule, which 
led to the erosion of genuine consociationalism, marking the beginning of increased 
Malay control and dominance in various areas affected, mainly through the NEP.133 
Through the NEP, UMNO managed to ensure that the Malays could also achieve 
eventual economic dominance aside from maintaining their political dominance in the 
country.134 Indeed, at the end of the NEP in 1990, the Malays’ share of the economy 
rose from 3 per cent at the onset of the NEP in 1971 to 20 per cent.135 The level of 
poverty fell from 30 per cent in 1977 to 17 per cent in 1987 and more Malays became 
entrepreneurs, creating a substantial Malay middle class because of the affirmative pro- 
Malay economic policies of the NEP. The improvements in the Malay population’s 
economic condition in general, however, did not have any negative effect on the non- 
Malays ’ economic wealth. Since 1971, the share of the economy under control of non- 
Malays had risen from 34 per cent to 47 per cent.136
132 On NEP, see, R.S. Milne, "Malaysia - Beyond the New Economic Policy," Asian Survey 26, no. 12 
(1986): pp. 1364-82, R.S. Milne, "The Politics o f Malaysia's New Economic Policy," Pacific Affairs 49, 
no. 2 (1976): pp. 235-62.
133 Tan, "From Sojourners to Citizens: Managing the Ethnic Chinese Minority in Indonesia and Malaysia," 
pp. 949-78.
134 Mak, "Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," p. 129.
135 Cited from Malaysian Government’s Statistic by Torii, "The New Economic Policy and the United 
Malays National Organization - with Special Reference to the Restructuring o f  Malaysian Society."
136 Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, Politics in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1999), pp. 133-4.
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Operation Lalang 1987
Besides contestation over political and economic issues, various beliefs in types of 
education also contributed to ethnic tension in Malaysia. Unlike with political and 
economic matters, where ethnic contestation was “stabilised”, educational issues 
remained contentious. From time to time, there were flare-ups and tensions on matters 
of education that hinged around the autonomy of vernacular education.137 For various 
reasons, the Chinese in Malaysia developed and maintained a very passionate 
attachment to Chinese education. In essence, the Chinese strongly resisted any 
initiatives made by the government to standardise the education system in the country 
because they perceived them as government interference in their affairs. Scholars such 
as Lee Hock Guan even describe the initiative by the government to streamline the 
country’s education system as a “Malay-dominated state’s attempts to regulate, control 
and marginalize Chinese education”.138 In addition, Hock Guan claims that the main 
reason why the government wanted to standardise the education system was due to the 
Malays perception that “the Chinese education is detrimental to the development of a 
national culture and to fostering national unity”.139 The Chinese Education Movement 
(Dong Jiao Zong, DJZ) also held this perception. The DJZ was a body that represented 
two Chinese educationalist organisations, namely: the United Chinese School 
Committees’ Association (UCSCA) and the United Chinese School Teachers’ 
Association (UCSTA).140 In addition, the DJZ was also responsible for the
137 Johan Saravanamuthu, "Malaysian Multicultural Policy and Practices: Between Communalism and 
Consociationalism," in The Challenge o f Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia, ed. Boon Kheng 
Cheah (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004).
138 Lee, Ethnic Relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The Cultural and Economic Dimension, p. 9.
139 Ibid., p. 5.
140 Collins, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education," pp. 567-88.
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administration, the running of more than 1,281 Chinese primary schools in Malaysia and 
raising funds for the Independent Chinese Secondary Schools.141
The suspicions surrounding government initiatives concerning Chinese 
vernacular education reached a climax when the then Minister of Education appointed 
100 non-Mandarin educated Chinese teachers in the Chinese primary schools in 
September 1987.142 The decision contributed to a rise in ethnic tension in Malaysia 
after DJZ warned the Chinese community that these appointments would “change the 
character of the Chinese schools”.143 On top of this, DJZ successfully created fear 
among the Chinese community that the appointment ‘was a subtle attempt by the regime 
to further undermine the status of the Chinese population’.144 As a result, DJZ was able 
to quickly mobilise support for a protest by bringing together the opposition Chinese- 
based political party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), other Chinese associations 
and guilds, the National Front Chinese parties, the MCA, and Gerakan.145 Over 2,000 
leaders from all of these Chinese-based organisations gathered on 11 October 1987 at 
the Thean Hou Temple in Kuala Lumpur where they called for a three-day boycott of 
schools if the appointments were not withdrawn.146
Even though the boycott was called off, the Malays headed by the Youth wing of 
UMNO responded by holding a rally in which around 10,000 Malays participated.147
141 Ibid.
142 For an account o f events see, Johan Saravanamuthu, "Authoritarian Statism and Strategies for 
Democratisation: Malaysia in the 1980s," in Partisan Scholarship: Essays in Honour o f Renato 
Constantino, ed. Peter Limqueco and Renato Constantino (Manila, Million: Journal o f Contemporary Asia 
Publishers, 1989).
143 Liok Ee Tan, "DJZ and the Challenge to Cultural Hegemony 1951-1987," in Fragmented Vision : 
Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, ed. Joel S. Kahn and Francis Kok-Wah Loh (North 
Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia, in association with Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 181 -201.
144 Sumit Ganguly, "The Politics o f Language Policies in Malaysia and Singapore," in Fighting Words: 
Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, ed. Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 2003), p. 251.
145 Amy L Freedman, "The Effect o f Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas 
Acculturation: The Case of Malaysia," Modem Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2001): pp. 411-40.
146 Collins, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education."
147 Saravanamuthu, "Malaysian Multicultural Policy and Practices: Between Communalism and 
Consociationalism," pp. 89-114.
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During the rally, MCA leaders, such as its deputy president, were condemned for 
championing the DJZ cause and colluding with the opposition party, the DAP. In 
addition, UMNO also planned to have another rally whereby it was estimated that 
around half a million of its members would attend. The rally was actually designed to 
celebrate UMNO’s 41st Anniversary. However, with the Malays perceiving that the 
Chinese were uniting against them, there was every prospect that the rally would 
become anti-Chinese. At that time, the possibility of experiencing another ethnic riot in 
Kuala Lumpur was considered very high. As Harold Crouch wrote, “[t] here seems to 
be little doubt that racial tensions had risen to a high point during October 1987; fear[s] 
that ‘May 13 Ha[d] Begun”, were by no means unfounded.148 Fearing another ethnic riot 
in the capital city, the Inspector General of Police cancelled the rally.
This tension led the government to launch “Operation Lalang” in October 1987, 
during which 150 individuals were arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA).149 
Among those arrested were members of the political parties from DAP, MCA, Gerakan, 
PAS, and UMNO youth leaders. In addition, a number of university lecturers and the 
President of DJZ were also arrested and three newspapers were suspended 
indefinitely.150 The government accused the DJZ of playing “prominent roles in 
exploiting sensitive issues as extremist pressure groups”, of increasing “racial 
sentiments among the Chinese”, and “agitation” by “raising questions that can hurt the 
feelings of the Malays”.151 The ‘questions raised’ regarded the imbalance in 
opportunities that exist between the different races because of Malaysia’s affirmative 
action policies.
148 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, p. 111.
149 Lee, Ethnic Relations in Peninsular Malaysia: The Cultural and Economic Dimension.
150 Collins, "Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education."
151 Ibid.
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Besides the DJZ, a Chinese election body, the Malaysian Chinese Organisations’ 
Elections Appeal Committee (SUQUI), also contributed to ethnic tension in the country 
when, during the 1997 economic crisis, the body took issue with Bumiputera and non- 
Bumiputera rights.152 In 2000, ethnic tensions increased again when the body demanded 
that UMNO accord non-Malays an equal status with Malays and other Bumiputera and 
to end the education quotas. The then Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 
responded to the demand by indicating that there would be no elimination of Bumiputera 
rights as long as the Malays wished to retain them.
In short, the account above shows how contentious relations have been between 
the two main ethnic groups in Malaysia. It also indicates that the government is ever 
willing to implement any policies that would serve to protect the interest of the Malays 
in the country. As Gordon Means has perceptively noted, ‘the reality of Malay political 
power [being] overwhelming and unassailable’ was clear to all.153 Not only was Malay 
security guaranteed politically, but also the community’s sense of relative deprivation 
gradually declined as the state became more assertive in the economic realm as a result 
of the NEP, and succeeded redressing economic imbalances to some extent. Overall, the 
Malaysian state, in Nathan’s view, is only a political expression: its political 
fundamentals are Malay in origin and evolution. The political basis of Malaysian 
security prioritises the security of ethnic Malays over other groups.154 All the preceding 
points show that domestically, the themes of Malay survival and political domination, 
apart from the struggle for political equality by other ethnic groups, have dominated the 
discussion regarding identity and security in Malaysia since independence.155 The 
following section argues that the ethnic factor has equally informed Malaysia’s foreign
152 Cheah, The Challenge o f Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia, p. 3.
153 Gordon P Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 316.
154 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 521.
155 Haque, "The Role o f the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia," pp. 240-66.
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policy especially with regard to ‘protecting’ the interests of the Malays from perceived 
external threats.
3.3 Protecting the Malays' Interests from External Threats
Given the intertwined nature of the state’s interests and the political leadership, the 
government has retained its role in formulating the foreign policy. Although there are 
other actors besides the state who have played some role in shaping the country’s 
foreign policy, their role have been limited to the issues related to the economic 
development of the country.156 Areas that are perceived as more crucial such as the 
military-security and political-ideological issues, however, are still being monopolised 
by the government.157 Nevertheless, the process of formulating the policy does not takes 
place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as it is commonly assumed. Instead, the actual 
formulation of foreign policy has traditionally take place primarily in the Prime 
Minister’s Department and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been limited 
only to the implementation of foreign policy decisions.158 In fact, within the Malaysian 
government’s bureaucratic structure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not even 
regarded as a major or central agency unlike other government agencies/ministries such 
as the Treasury, the Public Services Department or the Prime Minister’s Department.159 
A number of scholars had analysed the process of formulating Malaysia’s foreign 
policy.160 In general, they have concluded that in fact, the shaping of its foreign policy
156 Hari Singh, "Malaysia: Growing Foreign Policy Complexity and Persistent State Power," in Diplomacy 
and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes, ed. Maurice 
A. East and Justin Robertson (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 217.
157 Ibid., pp. 216-17.
158 Ibid., p. 201.
159 Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy: Malaysia's Foreign Ministry," in 
Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, ed. Brian Hocking (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 
119.
160 See, for example, Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Looking 
Outward and Moving Inward?," in Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. 
Robert A. Scalapino (Berkeley: Institute o f East Asian Studies, University o f  California, 1988), Nair,
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was essentially based on the rationalisation of the prevailing conceptions of the head of 
the government and his observations of domestic needs and international considerations. 
In other words, Malaysia’s foreign policy is not the outcome of a domestic debate but 
more of a reflection of the style, values, and sense of national interest held by the leader 
of the country.161
Having said that, Malaysia’s foreign policy, however, have not been determined 
solely by all of the respective Prime Ministers. In fact, there are other key agencies that 
are known to be utilised by the Prime Ministers in the policy formulation process. 
Among others is the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS). The ISIS 
which is supposedly an independent organisation is essentially a hybrid of present and 
former government officials who oversee it, and its existence depends heavily on 
government funding.162 According to Haji Ahmad, the exact position of the ISIS in 
foreign policymaking is not known, but tensions are said to have existed with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its formative period in 1983-1984.163 In fact, at certain 
periods ISIS has been regarded by some as the ‘other’ foreign ministry.164 Besides ISIS, 
another agency that has been utilised for the formulation of the country’s foreign policy 
is the little publicised government unit known as the Research Division located within 
the Prime Minister’s Department. This division has both internal and external security 
functions and provides the chief decision maker with important inputs on
Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, Johan Saravanamuthu, The Dilemma o f  Independence: Two Decades 
o f Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957-1977 (Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983), Singh, "Malaysia: 
Growing Foreign Policy Complexity and Persistent State Power."
161 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, Haji Ahmad, "Malaysian Foreign Policy and Domestic 
Politics: Looking Outward and Moving Inward?," p. 257, Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second 
Generation, Chapter 4-9.
162 Singh, "Malaysia: Growing Foreign Policy Complexity and Persistent State Power," p. 205.
163 Haji Ahmad, "Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy: Malaysia's Foreign Ministry," p. 122, Haji 
Ahmad, "Malaysian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Looking Outward and Moving Inward?," p. 
266.
164 Haji Ahmad, "Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy: Malaysia's Foreign Ministry," p. 122, Haji 
Ahmad, "Malaysian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Looking Outward and Moving Inward?," p. 
266.
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foreign/security issues.I6S From the observation made by Haji Ahmad, this division’s 
frame of reference is unclear, but it is believed that its purpose is to ensure the ‘Malay 
character’ of the government’s policies.166 There are at least two examples that indicate 
that the Malaysian government has indeed adopted a policy which aims at “protecting” 
the interests of the Malays in Malaysia from what the government has perceived as a 
threat to Malay interests. The first example relates to the way in which the Malaysian 
government has responded to the effects of its diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China on its Chinese citizens. The second example concerns the 
government’s reaction to the Vietnamese refugee crisis.
3.3.1 Diplomatic Relations with the People’s Republic of China
The “Chinese problem”, as some put it, when referring to the existence of the large 
Malaysian Chinese community, has played a significant role in shaping Malaysia’s 
perception of China and has given rise to the fear of a linkage between Beijing and 
sections of the local Chinese population. During the Cold War period, KL feared that 
these ties would reinforce the spread of communist ideology. This fear coincided with a 
heightened national consciousness on the part of the Chinese ethnic group and pride in 
their motherland, leading the local Chinese population to be often regarded as the fifth 
column for communist China.167 At the same time, the Chinese government had also 
openly demonstrated its support for the CPM’s ‘liberation’ war.168 Consequently, 
Malaysia initially refrained from having diplomatic relations with either the Chinese 
government in Beijing or Taipei for fear that an embassy would both provide a focal
165 Singh, "Malaysia: Growing Foreign Policy Complexity and Persistent State Power," p. 205.
166 Haji Ahmad, "Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy: Malaysia's Foreign Ministry," p. 122.
167 Boon Kheng Cheah, Red Star over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and after the 
Japanese Occupation o f  Malaya, 1941-1946 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1987), Walker 
Connor, "Ethnology and Peace o f South Asia," World Politics 22, no. 1 (1969): pp. 51-86.
168 Shome, Malay Political Leadership, p. 103.
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point for the Chinese in Malaysia to continue to be loyal to China, which could then 
spark ethnic strife in Malaysia.169
Reacting to a global shift in the balance of power as a consequence of China-US 
rapprochement, the second Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, in September 
1971 announced Malaysia’s willingness to establish diplomatic ties with China even 
though the Malaysian government remained anxious about what impact a Chinese 
embassy might have on the overseas Chinese community.170 Malaysia finally 
established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in May 1974, after 
Malaysia made it clear that diplomatic relations were preconditioned on Beijing’s firm 
assurances that it would not attempt to influence internal Malaysian politics.171 Malaysia 
was the first ASEAN member state to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
However, despite having established diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
there were incidents that had directly annoyed the Malaysian government during the first 
few years of the diplomatic relationship. However, relations between the countries have 
improved greatly since the end of the communist rebellion in 1989, and the notion of the 
‘China threat/Chinese fifth columnist’ is hardly ever heard now.172
3.3.2 Malaysia’s Response to Vietnamese Refugees
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 not only created a crisis 
situation in the Indochinese peninsula, but also threatened the stability of Southeast Asia 
and the members of ASEAN.173 Besides being intensely concerned that communism
169 Charles Edward Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies o f  Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas o f  
Smaller Asian States (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 147.
170 Ibid, Shome, Malay Political Leadership, p. 103.
171 Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies o f  Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas o f  Smaller Asian States, p. 
147.
172 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 114.
173 For detailed discussion on the crisis, see, Poh Ping Lee, "The Indochinese Situation and the Big Powers 
in Southeast Asia: The Malaysian View," Asian Survey 22, no. 6 (1982): pp. 515-23, Sharpe, "An ASEAN 
Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?," pp. 231-50.
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was expanding throughout the region, one of the direct consequences of the invasion 
was that the ASEAN members had to deal with a huge influx of refugees known as 
“boat people” in their respective territories. During 1978 and in the first half of 1979, 
the number of people who fled from southern Vietnam increased so drastically that by 
July 1979 a total of some 204,000 had landed in the ASEAN countries seeking first 
asylum.174 In fact, Malaysia received the largest number of these refugees; more than 
120,000 of them landing in the Malay Peninsula.175 Approximate figures for all arrivals 
by boat people in the other countries of Southeast Asia up to July 1979 were as follows: 
Indonesia 40,000; Philippines 11,000; Singapore 2,100; and Thailand 30,000.176 Before 
Malaysia finally resolved the issue in 2001 when the government closed the last camp 
for the Vietnamese boat people, a total of nearly 255,000 refugees had been given 
temporary asylum in the country.177
Given its previously insecure status as the majority ethnic group in the country, 
the Malays remain extremely concerned about their population size and status relative to 
the country’s competing ethnic groups.178 The anxiety that the uncontrolled inflow of 
these refugees would make the Malays once again a “minority” in what they consider 
their “own” country as in 1947, led the government to label the arrival of the 
Vietnamese boat people, who happened to be predominantly of Chinese ancestry, as a 
security threat.179 As the result of this fear, although the government policy towards 
refugees has altered from period to period, a constant feature of that policy has been that 
no Indochinese refugees who land in Malaysia can expect to become settlers.180 In fact,
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in June 1979, Dr. Mahathir, who was the Deputy Prime Minister, announced that 
refugees in Malaysia would be expelled and those seeking to enter in the future would 
be shot if they ignored warnings to go away.181 Although the Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Hussein Onn, subsequently denied that the boat people would be shot, he made clear 
that Malaysia would turn away boats attempting to land refugees.182 However, these 
warnings were merely rhetoric, as the boat people continued to seek first asylum in the 
country. Despite giving the refugees temporary asylum, according to various reports, 
Malaysia was ‘perhaps the most resolute of the Southeast Asian first-asylum countries in 
pursuing the repatriation of Vietnamese boat people’.183 This shows that although 
Malaysia was willing to extend humanitarian assistance to the refugees, due to the 
delicate demographic structure, the government had no intention of allowing them to 
settle in the country.
The Malaysian government’s approach towards the refugees such as those from 
Aceh and the Southern Philippines, on the other hand, has differed significantly from the 
approach concerning the Vietnamese refugees. According to Kaur, the Malaysian 
government worked in collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) from 1977-86 to integrate them and fund housing, healthcare 
facilities and schooling for their children.184 Although Malaysia promised to return the 
refugees following the 1996 Peace agreement between the Philippines government and 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), no major repatriation occurred. In the 
case of the refugees from Aceh, although Malaysia regarded all undocumented migrants 
from Indonesia as economic migrants, the government allowed them to stay,
181 Judith Strauch, "Malaysia's Response to the Boat People: The Ethnic Factor," Southeast Asia Chronicle 
(1980).
182 Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects," pp. 37-53.
183 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Flight from Indochina (2000 [cited 8 
October 2007]); available from http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3ebf9badO.pdf, Nancy Viviani, The 
Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in A ustralia (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1984).
184 Kaur, "Refugees and Refugee Policy in Malaysia," p. 87.
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acknowledging that they could be persecuted if they were returned to Aceh. In other
words, the movement of the Moros and the Acehnese into Malaysia was viewed as a
positive development, especially among some segments of the Malay elites.185 As
illustrated by Cribb,
“Migration to Malaysia from Indonesia and from the Muslim provinces in 
the southern Philippines, on the other hand, although often technically 
illegal, was commonly welcomed by the government as a means of boosting 
the demographic strength of the Malays vis-a-vis the large Chinese and 
Indian minorities”.186
In short, ethnic Malays’ fear of becoming a minority in the country due to the arrival of 
predominantly ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam during the height of the 
Vietnamese War indicated the government’s determination to ensure that Malays would 
continue to be the majority ethnic group in the country.
Both examples demonstrate that besides protecting the Malays’ interests in the 
country, the Malaysian government has also employed strategies and policies that aim to 
safeguard the Malays’ interests from perceived external threats. Against this backdrop 
concerning Malaysia’s domestic security practice, the thesis has prepared the ground to 
examine the influence of the ethnic factor on its external security practices.
3.4 Conclusion
Although Malaysia’s security practice comprises efforts that are premised on a broad 
notion of security incorporating political, military, economic, social, cultural, and 
psychological dimensions, preserving the Malay core of Malaysia’s society is arguably 
the most important goal of the Malaysian search for security. Given its previously 
insecure hold on the majority status, the Malay community remains intensely concerned
185 Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, p. 691.
186 Cribb and Narangoa, "Orphans o f Empire: Divided Peoples, Dilemmas o f Identity, and Old Imperial 
Borders in East and Southeast Asia," p. 175.
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about its population size and status relative to the country’s competing ethnic groups.187 
To ease this anxiety, the Malay-controlled government has promoted policies that are 
favourable to the Malays/Bumiputera especially since the most senior partner in the 
ruling party, UMNO, sees itself as the defender of Malay rights and interests. 
Subsequently, it is understandable that the security perceptions of its leaders have been 
shaped around the objective of Malay survival. As an ethnocratic state, domestic 
politics play a critical role in Malaysia’s foreign and security policy.188 Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 6 analyse whether the issue of ethnicity affects Malaysia’s security practice 
towards conflict in Southern Thailand, Aceh, and in the Moro Region.
187 Hoddie, Ethnic Realignments: A Comparative Study o f Government Influences on Identity, p. 87.
188 Mak, "Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation: Coming out o f the Closet," pp. 127-53.
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Introduction
B y the end o f  the 1990s, there was a general perception that the Thai governm ent had 
su ccessfu lly  dealt with the ethno-nationalist conflict in Southern Thailand. H owever, 
since 2001 the conflict has been steadily escalating, w hich resulted in the Thai 
governm ent placing the M alay majority provinces in the south under martial law in 
2004.' Consequently, num erous scholars and international organisations have attempted 
to explain the contemporary upsurge in violence. Generally, the violence is linked to the
1 Smith, "Trouble in Thailand's Muslim South: Separatism, Not Global Terrorism."
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grievances held by the Malay ethnic group in these provinces.2 This chapter will not 
endeavour to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conflict; rather it only investigates 
whether the question of ethnic kinship between the Thai Malays and the Malaysian 
Malays has influenced Malaysia’s security practices towards the conflict. The main 
argument of this chapter is that Malaysia’s security practice in the case of the conflict in 
southern Thailand can only be understood with reference to domestic and regional 
concerns and with reference to the framework of a common ethnic identity.
The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section [4.1] analyses 
the ethnic identity of the Thai Malays and gives a brief overview of their history in 
Thailand. In addition, this section also analyses the Thai central government’s policies 
towards the Malays in the context of nation-building in Thailand. The primary purpose 
of this section is to illustrate why the struggle by the Thai Malays continues despite 
‘their’ provinces having been incorporated into Thailand for almost 100 years. The 
second section [4.2] offers an overview of the ethno-nationalist movement in southern 
Thailand. The objective of this section is to elaborate on the particular goals of the 
various ethno-nationalist organisations under discussion (composed of ethnic Malays). 
The third section [4.3] analyses the ethnic linkages between the population in southern 
Thailand and the Malays in Malaysia. In order to set the context for a discussion of how 
ethnic kinship between the Malays across the common border has affected Malaysia’s 
security practices towards the conflict in southern Thailand, the fourth section [4.4] 
analyses the bilateral relations between Malaysia and Thailand. Lastly, the fifth section
2 See, for instance, Kavi Chongkittavom, "Thailand: International Terrorism and the Muslim South," in 
Southeast Asian Affairs, ed. Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2004), Crisis Group Asia Report N°98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," (Brussels: 
18 May 2005), Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in 
Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), Yegar, Between Integration and 
Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western 
Burma/Myanmar.
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[4.5] discusses the influence of ASEAN on Malaysia’s stance towards the conflict in 
southern Thailand.
4.1 The Malays in Southern Thailand
The Malay ethnic group is estimated to make up around four to five per cent of 
Thailand’s total population of 62 million.3 Although the Malay ethnic group constitutes 
only a small minority in the country, they form the majority in Thailand’s southernmost 
provinces: Patani,4 Narathiwat, Yala and Satun. In fact, according to Liow, the entire 
region is popularly defined as the “Malay heartland” of Thailand.5 Estimates are that in 
the provinces of Narathiwat and Patani, Malays make up around 80 to 85 per cent of the 
total population, whereas in Yala this figure is around 70 per cent and in Satun 
approximately 65 per cent.6 Besides being the majority ethnic group in three of the 
southern provinces, the Malays also represent the largest Muslim population in Thailand 
because they constitute almost 80 per cent of the total 4 million Muslims in the country.7 
The Malay ethnic group in Thailand’s southern provinces is distinct compared to the 
other ethnic minorities in the country. Above all, unlike the other ethnic minorities in 
Thailand, the Thai Malays are politically significant because they have been actively 
demanding their self-determination and have consistently resisted Bangkok’s 
assimilation policy.8
3 Linda J. True, "Balancing Minorities: A Study o f Southern Thailand," in SAIS Working Paper Series 
(Washington: 2004), p. 3.
4 ‘Patani’ is the Malay version; ‘Pattani’ is translated from the Thai spelling. This thesis will be using 
‘Patani’ instead.
5 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, 
Ideology, and Politics (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2006), p. 26.
6 Liow, "The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding o f  Domestic and 
International Dimensions," pp. 531-48, Duncan McCargo, "Southern Thai Politics: A Preliminary 
Overview," in Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand, ed. Sugunnasil Wattana (Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books: Prince o f Songkhla University, 2005), p. 24.
7 True, "Balancing Minorities: A Study of Southern Thailand," p. 3.
8 Uthai Dulyakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the Political 
Revolt," in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani (Singapore: Regional 
Strategic Studies Programme, Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 217.
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4.1.1 Thai Malays’ Ethnic Identity
Another important trait that distinguishes the Malays from the other ethnic minorities in 
Thailand is that “they did not come to Thailand, but Thailand came to them.”9 The 
conceptualisation of a separate identity among the Malay ethnic group in southern 
Thailand has revolved around four major premises, namely; the historical legacy of the 
Sultanate of the Patani that existed from 1390 to 1902; their ethnic distinctiveness and 
their ethnic ties with the Malays in Malaysia; and Islam.10 As in Malaysia, to be Malay 
in the southern provinces of Thailand is also to be Muslim, yet the converse is not 
necessarily true -  a Muslim need not be Malay.11 In other words, like for other Malays, 
especially those in Malaysia, for the Thai Malays, ‘Malayness’ and Islam are virtually 
inseparable. An example of this inextricable link between the ethnic and religious 
identity of the Thai Malays can be seen when their leaders appealed to the outside world 
during the campaign of resistance to the Thai government in early 1948 using the 
following terms: ‘Give us back our race as Malays and our religion as Islam.’12 
Although the Malay sultanate has been integrated into Thailand since 1909, the pre­
eminent role of Malay identity in the south of Thailand has continued. There are a 
number of significant ways in which the Malay identity has been sustained, such as 
through the continuation of the common use of the language among the Malays in these
9 Andrew D. W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai, The Muslims o f  Thailand, vol. 2 (Gaya, Bihar, India: 
Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989).
10 See, for example, Connor Bailey and John Miksic, "The Country o f Patani in the Period o f Re- 
Awakening: A Chapter from Ibrahim Syukri's Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani," The Muslim o f  Thailand, 
Volume II: Politics o f  the Malay Speaking South (1989), Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: 
Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 174.
11 Omar Farouk Bajunid, "Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State," in Dynamic Diversity in Southern 
Thailand, ed. Sugunnasil Wattana (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books: Prince o f Songkhla University, 2005), 
p. 9.
2 Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, "Letter to Barbara Whittingham Jones Dated 21 January 1948," in The 
Jones Papers (SOAS Library, London: 1948).
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provinces and the geographical contiguity with the northern Malay states of Kedah, 
Perak and Kelantan in Malaysia.13
However, unlike Patani, Narathiwat and Yala, the province of Satun had been 
spared from the violence plaguing its neighbouring provinces because the Malays there 
had never organised themselves to “rebel” against the Thai central government. 
Basically, there are three main explanations for this phenomenon. First, according to 
Syamsuddin Khan, who is currently the Head of the Executive Committee of the Patani 
United Liberation Front (PULO), the Malays in Satun are different from the Malays in 
the other three provinces primarily because they do not share Patani’s past.14 Unlike the 
three other provinces that were formally under the Sultanate of Patani, Satun, on the 
other hand, used to be part of the Sultanate of Kedah’s territory.15 When most of Kedah 
was ceded by Siam16 to British Malaya in 1909, Satun was made a Thai province.17 
Second, Kasturi Mahkota, the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Department, Patani United 
Liberation Front (New-PULO), claimed that the Malays in Satun did not develop the 
same degree of Malay nationalism as the Malays in the other three provinces because 
there were fewer religious schools in Satun compared to the other provinces.18 These 
religious schools, according to Mahkota, do not only function as the place where 
students learn about Islam but they also serve as the bastion of Malay history and 
identity.19 In other words, through teaching the students about their history and identity,
13 Bajunid, "Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State," p. 9.
14 Interview with Syamsuddin Khan, 11 September 2006. Syamsuddin Khan is currently the Head of 
Executive Committee, Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO). Also see, Ruth McVey, "Identity 
and Rebellion among Southern Thai Muslims," in The Muslim in Thailand, ed. Andrew Forbes (Bihar: 
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 52.
15 Interview with Khan. See for instance, Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, "Malay-Muslim and Thai- 
Buddhist Relations in the Patani Region: An Interpretation," in The Muslims o f  Thailand, ed. Andrew D. 
W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai (Gaya, Bihar, India: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 
73-74.
16 The country’s official name was changed from Siam to Thailand on 11 May 1949.
17 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," p. 2 n. 2.
18 Interview with Kasturi Mahkota, 7 September 2006.
19 Ibid.
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the religious schools in Southern Thailand have developed a strong sense of Malay 
nationalism among the new Malay generation. Third, the province’s main chain of 
communication is northward to Thailand. This has fostered a closer link with Thai 
culture and customs and stands in harsh contrast to the provinces of Yala, Patani and 
Narathiwat, which maintain very close border contacts with Malaysia.20 In fact, most of 
the Malays in Satun speak Thai in their everyday lives and therefore have not felt 
aggrieved by a sense of linguistic alienation.21 In other words, looking at these three 
explanations, one can argue that in the case of the conflict in southern Thailand, Thai 
Malays have been politicised by their nationalism that is based on the importance of the 
historical legacy of their sultanate and not Islam per se.
4.1.2 The History of the Malay Ethnic group in Thailand
Historically, a large area of territory in the region of the Isthmus of Kra was ruled by an 
ancient Malay Kingdom called Langkasuka, which was founded some time in the First 
century A.D.22 In fact, the territory that presently covers the provinces of Patani, Yala 
and Narathiwat provinces was part of this ancient Malay kingdom.23 This kingdom 
lasted for 400 years and was populous and prosperous.24 This ancient Malay Kingdom 
was renamed the Kingdom of Patani or “Greater Patani” (“Patani Raya”) at some point 
in the 14th century.25 According to Newbold, the Kingdom of Patani26 “was once the
20 Peter Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and 
Aceh," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001): pp. 241-69.
21 Ibid.
22 Lukman Thaib, The Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Golden Books 
Centre, 1997), p. 92.
23 Dulyakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the Political 
Revolt," pp. 220-21.
24 Thaib, The Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia.
25 Syed Serajul Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao o f the 
Philippines," Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998): p. 443, Virginia Matheson and M.B Hooker, "Jawi Literature 
in Patani: The Maintenance o f an Islamic Tradition," Journal o f  the Malaysian Branch o f  Royal Asiatic 
61, no. Part 1 (1988): pp. 1-86.
26 For a comprehensive history o f the kingdom, see for instance, Bailey and Miksic, "The Country of  
Patani in the Period o f Re-Awakening: A Chapter from Ibrahim Syukri's Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu
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largest and most populous of the Malay states on the Peninsula”.27 Patani had its golden 
age from 1584- 1651. The sultanate has been described as an important commercial 
hub for Asian as well as for European traders.28 In addition, Patani was also an 
important centre of Islamic scholarship in the Malay world.29 The confrontation 
between Siam and the Malay sultanates started when Sukhotai30 began to flex its 
political muscles in the southern parts of the Malayan peninsula. During the mid- 
fourteenth century, the empire of Ayudhya31 met military resistance from the Malay 
Muslim sultanates of Patani, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu and Melaka. With the defeat 
of the Melaka Sultanate32 to the Portuguese in 1511, Siam eventually succeeded in 
making all of the other aforementioned Malay states its vassals. As vassal states, all of 
these Malay sultanates were required to send the Bunga Mas (a tree with flowers and 
leaves made of gold) to the King of Siam as a form of submission.33 However, these 
Malay sultanates viewed this form of submission as largely symbolic, as neither the Thai 
political system nor the Thai culture was imposed on them at that time. In other words, 
although the Malay sultanates were Siam’s vassal states, they were able to cherish their 
Malay distinctiveness,34 and the sultanates’ political authority remained in the hands of 
the respective sultans.35 However, while for the latter the tributary relationship with
Patani.", Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern 
Thailand.
27 T. J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account o f  the British Settlements in the Straits o f  Malacca [by] 
T.J. Newbold, with an Introd. By C.M. Turnbull (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 670.
28 Thaib, The Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia, p. 92.
29 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 173.
30 Sukhotai was an early Thai Kingdom that existed from 1238 till 1438.
31 The Kingdom of Ayudhaya existed after Sukhotai from 1350-1767.
32 Patani was under the reign o f the Malacca Sultanate in the 15th century.
33 Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern 
Thailand, p. 34.
34 Gopinath, "International Aspects o f the Thai Muslim and Philippine Moro Issues: A Comparative 
Study," pp. 125-47.
35 Andaya and Andaya, A History o f  Malaysia, pp. 110-12.
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Siam was simply a symbol of friendship, Siam viewed this arrangement as an expression 
of allegiance.36
In 1785, the King of Siam decided to abolish this symbolic arrangement and 
enforced what has been referred to as centralisation policies by absorbing Patani and the 
other Malay sultanates (Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) into the Siamese Empire.37 In 
1909, Siam signed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty with the British whereby the Siamese 
kingdom agreed to relinquish the Malay states of Perlis,38 Kedah, Terengganu, and 
Kelantan to British Malaya.39 Besides casting a new international border between 
Thailand and British Malaya, the treaty also resulted in the formal incorporation of 
Patani, as the only Malay sultanate that became part of the Thai kingdom. In other 
words, the Malay provinces are in Thailand as the result of the annexation of their 
sultanate by Siam before being incorporated into Thailand. The inclusion of Patani 
following the signing of the Treaty allowed the Siamese government to take various 
measures aimed at what Brown has classified as creating a “mono-ethnic character of 
the state.”40 Among the measures implemented were the reorganisation of the Patani 
sultanate into three provinces such as Patani, Yala and Narathiwat and the replacement 
of local rulers with Thai governors. These measures, generally viewed by the Malays as 
unjust, evoked particularly strong resentment among the Patani royalty because the
36 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 74.
37 Nantawan Haemindra, "The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand," 
Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (1976): p. 198.
38 Just like Satun, Perlis was also originally part o f the Kedah Sultanate. Perlis was separated from Kedah 
by Siam in 1842. See, Kay Kim Khoo, Malay Society: Transformation andDemocratisation (Malaysia: 
Pelanduk Publications, 2001), p. 20.
39 Michael Steinmetz, "Thai Nationalism and the Malay Muslim Minority. Reflections on the Domestic 
and Foreign Policy Aspects o f Relevant Historic Sequences," in Ethnic Minorities and Politics in 
Southeast Asia, ed. Thomas Engelbert and Hans Dieter Kubitscheck (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 
131-64.
40 David Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," Pacific 
Affairs 61, no. 1 (1988).
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move altered their long-cherished political autonomy in the kingdom to their 
disadvantage.41
The drawing of new political boundaries led the Patani royals to seek assistance 
from the British either to gain independence from the Thai or to seek unification with 
the rest of the Malay states in British Malaya. For instance, in 1901 the Sultan of Patani, 
Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin, tried to solicit British intervention in order to win 
independence from Thailand. The British, represented by the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements in British Malaya, Sir Frank Swettenham, almost initiated a move to annex 
Patani into British Malaya. However, he did not proceed with the intervention because 
his plan was not approved by London.42 The Thai Malays again tried to rejoin their 
ethnic kin across the border as one political unit at the end of the World War II when 
they believed that the Western Allies would treat Thailand as a defeated belligerent.43 At 
that time, they requested the British administration in Malaya to incorporate the Malay 
provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun into British Malaya.44 Moreover, the 
development during and after World War II, which included the trading back and forth 
of four Malay states (Kelantan, Kedah, Terengganu and Perlis), between Thailand and 
British Malaya led to rising hopes among the Thai Malays that their request to British 
Malaya would be fulfilled.45 Consequently, on 1 November 1945, they sent a petition to 
the Supreme Commander of the British Forces in Malaya, in which they expressed their
41 Bajunid, "Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State," pp. 1-19, Dulyakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in 
Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the Political Revolt," p. 226.
42 Margaret L Koch, "Pattani and the Development o f a Thai State," The Journal o f  Malaysian Research 
o f  the Royal Asiatic Society Part 2, no. 50 (1977): pp. 78-81.
During the Second World War, Thailand was Japan’s ally. In fact, as a gift in exchange for having 
allowed the Japanese armed forces to march to Malaya through Thailand, the Japanese armed forces 
“returned” the Malay states o f Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and Kedah in 1943.
44 See, for example, Liow, "The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding o f  
Domestic and International Dimensions," pp. 531 -48, Thaib, The Politics and Governments o f  South East 
Asia, p. 97.
45 Steinmetz, "Thai Nationalism and the Malay Muslim Minority. Reflections on the Domestic and 
Foreign Policy Aspects o f Relevant Historic Sequences," pp. 131-64.
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hope to become independent from the Thai nation.46 The petition closely identified with
the Malay identity of Patani and reasoned that,
...Patani is really a Malay country, formerly ruled by Malay Rajas for 
generations, but has been Siam’s dependency only since about fifty years 
ago. Now the Allied Nations ought to help to return this county to the 
Malays, so that they can have it united with other Malay countries in the 
peninsula.47
In the same year, approximately 250,000 Thai Malays endorsed a petition to the 
United Nations (UN) requesting that the three southern provinces of Patani, Yala and 
Narathiwat should be permitted to secede from Thailand and join the newly constituted 
Federation of Malaya.48 The British officials (in Malaya) sympathised with the Thai 
Malays’ petition, addressed to the British Prime Minister, expressing the hope that the 
UN would help the “Malays of Patani and its dependent districts (i.e. Patani, Yala and 
Narathiwat)” to be “freed from [...] Siamese domination” and allowed “to become one 
federation with Malay states of the Peninsula”.49 British officials in Malaya argued that 
the annexation of these provinces would be an adequate retribution for Thailand’s 
behaviour during the war.50 London, however, disagreed for two reasons. First, the 
view from the British officials in Malaya was not shared by the British embassy in 
Bangkok, which refused with “utmost disapproval”5' to engage in any discussion that 
would involve the possible expansion of British protection into southern Thailand. 
Second, for strategic and political reasons, both Britain and the United States of America 
(USA) preferred the maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
46 Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Sejarah Perjuangan Melayu Patani (Bangi: Penerbit UKM, 2006), p. 2.
47 Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 180.
48 See, for example, Uthai Dulyakasem, "The Emergence and Escalation o f Ethnic Nationalism: The Case 
o f the Muslim Malays in Southern Siam," in Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, ed. Taufik Abdullah and 
Sharon Siddique (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p.223.
49 H. E Wilson, "Imperialism and Islam: The Impact of'Modernisation' on the Malay Muslim o f South 
Thailand," in The Muslims o f  Thailand, ed. Andrew D. W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai (Gaya, Bihar, 
India: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989), p. 62.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 63.
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Thailand.52 As a result, despite attempting to secede and to reunite with the other Malay 
states in British Malaya, Patani has remained part of Thailand. In fact, according to 
Wyatt, ever since the integration of the Sultanate, most of the Malays in Southern 
Thailand never stopped feeling like “subjects of a foreign colonial regime”.53
Over time, the Thai administrations have implemented both confrontational and 
more conciliatory policies towards their Malay ethnic minority. For instance, in 1948 
under the administration of General Phibunsongkhram,54 in the name of “nation- 
building”, the Thai government enforced a confrontation policy aimed at assimilating all 
the various minorities’ cultures in the country into the mainstream Buddhist “Thai- 
ness”.55 According to Muhkriz Mahathir, the Managing Director of the Perdana Global 
Peace Organisation (PGPO), who is also the head of the UMNO Youth International 
Bureau, the Thai government’s position in relation to Thai ethnic identity can be 
summarised by the following quote “When you are Thai, it means that you are Thai. 
You could not be a Malay Thai.”56 Consequently, in an effort to ensure that all Thai 
nationals had the same identity, the Thai government tried to impose several restrictions 
on the Malays so that their cultural heritage would not be able to be passed on to the 
new generation, so that future generations would in turn view themselves more as Thai 
than Malays. As a result, the Thai government officials both in Bangkok and in the 
southern provinces have tended to suppress the demands of Malays relating to
52 For a greater discussion see Christie, A Modern History o f Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism 
and Separatism, pp. 177-81. One o f the examples o f the strategic reasons mentioned by Christie was the 
fact that the Malayan government desperately needed the supply o f  rice from the Thai government after 
the Second World War.
53 David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 63, 
268.
54 Plaek Phibunsongkhram was in power from 1938 -  1944. The regime fell in 1944 because o f its 
association with the axis power during World War II. He returned to power in 1948 by coup d’etat and 
was the Prime Minister until 1957.
55 Chidchanok Rahimmula, "Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and Terrorist Movements in 
Southern Border Provinces o f Thailand," in Militant Movements in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, ed. S 
Yunanto (Jakarta: FES and the RIDEP Institute, 2003), pp. 263-77.
56 Interview with Dato' Muhkriz Mahathir, 13 March 2007.
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expression of their Malay identity because the government officials equate these with 
political demands for separatism.57 In his effort to foster a Thai racial identity and unity, 
that is, to promote the ‘one-ness’ of the Thai ethnic and national identity, 
Phibunsongkhram issued the Thai Customs Decree58 prohibiting the “wearing of 
sarongs, the use of Malay (Muslim) names and the Malay language.”59 In addition, the 
Thai government also replaced Islamic law with Siamese law and the imposition of 
education and language policies on the Thai Malays.60
Ironically, although the Thai government have precluded the Malay language as 
a medium of instruction in government schools, other languages such as Arabic and 
Chinese, on the other hand, are allowed.6' According to Mahathir, the Thai 
government’s policy of not allowing the use of the Malay language in state-run schools 
is viewed by Thais of Malay descent as an attempt to “deny their culture”.62 In addition, 
Phibunsongkhram also imposed elements of Buddhism on the Malay population 
whereby Buddha statues were placed in all public schools, and Malay Muslim children 
were forced to bow before them as a patriotic act.63 These policies sparked opposition 
and hostility among the Malay population in these provinces not only because they saw 
these policies as a direct threat to their ethnic identity but also because it led them to feel 
alienated socially, culturally, and religiously within Thailand. After all, to most of the 
Thai Malays, to speak Thai is the same as to abandon their own language, and their 
nation (community), because to them the term “Malay” stands for both their language
57 Crisis Group Asia Report N°98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad."
58 This decree was repealed in 1961. Nevertheless, the Thai government only made more than minimal 
concessions towards accommodating the Malays in the 1970s.
59 Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 177.
60 Haemindra, "The Problem o f the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces o f Thailand," pp. 208- 
25, Vincent. J. H. Houben, "Southeast Asia and Islam," The Annals o f  the American Academy, no. 588 
(2003): pp. 160-61.
61 Interview with Mahathir. According to Kasturi Mahkota, in private Islamic schools, the Malay language 
is permitted and nor “openly banned”. Email from Kasturi Mahkota, 7 February 2007.
62 Interview with Mahathir.
63 Crisis Group Asia Report N°98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," p. 3.
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and nationality.64 In line with the concept of societal security as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the Thais of ethnic Malay origin have sought to preserve, among other things, their 
cultural and linguistic practices. The Thai Malays have to rely solely on themselves to 
protect these values because no help from British Malaya or Britain was forthcoming, 
especially during that period. One of the strategies that the Thai Malays pursued in 
order to secure their values against the “threat” from the Thai Buddhist government was 
forming their own ethno-nationalist movement. In response to pressure from the Malay 
ethno-nationalist organisations and the wider international society, General 
Phibunsongkhram made some concessions, which allowed for the teaching in Malay in 
primary schools as well as the application of Islamic law (through Thai courts) in 
matters of family law and inheritance. He also allowed Malay state employees to wear 
Malay dress. These reforms, however, were implemented slowly and only partially.65
During the administration of Prime Minister General Prem Tinasulanond (^BO­
SS), Thailand embarked on a more conciliatory policy. General Prem supported the 
Malays’ cultural rights and religious freedom.66 According to Eskay Abdullah, the 
Honorary Consul of the Royal Thai Consulate at Langkawi, Malaysia, General Prem 
reversed all the ‘integration’ policies implemented by Phibunsongkhram and supported 
absolute religious freedom by building about 1,200 religious schools and more than 
1000 mosques in Thailand’s southern provinces.67 Arguably, General Prem thought that 
by reversing the policies on religious institutions and education, the members of the 
Malay ethno-nationalist groups would want to be re-integrated into society.68 However, 
such policies did not resolve the discontent on the part of the Thai Malays, and
64 Dulyakasem, "Muslim-Malay Separatism in Southern Thailand: Factors Underlying the Political 
Revolt," p. 229.
65 Ladd M. Thomas, "Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand," in The Muslims o f  Thailand, ed. 
Andrew D. W. Forbes and Sachchidanand Sahai (Gaya, Bihar, India: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 
1989).
66 Crisis Group Asia Report N°98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," p. 11.
67 Interview with Dato1 Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, 6 March 2007.
68 Ibid.
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especially not among those who had joined the ethno-nationalist organisations, 
notwithstanding the fact that during this period there was a significant decrease in terms 
of the level of violence initiated by them. According to Eskay Abdullah, although 
General Prem had introduced policies that supported the Malays’ cultural rights and 
religious freedom, he failed to appropriately embrace members of the ethno-nationalist 
organisations (composed of ethnic Malays).69 Above all, there were no specific policies 
targeting their grievances. However, rather than supporting the ethno-nationalist 
movement in their cause, the majority of Thai Malays have supported their local Malay 
politicians running for Thailand’s Parliament. In fact, during General Prem’s 
administration, the popular support extended towards the Thai Malays ethno-nationalist 
movement subsided tremendously, resulting in the steep decline of the movement’s 
activities by the late 1990s.70 In addition, the decline in support also caused many of the 
leaders of the Thai Malays ethno-nationalist movement to go into exile.71 However, the 
decision by the majority of the Thai Malays to join and support the political framework 
of the country was revisited when subsequent Thai governments, especially the Thaksin 
administration (2001-06), implemented national policies that have been perceived by 
the Thais of Malay ethnic origin as another effort to marginalise them.72
In fact, during the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra the level of violence in 
the southern provinces increased drastically. This phenomenon was largely attributed to 
Thaksin’s hard-line response towards events occurring in these provinces.73 According
69 Ibid.
70 Interview with Khan.
71 Interview with Abdullah.
72 Ibid. Interview with Khan.
73 It should be noted that there are a number of other factors that have been identified as the contributing 
factors that have increased the incidences of violence in the southern provinces. Among the factors are, 
regional and international terrorist organisations, criminal activities in the provinces, and political 
conflicts between the main political parties in Thailand. See, for instance, Crisis Group Asia Report N° 
98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad.", Aurel Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, 
Causes, and Consequences since 2001," Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005), Gunaratna, 
Acharya, and Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern
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to Mahkota, some of Thaksin’s confrontational policies towards the Thai Malays had 
indirectly led to the death of at least 80 people who had taken part in the Tak Bai 
demonstrations in 2004 and the kidnapping of Thai Malays by officials.74 Eskay, on the 
other hand, viewed Thaksin’s decision to dismantle the Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in 2003, which was in charge of administering southern 
Thailand’s provinces, as one of the policies that created tension among the Thai 
Malays.75 This centre was established in 1981 to serve as the main channel for 
communication between the authorities and the locals in the South.76 The Thai Malays 
could also bring their grievances to the attention of the government through the Centre.77 
Its dismantling resulted in the decision of many Thai Malays to take the law into their 
own hands because they found no other alternative to articulate their grievances.78 As a 
result, the Thai Malays decided to renew their support for their ethno-nationalist 
movement in the belief that this step would provide for the best mechanism to protect 
their identity and to attain their cause.79
This section has shown that due to the strong historical links between the Thai 
Malays and Malaysian Malays, the former have repeatedly tried to politically unite with 
their ethnic kin state across the border. The legacy of the Sultanate of Patani has played 
a major role in creating a separate identity espoused by the Malays in Patani, Narathiwat 
and Yala. The following section elaborates on the goals and the particular 
characteristics of the ethno-nationalist organisations in Southern Thailand. Generally, 
the origins of these movements lie in historical grievances stemming from
Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics, Duncan McCargo, "Thaksin and the 
Resurgence o f  Violence in the Thai South," in Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence, ed. Duncan 
McCargo (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007).
74 E-mail from Mahkota.
75 Interview with Abdullah.
76 McCargo, "Thaksin and the Resurgence o f Violence in the Thai South," p. 47.
77 Duncan McCargo, "Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy 
Strikes Back?," Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): p. 44.
78 Interview with Abdullah.
79 Interview with Khan.
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discrimination against the Thai Malay population and the heavy-handed policies carried 
out by certain Thai administrations in the name of “nation-building”.80 Not surprisingly, 
given that there were about twenty different Thai Malay ethno-nationalists organisations 
in the 1970s, there were also differences in terms of their ideological orientation, goals, 
tactics and strategies. Efforts focused on attaining one of the following goals: The goals 
of these organisations can be classified into three different objectives: (1) seeking full 
independence and the reestablishment of the Malay sultanate; (2) seeking unification 
with Malaysia; or (3) obtaining autonomy within Thailand. The following section will 
review some of the early Thai Malay organisations as well as the current major 
organisations.
4.2 The Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist Movement in Southern Thailand
The Thai Malays formed their first political organisation, the League of Malays of 
Greater Patani (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya - GAMPAR), in 1948. According to its 
manifesto, the organisation pursued three major objectives. The first was to unite the 
four “Malay heartland” provinces as a Malay Islamic state and liberate its residents from 
oppression and exploitation. The second objective was to establish a state appropriate to 
Islamic traditions and practices. The third goal was to improve the status and standard 
of living of the Malays in southern Thailand in areas such as justice, freedom and 
education.81 However, according to its founding leader, Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, of 
these three objectives of GAMPAR, the most important one was to seek unification of
80 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad.", Liow, Muslim Resistance 
in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics, p. 25.
81 Rahimmula, "Peace Resolution: A Case Study of Separatist and Terrorist Movements in Southern 
Border Provinces o f Thailand."
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the southern provinces with the Federation of Malaya.82 Interestingly, rather than 
establishing the organisation in Thailand’s South, GAMPAR was founded in Kelantan, 
Malaysia. However, since Kelantan was part of British Malaya, the organisation 
operated under the pretext of being a social and cultural organisation, which sought to 
promote and protect the Malays’ interests in both Malaya and Thailand. This focus on 
socio-cultural aims was necessary because the British administration did not allow for 
the existence of a foreign separatist movement on its territory as this could jeopardise its 
relations with the Thai government.83 After the establishment of GAMPAR in Kelantan, 
branches of the organisation were set up in three other states in Malaya, namely in 
Penang, Perlis and Kedah.84 However, when the leaders of GAMPAR died, the 
organisation soon disintegrated.85 In 1959, the Deputy leader of GAMPAR, Tengku 
Abdul Jalal, established the first organised armed separatist group - the Patani National 
Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani -  BNPP).86
4.2.1 Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP)
The BNPP was also reportedly founded in Kelantan.87 The BNPP was different from 
GAMPAR in terms of its core leadership, as this movement initially drew support from 
both the traditional aristocrats as well as the religious elite.88 Unlike GAMPAR that 
sought reunification of the Malay provinces with the Federation of Malaya, BNPP’s
82 Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, "Letter to Barbara Whittingham Jones Dated 6 March 1948," in The Jones 
Papers (SOAS Library, London: 1948).
83 Omar Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions ofMalay-Muslim Separatism in Southern 
Thailand," in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani (Singapore: Regional 
Strategic Studies Programme, Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), p. 237.
84 Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, "Letter to Barbara Whittingham Jones Dated 14 March 1948," in The 
Jones Papers (SOAS Library, London: 1948).
85 Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern 
Thailand, p. 98.
86 Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao o f the Philippines," 
pp. 441-56.
Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 142.
88 Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao o f  the Philippines."
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objective was to achieve complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic 
state (but not in the context of the Federation of Malaysia). Just as with GAMPAR, the 
BNPP’s political leadership was based in Kelantan since it received considerable 
support, both moral and material, from the Malaysia Islamic Party (Partai Islam Se- 
Malaysia -  PAS).89 In terms of its membership, the BNPP attracted many Thai Malay 
student activists who had studied in Malaya. According to Surin Pitsuwan, the BNPP 
was operating both inside the Kelantan state and within Thailand’s southern provinces.90 
The organisation encouraged the Thai Malays to apply for Malaysian citizenship 
because the leadership thought that it was easier for the organisation to conduct its 
activities on both sides of the border if its members had dual citizenship.91 However, the 
BNPP was weakened significantly after the Thai military campaign of 1972 and the 
death of its leader, Tengku Abdul Jalal, in 1977.92 The organisation finally disintegrated 
when PAS lost power in Kelantan in 1978. Many of its leaders left, some took up 
Malaysian citizenship and settled down, while others joined the Patani United Liberation 
Organisation (Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan Patani -  PULO).93
4.2.2 Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO)
Tunku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman), a descendant of the Patani nobility, 
founded the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) in 1968.94 During its prime, 
from the late 1970s to early 1980s, PULO was the largest, most effective and the most
89 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study o f  the Malay-Muslims o f  Southern 
Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, 1985), p. 229.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. According to Muhkriz Mahathir, there were about 60,000 Thai Malays who have dual citizenship 
at the end o f 2006. The Thai government estimates appear to assume even more citizens with dual 
citizenship. Interview with Mahathir.
92 Crisis Group Asia Report N°98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," p. 7.
93 Ibid.
94 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 146.
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prominent ethno-nationalist organisation in southern Thailand.95 According to Carment, 
PULO grew to be influential largely because it received material support from Libya and 
Syria, and ideological support from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.96 PULO’s ideology has 
been based on religion, ethnic nationalism, homeland, and humanitarianism (Ugama, 
Bangsa, Tanahair, and Perikemanusiaan - UBANGTAPEKEMA).97 According to 
Syamsuddin Khan, the Head of PULO’s Executive Committee, the stated goal of the 
organisation remains to establish an independent Malay Islamic state.98 For Khan, the 
question about the main orientation of the organisation - whether it is Islamist or ethno- 
nationalist -  does not arise in the first place because Malays must be Muslim.99 In other 
words, since being Muslim is one of the core elements of the Malay identity, it is normal 
for the organisation to occasionally articulate resistance with reference to Islamist 
parameters.'00 Just like the two aforementioned Thai Malay ethno-nationalist 
organisations, PULO reportedly also has links with Kelantan. In 1977, PULO’s political 
and military operational headquarters were in Tumpat, Kelantan and in 1978 the 
headquarters moved to Pasir Mas, Kelantan and lastly to Kota Bahru, Kelantan.101 
However, PULO headquarters ceased its operations in 1998, following the arrest and 
repatriation of their leaders to Thailand by the Malaysian authorities.102 In that year, the 
Malaysian security forces also arrested the leader of the New PULO, Abdul Rohman 
Bazo, its military chief Haji Daoh Thanam, as well as PULO’s military commander, 
Haji Sama-ae Thanma, in Kuala Lumpur, and quietly handed them over to Thai
95 Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and 
Aceh," pp. 36-40, Crisis Group Asia Report N° 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad," p. i, 
Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand.
96 Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience," p. 8.
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authorities.103 In fact, according to Khan, this incident was the first in Malaysian history 
where leaders of a Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisation were extradited to 
Thailand.104 The crackdown by the Malaysian authorities prompted other senior 
separatist leaders to flee Malaysia. The PULO’s leader, Tunku Bira Kotanila, left for 
Damascus, the former leader of the New PULO leader Arong Muleng went to Sweden, 
and his deputy, Haji Abdul Hadi Rozali, fled to Saudi Arabia.105
Before the incident, PULO had undergone a degree of “disintegration and 
reunification”.106 According to Khan, PULO had split into four different groups in 
1985.107 However, despite this division, individually, all of the different groups still 
called themselves “PULO”.108 In 1995, an organisation called the New PULO was 
created, which was led by Arong Muleng and Haji Abdul Rahman Boza.109 The goals of 
this faction remained the same as the goals of the original PULO. In 2005, the PULO 
held a reunification assembly in Damascus, Syria, which brought together around 40 
PULO leaders from Thailand, Europe, and the Middle East, and aimed at strengthening 
the movement in order to continue the fighting for the cause of the Thai Malays in all 
the Malay majority provinces of Southern Thailand.110 Since the objective of PULO has 
been to struggle for the cause of the Thai Malays, Kasturi Mahkota, the New PULO’s 
Chief of the Foreign Affairs Department, rejects the claims by some analysts that there 
are currently elements of international terrorist groups operating in southern Thailand.111
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According to Mahkota, the insurgency is the issue of the Patani-Malay people and it has 
nothing to do with either the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or Al-Qaeda.112 On this matter, even 
the Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, said, “as far as the situation in the 
southern part of Thailand is concerned, there is no relationship with any international 
linkages of any sort.”"3 Concerning the organisation’s operations in the southern 
provinces, the PULO is cooperating with the other Thai Malay organisations to 
coordinate their activities in southern Thai provinces. These organisations are the 
National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate (.Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate - 
BRN-C) and the Patani Islamic Mujahidin Group (Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani -  
GMIP)."4
4.2.3 Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate -  (BRN-C)
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) was established in the early 1960s. The BRN’s 
main objective was to create an independent Republic of Patani that consists of all the 
four Malay majority provinces (Yala, Narathiwat, Patani and Satun) and parts of 
Songkhla."5 Initially, the BRN had pan-Malay aspirations, as it called for the 
unification of all the Malays in the region, in line with its premise of Malay 
nationalism.116 In other words, the original objective of the BRN was to incorporate all 
the four southern provinces of Thailand into Malaya, including Singapore and portions 
of territory across the Straits of Malacca.117 The BRN, however, dropped its pan-Malay 
aspirations due to increasing factionalism within the organisation. This factionalism
112 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad.", "JI Claim Disputed by 
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114 Interview with Mahkota.
115 Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions o f Malay-Muslim Separatism in Southern 
Thailand," p. 240.
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was mainly caused by the confrontation waged by Indonesia in response to the creation 
of the Federation of Malaysia, as this led to the creation of splinter blocs within the 
organisation that either supported Indonesia or sided with Malaysia."8 Due to its 
identity as a Malay movement, the organisation was able to establish bases in Malaya.119 
However, the organisation lost its more conservative supporters in Malaysia and the 
Middle East when it was reported to have developed a close relationship with the 
communist parties of Malaysia and Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s.120 By 1984, the 
BRN had three major factions, namely the BRN-Congress, BRN-Coordinate and BRN- 
Uran.121 However, among these, the BRN-Coordinate at the time of writing is reported 
to be the most active, largest and best organised of the armed organisations.122 The other 
two, BRN-Coordinate and BRN-Uran, in principle no longer have any military wing in 
southern Thailand.123
4.2.4 Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani -  (GMIP)
Afghan war veterans124 founded the GMIP in 1995. Similar to both PULO (old and new) 
and BNPP, GMIP’s objective is also to create an Islamic state in southern Thailand. 
However, the organisation is effectively more of a criminal gang than a group of freedom 
fighters as it has been “engaged in kidnapping, extortion, and contract killing.”125 
According to Mahkota, originally the GMIP was just a small branch of the PULO, but
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later became an independent organisation.126 Thai intelligence sources have reportedly 
claimed that GMIP maintains an important underground base in Terengganu, Malaysia.127 
It has been thought that GMIP has run guns for other ethno-nationalist movements, in 
particular the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM).128 According to Thai military intelligence, this organisation can be classified as 
“guns-for-hire.” '29
4.2.5 Analysis of the Thai Malays’ Ethno-Nationalist Organisations
One can discern a shift in the objectives of the Thai Malay organisations. For instance, 
between the end of World War II and 1960, the Malay elites in Thailand sought 
reunification with the Federation of Malaysia. After 1960, the organisations decided to 
fight for their own state. In fact, lack of support from the Kuala Lumpur government 
(both the British colonial government and the Malayan/Malaysian government) for their 
irredentist demands was identified as the primary reason why these organisations 
decided to change their objectives. In order to ensure that they continued to draw 
support, particularly international support, for their struggle, these organisations had to 
adapt their strategy. They did this by placing more emphasis on their other core element 
of their identity in order to sustain their movement. As mentioned earlier, Malays must 
be Muslim. This Muslim identity allows them to gamer support from a wider Muslim 
population in the world. However, despite the fact that lately these organisations have 
been focussing more on the Islamic cause (i.e. calling for the creation of an Islamic state 
in these provinces), this does not mean that Islam has completely overridden the ethnic 
factor. Although there is heightened Islamic consciousness and existence of 
transnational linkages with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah
126 Interview with Mahkota.
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Islamiyah in southern Thailand, it would be a mistake to view longstanding grievances 
in Thailand as being subordinate to terrorist groups with global and abstract ideological 
agendas.130 Unlike the global and regional terrorist groups, the motivation for resistance 
among the Thai Malays ethno-nationalist organisations is different. It should be noted 
that although over the past few decades, the purist Salafi (and more specifically 
Wahhabi) teaching has been gaining ground in the province, the Thai Malays are 
predominantly practicing a moderate and syncretic variant of Islam, Sufism—Sunni 
Islam with a mystical moderate edge.131 In short, although there is a religious dimension 
within the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations, the main motivation for the 
struggle is their Malay nationalism.132 As argued by Khan, the Thai Malay organisations 
are currently no longer struggling over finer ideological points among each other but 
instead seem to be working together.133 Indeed, according to Khan, the Thai Malay 
organisations are in the process of merging into a single organisation.134
Another common characteristic of these organisations is that they all have links 
with Malaysia. This supports Farouk’s statement that the separatist struggle of the 
Malays in southern Thailand has, since its inception, involved Malaysia just as much as 
it has Thailand.135 As illustrated earlier, the fact that most of the Thai Malay 
organisations were either founded or had their bases in various parts of Malaysia, 
particularly in Kelantan, proves that Malaysia or some Malaysians have played a role in 
supporting these groups, either to challenge or at least to embarrass the Thai
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government. Consequently, there has been a general perception at least on the part of 
the Thai Malays that due to the overlap between their ethnic identity with that of the 
Malaysian Malays, the Malaysian government, and especially the Malays there, would 
readily come to their rescue.136 Given the fact that the most intense forms of protests and 
support for Thai Malays have always come from their ethnic kin across the border, it is 
quite appropriate to perceive these recurrent phenomena as “ethnic nationalism” among 
the Malay community. The ethnic nationalism among the Malay community can be 
defined as the “close attachment that Malays accord to the safeguarding of their Malay 
ethnic primordial ties or parochial interest in their dealing with others, especially non- 
Malays”.137
To support this section, the next one examines how the Thais of Malay descent 
are related or affiliated with the Malays in Malaysia. The section also analyses common 
Thai Malay perceptions of the Malays in Malaysia, and the impact of their ethnic 
kinship with the Malaysian Malays on their struggle against Thailand. The primary 
objective of this section is to demonstrate why Malaysia should be viewed as the kin 
state to the Thais of Malay descent.
4.3 Relations between Thai Malays and the Malays in Malaysia 
Although divided by an international border since 1909, the Thai Malays remain a self- 
conscious ethnic minority that is distinct from the Thai Buddhists. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, given that the southern provinces of Thailand actually belong to the Malay 
World of Southeast Asia from cultural, ethnic and linguistic standpoints, the Thai 
Malays maintain strong links with the Malays in Malaysia. The close ethnic linkages 
between the Thai Malays and the Malays were also acknowledged by the Malaysian
136 Interview with Khan.
137 Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, p. 1.
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Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar, when he said that, “It cannot be
denied that due to ethnic and religious similarities, there will be close relations among
those at the Malaysian-Thai border.”138 These links are based on extensive kinship
relations, commercial contacts and information exchange.139 In fact, both the Thai
Malays and the Malays in Malaysia view the present international border that separates
the Thai southern provinces from Malaysia as a legacy of the colonial past and a highly
artificial one.140 As Syed Husin Ali put it:
The Peninsular Malays (including the Malays of south Thailand) constitute 
but a minor portion of the people from the same stock, and the culture they 
inherit forms only part of a greater cultural heritage of the rest of the people 
in the area. What has set the Malays in this country apart from the rest 
socially and culturally has been the result of recent colonial history.141
The decision made by the “colonial powers” to draw their international borders in such a 
way as to separate the Malays into two different countries is in fact one of the 
identifiable ways by which ethnic kin states are created. In other words, in the case of 
British Malaya (later Malaysia), since the Malays have formed the majority ethnic group 
in the country, it can be considered as an ethnic kin state to the Thai Malays.
4.3.1 Ethnic Kinship between Thai Malays and Malaysian Malays
Without a doubt, the southern provinces of Thailand are part of the Tanah Melayu (the 
Malay land). Therefore, both the Thai Malays and the Malaysian Malays (particularly in 
the northern states) not only share a common ethnic background, culture, past history,
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Times, 28 November 2006.
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but in some cases are also related through ties of kinship and marriage. In fact, the 
Sultanate of Patani has had particularly strong links with the Sultanate of Kelantan. For 
instance, the consort of the current Sultan of Kelantan is from the Patani royalty. In 
addition, the current Crown Prince of Kelantan is also married to a royal family member 
from Patani.142 Historically, the Sultanate of Patani was actually comprised of two major 
dynasties; the Patani Dynasty and the Kelantan Dynasty.143 Even when Thailand 
incorporated the Sultanate of Patani into its territory, Patani’s link with Kelantan 
continued to survive. In fact, this link has played a major role in cementing strong ties 
between the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations and Kelantan. According to 
Carment, it is unlikely that Malay nationalism in the Malay provinces in Thailand would 
have begun with such enthusiasm and optimism without substantial assistance from the 
Kelantanese.144
As a matter of fact, there is no other state in Malaysia that has been more 
vociferous in supporting the rights of the Thai Malays than Kelantan. Kelantan’s strong 
link with Patani makes the state the most popular destination among the Thai Malays 
whenever they flee Thailand. There are several reasons for this: first, Kelantan has 
attracted many Thai Malay religious leaders and wealthy Malays who fled to the state as 
soon as the Thai Kingdom formally annexed the Patani Sultanate.145 Second, according 
to Dr. Syed Azman Syed Nawawi, the Head of the PAS International Relations Bureau, 
many of the Thai Malays have blood ties with the Malays in Kelantan.146 Due to these 
close ethnic linkages, the people living in some areas of the border region cross back 
and forth passing boundary markers as if they did not exist. Even when the Thai Malays
142 "Tengku Mahkota Kelantan Pilih Kerabat Diraja Pattani," Utusan Malaysia 21 October 2004.
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have to pass through an official border control, they are still free to move into Malaysia 
or vice versa. According to Khan, one of the main reasons why the Thai Malays are 
able to move into Malaysia (at least to Rantau Panjang, Kelantan) and return to Thailand 
freely is because they are not required to produce any travel documents when leaving 
Thailand or entering Malaysia by the immigration officials of both countries.147 In short, 
the ethnic ties, cultural links, and historical bonds exert themselves in defiance of 
political boundaries superficially imposed on them.
This section has illustrated that the Thai Malays and the Malaysian Malays 
indeed not only share a common ethnic identity, but also have very close personal 
bonds. The next section analyses how Malaysia has approached the conflict in southern 
Thailand. The primary objective of this section is to analyse whether ethnic affinity 
with the Thai Malays has an impact on Malaysia’s security practice towards the conflict 
in Thailand’s southern provinces.
4.4 Malaysia and Thailand Bilateral Relations
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ethnic conflicts tend to draw external attention. In the case 
of the Thai Malays, one of the factors that has attracted international attention to their 
affairs is the ethnic affinity that exists between themselves and the Malaysian Malays. 
The fact is that the “Thai Malays are perceived by the Malays in Malaysia as their ethnic 
kin has created a security dilemma especially to the Thai government.”148 It should be 
noted that in this context, the concept is not used by the usual security dilemma 
dynamics.149 However, there is an element of uncertainty on the part of the Thai
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149 For detailed discussion on how ‘security dilemma’ is defined, see John Hermann Herz, Political 
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government with regards to the real intention of the Malays and the Malaysian 
government when they provide aid to Thais of Malay descent across the border. The 
Thai government fears for the country’s territorial integrity, especially since a number of 
the Malay ethno-nationalist organisations have espoused irredentist demands. On the 
part of the Malaysian government, while there is a general desire to maintain good 
relations with the Thai government in accordance with the policy of non-intervention, 
the government must also respond to meet the demands of its own Malay population, 
who want the government to render assistance to their ethnic kin across the border.150 In 
other words, despite wishing to maintain cordial relations with Thailand, the Malaysian 
government has to deal with strong domestic pressure, particularly if the cooperation 
with the Thai government could result in the suppression of the Malays of southern 
Thailand.151 Ultimately, the Malaysian government has to balance domestic exigencies 
and international obligations.
One of the major domestic constraints that the Malaysian government has to take 
into account is the existence of strong advocates of Thai Malay interests in Kelantan. If 
Kuala Lumpur ignored this domestic demand and cooperated fully with the Thai 
government in suppressing the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations, the 
government would run the risk of fuelling support for PAS. After all, PAS has already 
been acknowledged as commanding a strong support base in most of the northern 
Malaysian states such as Kedah, Terengganu and Kelantan. In particular, the 
government, headed by UMNO, cannot be perceived as caving in to Thai demands, as
Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, ed. John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992).
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this would provide “political ammunition” for the PAS.152 Even if the Malaysian Malays 
do not reinforce their support to PAS as a form of protest against the government’s 
cooperation with the Thai government to control the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist 
organisations, it is difficult for the Malaysian government to commit itself to the active 
suppression of the Malays’ ethnic kin across the border, as this could easily threaten the 
political stability of Malaysia. Since the conflict in Thailand’s southern provinces has 
been seen as an emotional issue by the general Malay population of Malaysia, especially 
Malaysians in the northern states of the country, the Malays there would not hesitate to 
openly criticise the government for implementing policies that are viewed as detrimental 
to the societal security of their ethnic kin.153 Of particular importance in this regard is 
the role of the Kelantan state government. Unlike other states in Malaysia, the Islamic 
Party of Malaysia (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia -  PAS) has been ruling the state of 
Kelantan since 1990. PAS was also the ruling party of the state from 1959 -  1978. 
UMNO’s aim is to win back this state.
4.4.1 The Influence of Partai Islam Se-Malavsia fPAS) in the Conflict 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the Sultanate of Patani has maintained very close 
links with Malaysia, particularly with Kelantan. In addition to having relations with the 
Malays in Kelantan, the ruling party of the state, PAS, has also been known to be very 
sympathetic to the Thai Malays and has been championing their cause for decades. It is 
also a known fact that many Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations have benefited
152 S. P Harish, How Malaysia Sees Thailand's Southern Strife (8 February 2006 [cited 12 May 2006]); 
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from good connections with PAS.154 According to Khan, however, cooperation between 
PAS and Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations such as the PULO has not taken 
place on a “party-to-party basis”.155 Rather, the informal cooperation between PAS and 
PULO has been based on blood ties between individual personalities of PAS and PULO. 
It is these blood ties that have led some PAS personalities to feel obligated to extend 
support to some of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations.156 For the most part, 
PAS has tended to confine itself to statements of sympathy and concern towards the 
Malays across the border. However, due to blood ties between members of PAS and 
members of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations, there is a great deal of 
suspicion in Bangkok that the party condones tangible support for the autonomy- 
separatist groups as well. Thailand, for instance, has repeatedly alleged that PULO and 
New PULO have benefited from a safe-haven in Kelantan and that this support has both 
been sanctioned by PAS and met with official indifference by the Federal government in 
Kuala Lumpur.157 In addition, the Thai government also believed that without the 
support of PAS, the campaign that was codenamed “Falling Leaves” devised by both the 
PULO and the New PULO in 1997, and which targeted Thai state officials, could not 
have been carried out.158 According to both Khan and Mahkota, the “Falling Leaves” 
operation represented PULO’s strategy to shift their operations from the jungle to the
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urban areas to engage in a “direct confrontation” with Thai security forces; however, 
this operation had nothing to do with PAS.159
Although both PULO leaders have denied that they had any links with PAS, the 
ruling party of Kelantan has often played the role of spokesman for the Thai Malay 
ethno-nationalist movement. However, PAS does not advocate outright support for the 
Thai Malay secessionists despite proclaiming in 1945 that the Malays in the four 
southern provinces of Thailand have the right to determine their own future.160 When 
the discussions leading to the establishment of Malaysia were being conducted in the 
1960s, PAS called for the annexation of the four southern provinces to the incipient 
independent Malaysia.161 In 1992, the issue of PAS sympathy and refuge for the Thai 
Malay separatists surfaced again, when then PAS Deputy President Abdul Hadi 
Awang162 was reported to have argued, “PAS has to offer this help because our Muslim 
brothers are being discriminated against in all aspects of life in Southern Thailand.”163 In 
2004, following the Tak Bai incident in which more than 80 Thai Malays died due to 
suffocation in Thai army trucks, the Malays in Kelantan organised weekly 
demonstrations condemning the Thai government.164 In 2005, the PAS spiritual leader 
who is also the Chief Minister of Kelantan, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, advised the 
Kelantanese people to help those Thai Malays who fled their country.165 In 2006, Nik 
Aziz requested the Malaysian government not to avert Thai Malays from entering
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160 See, for example, Suhrke and Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations, p, 201, Yegar, Between 
Integration and Secession; The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and 
Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 163.
161 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 163.
162 Currently Abdul Hadi Awang is the President o f PAS.
163 “Malaysia’s opposition party offers sanctuary for Thai Moslem separatist,” Agence France Presse, 16 
August 1992 quoted in Liow, "The Security Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of 
Domestic and International Dimensions," p. 540.
164 Interview with Khan.
165 "Isu 131 Warga Thailand Diserah Kepada Pusat," Utusan Malaysia, 2 September 2005.
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Malaysia due to the increasing violence in southern Thailand.166 According to Syed 
Nawawi, the motive of the PAS leader to extend declaratory support to the Thai Malays 
was solely based on humanitarian grounds because the Thai Malays had been 
suppressed by the Thai authorities for so long.167 Also, “they had suffered in silence 
while the whole world was just watching”.168
Interestingly, Malaysia’s coalition government has only rarely contradicted the 
PAS position publicly, as leaders are obliged to acknowledge that there are strong ethnic 
ties between the Thai Malays and the Malays in Malaysia, especially in Kelantan. In 
fact, according to Mohamed, although the government is concerned for the safety of the 
Malays in southern Thailand, it could not openly voice its apprehension as this could 
jeopardise Kuala Lumpur’s good relations with Bangkok.169 The sensitivity of the 
federal government and UMNO in dealing with the situation in southern Thailand can be 
better understood when taking into consideration that PAS has had important re- 
electoral strongholds in the states bordering the Thai border in addition to strong ethnic 
linkages with the Thai Malays. Indeed, the significance of the issue has meant that 
Kuala Lumpur’s security practice has occasionally been dictated by and/or subordinated 
to domestic considerations.170 However, this does not mean that Malaysia has ignored 
the societal security of the Thai Malays. In fact, in early 2007, the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, offered assistance to the Thai government to 
mediate in negotiations between Thailand and the Thai Malay organisations. According 
to the Prime Minister, Malaysia possesses the capacity and ability to mediate in the 
issue, as it understands the situation in southern Thailand and the Thai government’s
166 "Benarkan Pelarian Masuk," Utusan Malaysia, 21 September 2006.
167 E-mail from Syed Nawawi.
,68Ibid.
169 Interview with Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 14 March 2007.
170 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 174.
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stand to end the continuing violence.171 In addition, the Prime Minister said, “Moreover, 
we know the separatist groups, in the sense that they are Muslims, of Malay descent and 
that Malaysia has good relations with Thailand.”172
In other words, the Malaysian government is facing a dilemma between having 
to choose either to serve the interests of its ethnic brethren involved in ethnic conflict in 
the respective countries, or to remain committed to the principle of non-interference 
among ASEAN member states. As political leaders, they have to be sensitive to the 
interests of their constituents, even if these interests lie beyond its borders. The 
government’s inaction in this matter could be detrimental to the ruling party as 
supporters might give their support to other political parties.
4.4.2 Malaysia’s Assistance to the Thai Malays
Due to the government’s concern about the human security of the Thai Malays, the 
leadership has without any hesitation been willing to allow the Thai Malays to seek 
refuge in the country despite announcing that it pursued an official policy of rejecting 
refugees. In order to justify the decision to allow them to seek refuge in Malaysia, the 
government even made a statement that while the non-acceptance of refugees was the 
official policy, there was “no definite policy on the Thai-Muslims’ [Malays’] refugee 
problems”.173 As stated by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, “it is 
normal for many Thai Muslims who "profess allegiance to Malaysia" to cross over to 
Malaysia time and again.”174 Abdullah added that Malaysia is also willing to host the 
Thai Malays if they want to stay on for a while.175 Historically, the largest exodus of the
171 M'sia Well-Placed to Mediate fo r  Peace with Thai Separatists (Bemama, 13 February 2007 [cited 3 
June 2007]); available from http://www.pataninews.net/ReadEnglish.asp7nX343.
172 Ibid.
173 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 176. '




Thai Malays into Malaysian territory occurred when almost 1,200 refugees fled into the 
country in 1981, after it was reported that the Thai Malays were caught in crossfire 
between the PULO and Thai military forces and fled to nearby Kelantan and Kedah.176 
For its part, Malaysia’s government leaders at the time said that the refugees would not 
be returned against their wish and Malaysia would provide them shelter on purely 
humanitarian grounds.177 However, rather than asking them to leave after tension 
subsided, these refugees were absorbed into Malaysia’s society, as the country has 
practised with previous Thai Malay refugees.178 According to a Thai senator, Malaysia’s 
practice of allowing Thai Malays to enter the country has resulted in around 200,000 
Thai Malays now living in Malaysia.179
The latest incidents where Thai Malays sought refuge in Malaysia occurred in 
August 2005, when 131 Thai Malays fled to Kelantan to escape from the escalating 
violence in Southern Thailand.180 The Malaysian government not only accepted them, 
but also refused to send them back to Thailand even after the Thai government requested 
Malaysia to do so.181 Instead, Syed Jaafar said that “it is up to them [the Thai 
government] to convince their citizens to return” because Malaysia will not force them 
[the refugees] to do so.182 In order to reassure the Thai government that the decision on 
the 131 Thai Malays’ application for refugee status would be made without any pressure 
from the state government, Kuala Lumpur transferred the Thai Malays to a facility in
176 See, for example, Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 176, Yegar, Between Integration and 
Secession: The Muslim Communities o f the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western 
Burma/Myanmar, p. 166.
177 Pitsuwan, "The Ethnic Background o f Issues Affecting Bilateral Relations between Malaysia and 
Thailand," pp. 337-8.
178 Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience," p. 14.
179 "200,000 Rakyat Thai Lari Ke Malaysia," Utusan Malaysia, 14 September 2006.
180 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 105, "Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution," (Brussels: 18 
November 2005), p. 11.
181 However, in December 2005, Malaysia extradited one person from the group who was wanted by the 
Thai authorities in connection with the insurgency. See for example; Bemama, "Thai Welcomes M'sia's 
Move Not to Include South Issue During Summit," (25 October 2005), Harish, How Malaysia Sees 
Thailand's Southern Strife.
182 Up to Thailand to Convince Its People to Return - Syed Hamid (Bemama, 20 January 2006 [cited 3 
July 2006]); available from http://www.bemama.com/bemama/v3/bm/news.php?id=176603.
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Terengganu. This was necessary because the Kelantan state government is controlled by 
PAS.
4.4.3 Malaysia’s Assistance to Ethno-Nationalist Organisations
Malaysia’s official stance on the conflict in southern Thailand has been not to support 
the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist movement and not to interfere in Thailand’s domestic 
affairs.183 In other words, the government’s policy in relation to the conflict has been 
limited to formal statements, which amounted to expressions of empathy and concern 
about the confrontation but were always accompanied by an emphasis that this was an 
internal Thai problem.184 To the extent that Malaysia has voiced criticisms, it has 
addressed these through its non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the 
Malaysian Youth Islamic Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia -  ABIM).185 At 
the same time, Malaysia has also been actively promoting peace talks between the Thai 
Malay ethno-nationalist movement and the Thai government through its NGOs. For 
instance, the Perdana Global Peace Organisation (PGPO) has mediated in talks between 
the Thai Malay movements and Thai government officials. According to Mahathir, the 
Malaysian government is very much aware of the PGPO activities with regard to 
pacifying southern Thailand, because the PGPO briefs the Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister, Najib Abdul Razak regularly.186 The mediation carried out by the PGPO 
seems to be working well since a number of suggestions made during the negotiations 
have either been implemented by the Thai government or are in the process of
183 See, for instance, Farouk, "The Historical and Transnational Dimensions ofMalay-Muslim Separatism 
in Southern Thailand," p. 247, Gopinath, "International Aspects o f the Thai Muslim and Philippine Moro 
Issues: A Comparative Study," pp. 125-47, "KL Won't Interfere in Thai Peace Talks, Says Najib," Straits 
Times, 9 October 2006.
184 See, for example, Harish, How Malaysia Sees Thailand's Southern Strife, Yegar, Between Integration 
and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western 
Burma/Myanmar, p. 166.
185 Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: Islamic Brotherhood Versus National 
Interests," p. 221.
186 Interview with Mahathir.
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implementation. Among the achievements is the appointment of a Thai Malay as the 
Governor of Yala in November 2006 and a commitment made by the Thai government 
to introduce the Malay language into the curriculum of public schools in Southern 
Thailand.187 In addition, the Thai government had also agreed to use the Malay language 
as the medium of instruction in 200 schools in Thailand’s southern provinces.188 
However, Mahathir could not verify whether these schools were actually up and 
running.189
Although the Malaysian government has disassociated itself from any irredentist 
demands, giving assurances that the conflict is an internal issue for Thailand and in 
which Malaysia will not interfere, the friction between both countries has not ended. 
One of the reasons for the everlasting tensions in both countries’ bilateral relations is 
Thailand’s lack of conviction that Malaysia has actually been doing all it can to assist in 
suppressing the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations and to prevent sympathetic 
elements in Malaysia from extending support to the Thai Malay organisations across the 
border.190 In other words, the Thai government suspects that the Malaysian government 
does not want to take any strict measures to stop the members of the Thai organisations 
from crossing the international boundary into Malaysia. In fact, Thai state officials have 
complained to Malaysia on numerous occasions that separatist organisations have been 
taking advantage of safe havens in Kelantan.191 For instance, in the late 1980s, the Thai 
border officials alleged that the Malaysian military forged links with the PULO because 
its members were reported to be wearing jungle fatigues and using tinned rations and
187 "Malay Muslim Is Yala Head," The Star, 2 November 2006.
188 Interview with Mahathir.
189 Ibid.
190 Harish, How Malaysia Sees Thailand's Southern Strife, Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The 
Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 
166.
191 Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists, p. 56.
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equipment similar to what was used by Malaysian armed forces.192 According to Khan, 
the PULO formerly had good relations with the Malaysian security forces, especially at 
the height of the communist insurgency against the Malaysian government.193 More 
specifically, it would seem that in 1976 the PULO came to an agreement with the 
Malaysian security forces whereby the organisation agreed not to cooperate with the 
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) but instead help the Malaysian army defeat the 
insurgency.194 As a matter of fact, PULO played a major role in defeating the CPM. It 
relayed information to the Malaysian army on the exact location of CPM bases, and in 
some cases, even engaged the CPM in battle.195 In return, the PULO fighters were given 
food and ammunitions by the Malaysian military and allowed to seek refuge in 
Malaysian territory whenever they were under attack by the Thai military.196 However, 
these arrangements were terminated when the CPM surrendered.197
Although cooperation between the Malaysian army and the PULO ceased to 
exist following the CPM’s surrender, Thailand continues to accuse Malaysia of lending 
support to Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations. In January 1998, the then Thai 
Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, accused Malaysia of supporting the guerrillas after 
Malaysian authorities apparently refused to hand over the leader of the PULO, who had 
been arrested on a charge of carrying explosives.198 During 2006, the Thaksin 
government repeated the accusation that southern militants were being sent to training 
camps in Kelantan, and that bombs manufactured in Malaysia were being smuggled into
192 Pitsuwan, 'The Ethnic Background o f Issues Affecting Bilateral Relations between Malaysia and 
Thailand," p. 324.
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155
Thailand.199 Lastly, in November 2006, the Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont 
accused Thai restaurants in Malaysia of helping to fund the separatist insurgency in the 
South.200 However, in this particular case, the Thai Prime Minister did not accuse any 
official institution involved in the policy making process in Malaysia, but rather parts of 
civil society.
4.5 The Influence o f ASEAN on Bilateral Relations
Although Malaysia has been disturbed by the treatment of Thai Malays, there were at 
least two instances when both countries were willing to put aside their differences over 
the Thai Malay issue, namely when both countries faced a common threat and when the 
relations among ASEAN member states were at risk. First, when both countries faced a 
threat from communism, the security forces of both countries seemed to have worked 
together fairly well. Malaysia’s border security cooperation with Thailand to suppress 
the communist activities along both sides of the border goes back to when Britain 
approached Bangkok with a view to establishing cooperation to deal with CPM 
sanctuaries along the common border in the south of Thailand.201 In fact, the level of 
border security cooperation between the two countries reached an unprecedented peak 
during 1979-80, when a series of large-scale combined military operations were 
launched against the CPM’s various factions. In the event, the security cooperation 
between the military forces of the two countries played a key part in the CPM’s 
surrender in 1989.
199 Storey, "Malaysia's Role in Thailand's Southern Insurgency."
200 "Restaurant Rebel Funds Comment Upset Malaysia," Bangkok Post, 23 November 2006.
201For more comprehensive details on Malaysia-Thailand cooperation to suppress communist activities in 
the border region, see for instance, Leon Comber, "The Malaysian Special Branch on the Malayan-Thai 
Frontier During the Malayan Emergency (1948-60)," Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (2006), 
Chandran Jeshurun, "Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Malaysia 1957-82," in Governments 
and Rebellions in Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Regional Strategic 
Studies Programme, Institute o f South East Asian Studies, 1985), p. 149, Short, The Communist 
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Second, Malaysia has not pressured ASEAN to put the issue on its Summit 
agenda since this would have further complicated relations with Thailand. For instance, 
Malaysia did not pressure Laos to include the issue on the agenda at the 10th ASEAN 
Summit held in 2004.202 Even when Malaysia became the host of the 11th ASEAN 
Summit in 2005, the conflict in southern Thailand was not on the agenda. According to 
Syed Jaafar Albar, this decision is in line with the "ASEAN tradition” whereby member 
countries do not discuss domestic matters.203 In the second instance, cooperation 
between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok takes place following a decision to implement 
various programmes which aim to revive economic and cultural ties, in addition to 
elevating the economic status of the Thai Malays.204 The decision was made mainly 
because, although Thailand’s absolute growth rates are increasing, the southern 
provinces remain underdeveloped relative to other parts of the country and Thai Malays 
earn less per capita income than their non-Malays counterparts in the neighbouring 
provinces within the country.205
In fact, the provinces of Satun, Patani, Yala and Narathiwat are among the least 
developed provinces in Thailand.206 In an effort to increase the Thai Malays’ economic 
standing, the Langkawi Accord was signed in July 1993, marking the formal 
establishment of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). The 
IMT-GT covers the southern provinces (Satun, Songkhla, Yala, Narathiwat and Patani) 
of Thailand, the northeastern states (Kedah, Perak, Penang and Perlis) of Malaysia, and 
the Indonesian provinces of Aceh and North Sumatra. However, Khan questions this
202 "Thai Muslim Deaths Swept under Carpet at ASEAN Summit," The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 
November 2004.
203 Bemama, "Thai Welcomes M'sia's Move Not to Include South Issue During Summit."
204 Phil King, "The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle: How the South Was Won...And Then 
Lost Again," in Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand, ed. Sugunnasil Wattana (Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books: Prince o f Songkhla University, 2005), pp. 93-108.
205 Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and 
Aceh."
206 Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001," pp. 21-43.
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kind of cooperation as a suitable instrument for resolving the problems in southern 
Thailand because, according to him, economic issues are not the key reason why the 
Thai Malays continue their struggle through their ethno-nationalist organisations.207 
Although he acknowledged Malaysia’s good intentions, he also maintained that the 
economic cooperation between the two countries in the region did not benefit the Thai 
Malays’ economic needs.208
In addition, both countries also signed a Joint Development Strategy (JDS) in 
2004 that aims to start development projects including strengthening border 
development, which covers areas such as trade, tourism, agriculture, energy, education, 
human resources and disaster relief.209 Before 2004, Malaysia through one of its 
government agencies, GIATMARA, has been involved in giving technical training to 
271 Thai Malays between July 1999 to December 2003. In January 2007, Malaysia and 
Thailand agreed to reconvene annual talks between the two leaderships and expedite 
JDS projects.210 As a result, Malaysia has set up an agency called “Task Force 2010”, 
whose aim is to coordinate all assistance from Malaysia that would help restore peace in 
southern Thailand. One of the projects that has been carried out is providing vocational 
training to 16 Thai Malays in Malaysia’s higher institution in April 2007, with funding 
coming from the Malaysian government. Both governments also agreed to resolve the 
issue of dual-nationality by sharing biometric information contained in electronic 
databases to identify people with dual-nationality.211 Thailand believes that members of 
the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations are abusing dual citizenship to escape 
across the border with Malaysia after committing attacks in the southern provinces.
207 Interview with Khan.
208 Ibid.
209 Harish, How Malaysia Sees Thailand's Southern Strife.
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Malaysia, which does not recognise dual-nationality, has said that any Malaysian 
national found to have two passports would be asked to choose a single nationality.
4.6 Conclusion
The Malaysian government’s policy towards the conflict in southern Thailand rests in a 
general sense on the importance that Kuala Lumpur attaches to friendly relations with 
the Thai government. However, the prevailing good relations between Thailand and 
Malaysia, which - to some extent - have helped to defuse the crisis, do not mean that the 
sentiments in favour of the Thai Malays from the Malaysian government - particularly 
from the perspective of the Malaysian Malays - have disappeared. Even though Islam is 
a very important identity-marker for both the Thai Malays and the Malaysian Malays, 
the support for Thai-Malays cannot be reduced solely to the common religion. This is 
mainly because besides common religious faith, the Malays from Thailand’s southern 
provinces maintain strong links with Malaysia, particularly with northern Malaysia, on 
the basis of kinship relations, cultural ties, and commercial contacts.212 Despite the fact 
that both governments are seen as trying to resolve this issue without straining bilateral 
ties, the ethnic linkages between the Thai Malays and the Malaysian Malays forged 
throughout history have caused the Thai government to be suspicious towards 
Malaysia.213 In general, although Malaysia has repeatedly declared that the country will 
not interfere in the internal affairs of Thailand, the government is under pressure to 
make public comments whenever Thailand is seen to be taking a hard-line response in 
tackling the problems in its southern provinces. The Malaysian government has to play 
a delicate balancing act between domestic pressures to intervene in the conflict and
212 See Gopinath, "International Aspects o f the Thai Muslim and Philippine Moro Issues: A Comparative 
Study," pp. 125-47.
2,3 See "Analysis: PM Faces Difficult Task of Winning KL's Help," The Nation, 2 April 2004, "Southern 
Unrest: 'Culprits Finding Refuge in Malaysia'," The Nation, 2 April 2004.
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wider regional considerations to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of its 
neighbour. This can be seen by looking at the actions taken by the Malaysian 
government when dealing with this issue. As illustrated in this chapter, indeed, there are 
various channels through which the Malaysian government seeks to exert influence on 
the conflict in Southern Thailand, although officially the government adheres to a policy 
of non-interference. In short, although sometimes Kuala Lumpur is perceived to be 
cooperating well with the Thai authorities, at other times it appears to be making things 
difficult for Bangkok especially when there are rising calls in Malaysia to intervene on 
behalf of the Malays when their co-ethnic group are seen to be given “harsh” treatment 
by the Thai government. Looking at this particular case study, it can be concluded that 
ethnic factors do indeed have an influence in Malaysia’s security practice.
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Chapter 5: Malaysia’s Security Practices Towards Aceh, Indonesia
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Introduction
At least until late 2004, most Indonesians viewed the ethno-nationalist movement in 
Aceh as one o f the most serious challenges to the country’s territorial integrity, 
especially since the conflict had lasted for more than three decades by then. The 
Acehnese, led by the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), popularly 
known as Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka -  GAM) revolted against the 
Indonesian government in 1976. The conflict really turned sour between 1990 and 
1998, which led the Indonesian central government to put Aceh under military
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operations that aimed to bring the province in line with the rest of the Republic. Before 
signing the Helsinki Peace Accord in August 2005, the Acehnese, represented by the 
GAM, and the Indonesian Central Government had signed two earlier accords but 
neither had been successful in solving the conflict.1 With the signing of the latest peace 
agreement, GAM began to disarm its fighters and the Indonesian government started to 
withdraw from Aceh under the supervision of international monitors from Europe and 
some ASEAN members. As in southern Thailand, the conflict in Aceh was also linked 
to the grievances held by the Acehnese towards Jakarta’s policies on the province. In 
fact, a wide range of Acehnese grievances are already well documented in the literature.2 
As the primary subject of investigation here is Malaysia’s security practices towards the 
Acehnese conflict, the chapter will not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the conflict. The main argument of this chapter is that Malaysia’s security practice in 
the case of the conflict in Aceh can also only be understood with reference to domestic 
and regional concerns and with reference to the framework of a common ethnic identity.
The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section [5.1] analyses 
the Acehnese ethnic identity and offers a brief overview of the Sultanate of Aceh’s 
history, including how the sultanate ended up as part of the Republic of Indonesia. The 
primary purpose of this section is to illustrate the status of Aceh before joining 
Indonesia, which was frequently referred to as one of the main justifications for the 
province being granted a special status within the republic. The following section [5.2] 
focuses on the ethno-nationalist movement in Aceh. The objective of this section is to
1 See, for example, Edward Aspinall and Harold A. Crouch, The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed 
(Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2003), Crisis Group Asia Report N°17, "Aceh: Why 
Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," (12 June 2001).
2 Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and 
Aceh.", Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, Kirsten E Schulze, 
"The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003), Anthony L Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," 
New Zealand Journal o f  Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2002), Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in 
Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications."
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elaborate on the goals that particularly characterised Acehnese ethno-nationalist 
organisations. The third section [5.3] examines the close ethnic linkages that have 
existed between the population in Aceh and the Malays in Malaysia. This section also 
highlights the stark differences between Acehnese and Javanese ethnic identities.3 In 
order to set the context for exploring how ethnic kinship between the Malays and the 
Acehnese has affected Malaysia’s security practices in relation to the conflict in Aceh, 
section [5.4] analyses Malaysia’s bilateral relations vis-a-vis Indonesia and examines 
Malaysia’s stance in relation to the conflict prior to 2005. Lastly, the fifth section [5.5] 
discusses the constraints by ASEAN norms and cooperation on Malaysia’s security 
practices towards the conflict and focuses on Malaysia’s response to the 2005 Peace 
Agreement.
5.1 The Acehnese in Sumatra, Indonesia
Indonesia consists of at least 17,000 islands and currently has a population of 220 
million. Hassan di Tiro illustrated well the geographical coverage of Indonesia when he 
stated that the country “covered an area equal in length to that between Moscow and 
Lisbon, and in width equal to that between Rome and Oslo.”4 Due to its geographical 
fragmentation, the population of Indonesia is ethnically very diverse. In fact, according 
to the anthropologist, Hildred Geertz, Indonesia boasts more than 300 different ethnic 
groups, each with its own cultural identities that are speaking about 250 distinct 
languages.5 Despite the size of the country, the majority of the population tends to be 
concentrated on four major islands, namely Java, Kalimantan (the Indonesian part of the
3 Javanese is the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia.
4 Hassan di Tiro, "Indonesia Nationalism: A Western Invention to Subvert Islam and to Prevent 
Decolonization o f the Dutch East Indies" (paper presented at the World Seminar on the Impact of 
Nationalism on the Ummah, London, 31 July - 3 August, 1985).
5 Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven: 
HRAF Press, 1967), p. 24.
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island of Borneo), Sulawesi and Sumatra.6 Aceh7 is located in the northern part of 
Sumatra, which lies between the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca. Although 
Indonesia in general is comprised of people from diverse ethno-linguistic backgrounds, 
the people in Aceh are relatively homogenous. Its population is approximately four 
million, which is about a quarter of the total population of Sumatra. Within Aceh, the 
Acehnese form the largest ethnic constituency, representing about 75-80 per cent of the 
regional population.8
5.1.1 Acehnese Ethnic Identity
Despite being part of the Republic of Indonesia, the Acehnese people still possess a 
strong sense of identity distinct from Indonesians heralding from the archipelago’s other 
provinces. In historical terms, the key to this identity is the memory of an important 
sultanate that used to be a significant regional power.9 In addition, Aceh’s identity also 
took shape against the background of their resistance against Dutch colonisation, which 
actually lasted longer here than in almost any other part of Indonesia.10 The roughly four 
million people of Aceh have a distinctive language, Acehnese, which has many 
characteristics of Malay.11 Islam also forms one of the main elements of the Acehnese 
ethnic identity because it is the main religion in Aceh.12 Accordingly, a true Acehnese 
would define him/herself as a person whose family has resided in Aceh over several 
generations, who professes Islam as his/her religion and who also belongs to one of
6 The Indonesian Central Government is located in Jakarta on the island o f Java.
7 This thesis will use the spelling ‘Aceh’ adopted under the Malay language rather than ‘Atjeh’ that is used 
by the Dutch or ‘Acheh’ by the English. This spelling will be used constantly except in quotes whilst 
acknowledging that many Acehnese people use the forms ‘Acheh’ and ‘Atjeh’.
8 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, pp. 8-9.
9 Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 140, Tan, 
"Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," pp. 
267-88.
10 Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden of History in Aceh," p. 302, Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," pp. 438- 
39.
11 Interview with Dr. Husaini Hassan, 10 September 2006. See, for example, Christie, A Modem History 
o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, p. 140.
12 In fact, Islam is also the prevailing religion among most o f the ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia.
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Aceh’s nine ethno-linguistic groups: Aceh, Anek Jamee, Alas, Bulolehee, Gayo, Kluet, 
Simeule, Singkil, and Tamiang.13 Despite there being different ethno-linguistic groups 
among the Acehnese, all of them actually have the same roots as the Malays on the 
Malay Peninsula. As in Malaysia, Islam has also served as a unifying factor for all of 
Aceh’s different ethno-linguistic groups. In fact, even during the early years of 
Indonesian independence, when the country’s leaders were still arguing about whether 
or not Indonesia should become an Islamic state, the population in Aceh was already 
united under Islam.14
A few factors need to be taken into consideration when assessing the role of
Islam in Acehnese ethnic identity. Some historians have recognised Aceh as the place
through which Islam entered Southeast Asia around the year 700.15 The prominence of
having been the entry point of Islam in the region led Aceh to be dubbed as Serambi
Mekah, or the “front porch of Mecca.”16 In fact, Islam was promoted throughout
Southeast Asia by the Acehnese alongside the Malays in Melaka and other Malay
traders who had also converted to Islam.17 Since Aceh’s population has always
emphasised its devoutness and regarded Islam and Islamic symbols as part of its national
heritage, its religion and civilisation are intertwined with Acehnese cultural, social,
political, historical, and ethnic identity. According to di Tiro:
Everything in Aceh is judged by Islamic standards. Islam is an inseparable 
part of Acehnese identity. As far as my people are concerned Aceh and 
Islam have the same meaning. If Aceh is a coin, Islam is the other side of 
that coinage. Aceh is a nation founded on Islam and lives by the law of 
Islam.18
13 Kirsten E Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization 
(Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), p. 7.
14 Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," pp. 438-39.
15 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 9.
16 Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 69.
17 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 10.
18 Hassan di Tiro, The Price o f  Freedom: The Unfinished Diary ofTengku Hassan Di Tiro (Ministry of 
Education and Information, State of Acheh-Sumatra, 1982), 15 December 1977, p. 128.
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In short, Islam has a major influence in determining the course of social and political 
change in Aceh in addition to providing a rallying point around which the Acehnese 
have been able to unite against the incursion of foreigners and outsiders.19
5.1.2 The History of the Acehnese Ethnic group in Indonesia
Unlike Patani (previously known as Langkasuka), which has a history that dates back to 
the 1st century A.D., the Sultanate of Aceh was only founded at the end of the fifteenth 
century. However, while Patani was made one of the Siamese vassal states following 
the invasion of the Sultanate of Melaka in 1511, the Acehnese Sultanate grew after a 
series of strong leaders annexed several nearby kingdoms that led to the Sultanate 
developing a great reputation as a regional military and economic power. In fact, 
Aceh’s reputation as the most influential sultanate in the region grew not only due to the 
invasion of Melaka but also due to the fall of Pasai and Pedir in north Sumatra, which 
was caused by the constant military onslaught by the Portuguese (and Siamese). 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century until the first half of the seventeenth century, 
the Sultanate of Aceh was described as the “most dominant nation in the East Indies” 
and as the most powerful trading state in Southeast Asia.20
Historically, the Sultanate of Aceh experienced its golden age during the reign of 
Sultan Iskandar Muda (1581-1636). According to some classical texts such as the 
Sejarah Melayu, it has been well documented how Aceh, during the height of its power, 
not only controlled many Malay states on the Malay Peninsula - such as Perak, Johor, 
Pahang and Kedah - but also had a booming entrepot trade.21 Penang, which is one of 
the current states of Malaysia, became Aceh’s ‘gateway to the world’ from about 1850,
19 Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," pp. 438-39.
20 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 12, M. C. 
Ricklefs, A History o f  Modern Indonesia since C. 1300 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 355, Thaib, 
The Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia, p. 45.
21 Osman Mohd. Taib, Islamic Civilization in the Malay World (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka and the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, Istanbul, 1997), p. 22.
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when Aceh’s regular trade routes were reorganised.22 In fact, in terms of its trading 
power, during the period from 1800 -  1870, Aceh provided about half of the world’s 
pepper supply, which allowed the sultanate to develop strong trading links with a 
number of major countries at the time including Turkey, India, America, France and 
Italy.23 Indeed, despite the presence of European powers in maritime Southeast Asia, 
beginning with Portugal’s conquest of Melaka in 1511, three hundred years after the 
Dutch became the colonial power in Java and exerted their power over the rest of the 
East Indies, the Sultanate of Aceh was still recognised internationally as an independent 
sovereign state.
One of the major factors for Aceh’s ability to maintain its independence was the 
1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty whereby the Dutch agreed to the British demand that Aceh 
retain its separate status.24 However, Aceh only managed to remain a separate entity 
from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) until the Dutch invaded the territory on 
April 5, 1873. The Dutch invaded Aceh mainly as a result of the later Anglo-Dutch 
treaty, signed in 1871, that gave them free reign over Sumatra.25 However, Aceh proved 
to be one of the most difficult territories for the Dutch to subdue. The Acehnese offered 
fierce resistance to the Dutch invasion. In fact, according to di Tiro, one of the decisive 
battles of history in which a European colonial power experienced their first defeat by a 
people of this region was “the Battle of Bandar Aceh” on 23 April 1873.26 However, 
following the demise of the Acehnese Sultan Muhammad Daud Syah in 1903, the Dutch
22 Atjeh Verslag o f C. Snouck Hurgronje, 1893, as translated in Anthony Reid, The Contest fo r  North 
Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
p. 269.
Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden o f History in Aceh," p. 301.
24 Hassan di Tiro, "The Case & the Cause: National Liberation Front Acheh Sumatra" (paper presented at 
the Scandinavian Association o f Southeast Asian Social Studies, Goteborg, 23 August 1985), p. 2, Smith, 
"Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 71.
25 Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 71.
26 di Tiro, The Price o f  Freedom: The Unfinished Diary ofTengku Hassan Di Tiro, 25 January 1977, p. 
32.
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finally subjugated the Acehnese after thirty years of brutal warfare (1873-1903).27 
Nevertheless, small-scale resistance continued until the Japanese invasion in 1942.28
The Japanese invasion marked the end of the conflict between the Dutch and the 
Acehnese because the Japanese arrival completely removed the Dutch from Aceh. 
Following the surrender of the Japanese forces at the end of World War II (WWII), the 
Dutch colonial provinces, under the leadership of Sukarno, declared Indonesia’s 
independence in 17 August 1945. Although the Dutch sought to restore their rule over 
the archipelago after WWII, they did not attempt to reclaim Aceh.29 Meanwhile, Aceh 
regarded itself as having returned to its pre-colonial independent status.30 On 27 
December 1949, after a hostile armed struggle during the Indonesian National 
Revolution, the Dutch finally recognised Indonesia’s independence. Under the auspices 
of the United Nations (UN), Round Table Conference Agreements were signed which 
allowed for the transfer of the remaining Dutch colonial provinces’ territory to the fully 
independent Indonesia.31 The Sultanate of Aceh was included in these agreements 
despite having never been formally recognised as one of the Dutch colonial provinces.32 
Nevertheless, Aceh joined the new republic after the persuasion made by Sukamo. The 
agreement to join Indonesia was decided on the basis that the Aceh would be given 
autonomy within Indonesia, and allowed to implement Islamic law.33 In other words, 
unlike the Sultanate of Patani where it has been absorbed into a “foreign” state against
27 See Ricklefs, A History o f  Modem Indonesia since C. 1300.
28 There is substantial disagreement amongst commentators and scholars over when the Aceh War (or the 
Dutch War, as it is known in Aceh) ended. Some argue that the war only ended after Japanese invasion in 
World War II, while other suggests different dates in the early 1900s. Thus, the important point to note is 
that despite the Dutch achieving a degree of pacification by the early 1900s, the colonial power continued 
to face lower level resistance by the Acehnese.
29 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 16.
30 Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," p. 439.
31 Patricia Dexter, "Historical Analysis o f Population Reactions to Stimuli - a Case Study o f Aceh," 
(Edinburgh, Australia: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Department o f Defence, Australian 
Government, 2004), p. 5.
32 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 17.
33 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 117, "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh," (Brussels: 31 July 
2006), p. 2, Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," p. 438.
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its will, Aceh, on the other hand, was incorporated into Indonesia under its own free 
will.
The following section elaborates on the goals and particular characteristics of the 
ethno-nationalist movement in Aceh.
5.2 The Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist Movement in Aceh 
After being incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia, Aceh was promised that it 
would be given political autonomy within Indonesia. However, in 1951, President 
Sukarno integrated the Sultanate into the Indonesian province of North Sumatra.34 Two 
years after the dissolution of the autonomous Aceh province, the Acehnese, led by Daud 
Beureuh joined the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion in opposition against Jakarta.35 The main 
reasons prompting the widespread rebellion were DI’s intention to create an Islamic 
state of Indonesia, its desire for greater autonomy in matters of religion, customary law 
and education, and the perceived necessity to respond forcefully to Jakarta’s decision to 
revoke Aceh’s autonomous status in 1950.36 However, the rebellion at this time did not 
advocate the independence of Aceh as an objective. In the event, the uprising was 
largely brought under control in May 1959 (some elements continued to fight until 
1962) through an agreement that granted Aceh a special status called Daerah Istimewa,
34 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study o f  the Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: 
Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 357.
35 The Darul Islam (House o f Islam) rebellion was launched on western Jave in 1948 and that continued 
until the 1960s. The revolt was sparked after S.M. Kartosoewirjo accused the Indonesian leaders o f  
committing ‘crimes against Islam’ as they had rejected Islam as the sole foundation of the state. The 
rebellion spread from Java to north Sumatra and south Sulawesi during the 1950s. For further details see, 
C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner o f  Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981), Michael Leifer, Dictionary o f  the Modem Politics o f  South-East Asia, 3rd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 93-94, Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search fo r  Stability, 2nd 
ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 169.
36 See Shane Joshua Barter, "Holy War or Open Door? The Role o f Islam in the Aceh Conflict" (paper 
presented at the Twelfth Annual CANCAPS Conference, Quebec City, Quebec, 3- 5 December 2004), 
Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 242, 
Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge o f Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," Australian Journal o f  
International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): pp. 50-51, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: 
Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 175.
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whereby the region can exercise autonomy in matters of adat (customary law), 
education, and religion.37
However, the decision of the Indonesian government to grant a special status to 
the Acehnese within Indonesia was just in theory, as it had never been implemented 
fully.38 Consequently, this has created tensions, especially with regard to the nature of 
centre/periphery relations with the Indonesian central government. In consonance with 
its historical past, there is a widespread and strong sense of distinct ethnic and national 
identity in Aceh. Efforts to safeguard their societal security or in this particular case 
their distinct identity against Indonesia’s dominant ethnic group, in addition to the 
realisation that the prospect for self-rule in Aceh was very unlikely if not impossible 
under President Suharto’s “New Order” regime, led to a second revolt in 1976.39 Unlike 
when the first revolt occurred, this time the Acehnese grouped under the leadership of 
Hassan di Tiro. They aimed to secede from the Republic of Indonesia and sought to re­
establish an independent Acehnese state.40
5.2.1 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Hassan di Tiro, a descendant of a famous hero, Teungku Chik di Tiro, who led the war 
against the Dutch from 1874 - 1891,41 formed the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation 
Front (ASNLF), popularly known as the Free Aceh Movement {Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
-  GAM) in 1976. In fact, di Tiro has remained to this day the key leader of GAM. 
However, due to his health problems, Tengku Malik Mahmud, the Prime Minister of 
GAM and Zaini Abdullah, the Foreign Minister in-exile, have achieved more
37 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 2, Schulze, "The 
Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy of GAM," p. 242.
38 Kirsten E Schulze, "Aceh - a Year after the Tsunami: Dealing with Destruction," The World Today 62, 
no. 1 (2006): p. 12, Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 88.
39 Rizal G. Buendia, "A Re-Examination o f Ethnicity and Secessionist Movements in the Philippines and 
Indonesia: The Moros and Acehnese," Philippine Political Science Journal 46 (2002).
40 Sjamsuddin, The Republican Revolt: A Study o f  the Acehnese Rebellion.
41 Hassan di Tiro, "The Right o f Acheh/Sumatra to Survive as a Free Independent State," (Norsborg: 
Information Department, NLF Acheh Sumatra, 1992), p. 18.
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prominence in recent years. GAM’s official leadership has been given sanctuary by the
Swedish government in order to evade the Indonesian security forces.42 In fact, di Tiro
has been living in Sweden since 1979. The establishment of the movement was the
outcome of di Tiro’s political beliefs whereby the domination by one ethnic group -
Javanese - over others has been at the heart of Indonesia’s political troubles.43 In
general, GAM’s ideology has revolved around two major concepts: Acehnese
nationalism and national liberation. It is an ethnic nationalist movement because it is
based on the Acehnese ethnic group’s determination to be free from Javanese control.
In the words of di Tiro, the formation of GAM represented a bid “to free my people
from foreign domination, from the yoke of Javanese colonialism.”44 Di Tiro sees
Javanese rule as tantamount to foreign domination because to him:
The Javanese are very different from us. They have never been independent 
in modem recorded history. Now they have the impudence to come here 
and colonise us after we helped them gain independence from the Dutch in 
the 1945-49 struggle,45
The Indonesian central government used to view GAM as a separatist movement 
rather than a national liberation organisation because when Indonesia won its 
independence from the Dutch in 1949, Aceh was part of the country. However, di Tiro 
has remained adamant that the incorporation of Aceh into Indonesia was illegal because 
Aceh to him did not voluntarily join the Republic in 1949. Instead, GAM argued that 
Aceh was at the time an internationally recognised independent state, as exemplified by 
the 1819 treaty between the Sultan of Aceh and the United Kingdom and the 1824 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty. Another factor that has supported GAM’s argument on the status
42 Stephen Sherlock, "The Tyranny o f Invented Traditions: Aceh," in Violence in Between: Conflict and 
Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, ed. Damien Kingsbury (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2005), p. 189.
43 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, "Issues and Politics o f Regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Acehnese 
Experience," in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani (Singapore: Regional 
Strategic Studies Programme, Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 114-15.
44 di Tiro, The Price o f Freedom: The Unfinished Diary ofTengku Hassan Di Tiro, 28 October 1976, p. 7.
45 Ibid., 11 February 1977, p. 48.
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of the Sultanate of Aceh was the decision taken by major powers such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Austria-Hungary to declare their 
neutrality when the Dutch declared war against the sultanate of Aceh on 26 March 
1873.46 Therefore, di Tiro strongly feels that Aceh’s independence should have been 
returned to the Sultanate of Aceh rather than to the Republic of Indonesia.47 As di Tiro 
said:
The Netherlands had declared war against the Kingdom of Acheh, not 
against '’Indonesia" which did not exist in 1873; and "Indonesia" still did 
not exist when the Netherlands was defeated and withdrew from Acheh in 
March 1942. And when the Netherlands illegally transferred sovereignty to 
"Indonesia" on December 27, 1949, she had no presence in Acheh.48
In addition, GAM held that the incorporation of Aceh into Indonesia violated the 
Acehnese right to self-determination because the decision was made without any 
consultation of the Acehnese people.49 As a result of perceiving that “Javanese 
Indonesia” (the terminology used by GAM) did not have a legitimate claim to Aceh by 
virtue of decolonisation, GAM issued a “Declaration of Independence of Acheh- 
Sumatra” on 4 December 1976 that stated that Aceh’s independence would be an 
exercise of “our right of self determination” against “the Javanese colonialists” who had 
replaced the Dutch.50
5.2.2 GAM’s Splinter Group
Internal differences among the key leaders of the GAM led to the formation of the Free 
Aceh Movement-Govemment Council {Majlis Pemerintahan-Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-
46 See Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f a Separatist Organization, p.6,Thaib, The 
Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia, p. 47.
47 Hassan di Tiro, The Legal Status o f  Acheh-Sumatra under International Law (National Liberation Front 
o f Acheh-Sumatra, 1980).
48 Hassan di Tiro, "The New-Colonialism; Denominated "Indonesians!"" (paper presented at the UNPO 
General Assembly, Hague, 20 January 1995), p.2.
49 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
50 Acheh Sumatra National Liberation Front, Declaration o f  Independence ofAceh-Sumatra (4 December 
1976).
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MP-GAM). Originally, the MP-GAM was part of GAM because the main objective of 
its foundation was to serve GAM members who were living in Malaysia.51 However, 
the group decided to break away from the original GAM because of a disagreement over 
Tengku Malik’s appointment as the organisation’s Prime Minister.52 When MP-GAM 
officially separated from the original GAM in 1987, Teuku Don Zulfahri became the 
new group’s Secretary General. MP-GAM perceived themselves as more Islamic than 
GAM.53 GAM, on the other hand, claimed that the differences between them were 
nothing to do with Islam, but caused by the former’s cooperation with the Indonesian 
intelligence to make them look “fanatical and fundamentalist.54 MP-GAM, however, 
only has a significant following among Acehnese exiles and has never had strong armed 
support inside Aceh.55 Zulfahri, who had lived in Malaysia since 1981, held the post 
until his assassination - also in Malaysia - on 1 June 2000. Following the assassination, 
Husaini Hassan, formerly a cabinet minister of GAM, advanced as the main leader of 
MP-GAM.56 MP-GAM suggested that the killing of Zulfahri took place in accordance 
with instructions received from the original GAM leadership.57 The GAM leadership, 
on the other hand, attributes the assassination of Zulfahri to the Indonesian military.58
Significantly, the differences between the two Acehnese organisations, 
especially after the signing of Peace Agreement in 2005, are no longer about who 
exercises power or ideological differences, but about the ultimate objective of the two
51 Interview with Hassan.
52 Ibid.
53 Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 
252.
54 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 23.
55 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  Peace in Aceh? , p. 61.
56 See, for example, Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 
21, Singh, "The Challenge o f Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," pp. 50-51.
57 Interview with Hassan.
58 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 115.
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groups.59 According to Hassan, while the original GAM leadership under Tengku Malik 
“has placed Aceh under Indonesian occupation” by signing the Helsinki Memorandum 
of Understanding of the 15th August 2005, the MP-GAM, on the other hand, has wanted 
to continue the struggle for the independence of Aceh.60 The 2005 peace agreement 
between GAM and the Indonesian government (the Helsinki Accord) came after GAM 
set aside its demand for an independent Acehnese state. In essence, the accord 
requested GAM to demobilise all its guerrillas and to decommission its weapons. In 
addition, GAM also required surrendering and destroying the entire inventory of its 
firearms under international supervision. In return, Indonesia’s government agreed to 
grant an amnesty to all GAM members and supporters, and to release all political 
prisoners and detainees. In addition, the Indonesian government promised to allocate 
farming land and funds to assist with the reintegration into society of former 
combatants, besides compensating political prisoners and civilians who suffered losses 
in the conflict.61 Furthermore, the Indonesian government will allow former GAM 
combatants to serve in the local Indonesian police and armed forces.62 According to 
Hassan, this agreement was at odds with the Declaration of Independence promulgated 
by GAM on 4 December 1976 and therefore, his group, the MP-GAM, will therefore 
continue the struggle to regain Aceh independence.63 However, the Indonesian 
government chose GAM as its negotiation partner because the organisation was known 
to have superior political and military forces on the ground.64 For instance, in early 
2001, around 60-80 per cent of Aceh was under GAM control whereby the organisation
59 For a discussion on the reasons for the split between GAM and MP-GAM, see Schulze, The Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 22. Interview with Hassan.
60 Interview with Hassan.
61 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 343. For 
the full text o f the Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian government and the GAM, see 
Appendix 3.
62 Ibid.
63 Interview with Hassan.
64 See, for example, Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, 
p. 114, Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 21.
174
had assumed responsibility for government services such as education, health care, and 
infrastructure.65 In terms of its military strength, in 2001 -2002, the organisation was 
estimated to have about 15,000-27,000 regular and irregular soldiers.66 In short, GAM 
had grown from a small ethno-nationalist organisation into a strong and popular 
resistance organisation. This meant the government of Indonesia had to take GAM 
seriously and engage with this organisation if peace in Aceh was to be attained.67
5.2.3 Analysis of the Acehnese’s Ethno-Nationalist Organisations
There are a number of different interpretations of why GAM led the Acehnese struggle 
against the Indonesian government in 1976. The most common views hold that it is best 
explained as a consequence of Acehnese resentment of the Javanese domination of 
Indonesia and because they believed that they had not benefited from the province’s 
wealth.68 In addition, a number of scholars have argued that the reasons for the 
Acehnese revolt against Indonesia also included differences in lifestyles among them. 
While the Acehnese are known to have a more pious Islamic culture, the Javanese, on 
the other hand, have a nominal Muslim lifestyle.69 Because of the perceived differences 
between the Acehnese and the Javanese in their practice, interpretation and approach to 
Islam, a number of media sources and some academics have taken the view that GAM 
was struggling for the establishment of an “Islamic State”.70 Many other scholars,
65 Crisis Group Asia Report N°17, "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," p. 7, 
Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, p. 153.
66 Crisis Group Asia Report N°17, "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," p. 7, Michael 
L Ross, "Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia" (paper presented at the Yale-World Bank Project 
on "The Economics of Political Violence, 5 June 2003), p. 26.
67 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 2.
68 See, for example, Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, 
Mindanao, and Aceh," pp. 241-69, Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, andGlobal 
Issues, p. 42, Singh, "The Challenge o f Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," pp. 47-68, Tan, 
"Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," pp. 
267-88.
69 See, for example, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second 
Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 175.
70 See, for example, Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, 
Mindanao, and Aceh," pp. 241-69, Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia:
175
however, do not support this interpretation on the grounds that the question of Aceh as 
an “Islamic State” has never been formally raised by GAM, not even in its Re­
declaration of Independence of Aceh.71 That said, di Tiro made a claim in the 1970s and 
early 1980s that the memory of Iskandar Muda's rule during the “Golden Age”, “will 
help us to regain our freedom and to restore what it was on the surface of this land of 
his”.72 In a way, this statement infers that GAM’S main objective was to re-establish the 
sultanate rather than a theocratic Islamic state.73 According to Thaib, the alleged goal of 
establishing an Islamic State was actually “raised solely by the Indonesian military 
authorities in Jakarta, as a scarecrow, to justify its aggression and colonisation of Aceh- 
Sumatra in the eyes of some of its uninformed western allies.”74
In a similar vein to Thaib, Rizal Sukma has portrayed the Acehnese rebellion in 
primarily nationalist terms. He has seen the rebellion as the result of the central 
government’s responses, rather than an outcome of religious motives.75 The Declaration 
of Independence issued by GAM in 1976 tends to support this perspective.76 In that 
declaration, di Tiro said that;
Holland [the Netherlands] was the first foreign power to attempt to colonise 
us when it declared war against the Sovereign State of Acheh on March 26,
1873, and on the same day invaded our territory, aided by Javanese
mercenaries However, when, after the World War II, the Dutch East
Indies was supposed to have been liquidated... our fatherland, Acheh, was 
not returned to us. Instead, our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to 
the Javanese -  their ex-mercenaries -  by hasty fiat of colonial powers. The 
Javanese are alien and foreign people to us Acehnese Sumatrans. We have
Persistence, Prospects, and Implications." Tan writes, “Although the rebellion is heavily Islamic in nature, 
there are also historical, nationalistic and economic factors at work” (p.34) and goes on to cite the linkages 
with “co-religionists” in southern Thailand, Malaysia and Libya.
71 See Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 75, Thaib, The Politics and 
Governments o f  South East Asia , pp. 48.
72 di Tiro, The Price o f  Freedom: The Unfinished Diary ofTengku Hassan Di Tiro, 27 December 1977,
p. 126.
See, for instance, Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 74.
74 Thaib, The Politics and Governments o f  South East Asia, p. 48.
75 Rizal Sukma, "The Secessionist Challenge in Aceh: Problems and Prospects," in Governance in 
Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency, ed. Hadi Soesastro, et al. (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
76 For the full text o f the Declaration o f Independence o f Aceh-Sumatra, see Appendix 2.
176
no historic, political, cultural, economic, geographical relationship with 
them. When the fruits of Dutch conquest are preserved, intact, and then 
bequeathed, as it were, to the Javanese, the result is inevitable that a 
Javanese colonial empire would be established in place of that of the Dutch 
over our fatherland [...].77
The Declaration of Independence shows that Aceh-Sumatra wanted to become 
independent not because Indonesia was not an “Islamic State”, but because it wanted to 
retain its identity, its rights, and its historic status as an independent and free nation. 
The leadership of GAM itself also supports the perception that GAM is a nationalist 
organisation. According to Tengku Malik Mahmud, the Prime Minister of the GAM, 
the organisation is based on Acehnese nationalism and therefore is not a religious 
organisation, although Islam is the religion of its members.78 The main objective of 
GAM had been to regain the political rights of the Acehnese of which the latter were 
deprived by the Dutch, when they invaded Aceh in 1873, and followed by the Javanese 
when Aceh was handed over to Indonesia.79 The conflict in Aceh also has no serious 
implications for the Global War on Terrorism, as GAM has little to do with international 
terrorism or even Islamic fundamentalism. Although elements of GAM have engaged in 
terrorist acts, GAM is not linked to the Al- Qaeda movement or to any other movement 
that threatens western interests.80 As a matter of fact, GAM has carefully distanced itself 
from Islamist terrorist groups and radical Middle Eastern states.81 There are also distinct 
differences between the Acehnese ethno-nationalist organisations with the Islamist 
terrorist groups in terms of their identity. The Acehnese have never claimed an identity 
based on the religion alone, and piety has never resulted in the kind of rigid puritanism
77 Acheh Sumatra National Liberation Front, Declaration o f  Independence ofAceh-Sumatra.
78 Interview with Tengku Malik Mahmud, 9 September 2006.
79 Ibid. GAM dropped its objective to regain Aceh’s Independence after signing peace agreement with 
Indonesia in August 2005.
80 Anthony L Smith, "Indonesia's Aceh Problem: Measuring International and Domestic Costs," Asia- 
Pacific Security Studies 2, no. 5 (2003): p. 3-4.
81 Ibid.: p. 2.
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associated with Saudi Arabia or the approach to Islam called salafism.82 In fact, 
according to Smith, “the problems in Aceh relate primarily to local conditions, and 
linkage to problems of international terrorism would be unfortunate and wrong 
headed.”83 In short, although Islam continued to be relevant in the sense that it was the 
stated religion of all members of GAM, the organisation was neither explicitly Islamic 
nor did it pursue Islamist political aspirations.84 Rather, GAM is a national liberation 
organisation that defines its sense of identity through common ethnicity and also 
religious belief. Thus, while religion is an important identity marker for the members of 
GAM, it is difficult to attribute the existence of this national liberation organisation to an 
organisation that aims to establish an Islamic state in Aceh.
For the purpose of this dissertation, it is especially important to note that the 
leaderships of GAM, both that of GAM and the MP-GAM, were able not only to 
live/seek sanctuary but also establish their offices in Malaysia. The next section 
therefore analyses in more detail Acehnese perceptions towards their Malay brethren 
across the Straits of Malacca and vice versa. Above all, the section aims to establish the 
existence of kinship ties, both political and ethnic, between the Acehnese and the 
Malays.
5.3 Relations between the Acehnese and the Malays in Malaysia
Since the founding of the Sultanate of Aceh in the 1500s, links have been forged across
the Straits of Malacca through political struggle, warfare, intermarriage, rich scholarly
82 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 117, "Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh," p. 1.
83 Smith, "Aceh: Democratic Times, Authoritarian Solutions," p. 79.
84 For views that GAM is not an Islamic organisation, see, for example, John Gershman, "Is Southeast 
Asia the Second Front?," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): p. 67, Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 7.
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exchange and, in particular, trade.85 In actual fact, even after both the western and the
eastern sides of the Straits of Malacca were demarcated by the Dutch and the British
according to their colonial interest as stated in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the
straits continued to play a role as the sea that “joined” the lands at both sides of the
straits.86 According to Mahmud, many Acehnese actually view the Straits of Malacca
only as a river,87 which indicates the perceived closeness in terms of interaction and
movement between the Acehnese and the Malays on the Malay Peninsula. Historically,
Aceh and the Malay Peninsula had strong links with each other. Reid, for instance,
acknowledged that,
“up until the Dutch conquest in the late 19th century, Aceh had economic, 
political and cultural linkages with the Indian Ocean and the Malayan 
Peninsula, but not with the Java Sea world, dominated first by Java and then 
the Dutch.”88
In fact, for more than a century after the fall of the Sultanate of Melaka to the 
Portuguese in 1511, Aceh could legitimately claim to be Melaka’s heir. Aceh’s 
example, like that of Melaka before, became a model for proper Malay behaviour and 
institutions, which were already emulated on the west coast and the northern half of the 
east-coast of Sumatra, as well as in a number of states on the Malay Peninsula such as in 
Perak, and Kedah.89 According to Andaya, during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Aceh became a serious contender for leadership in the Malay world by setting 
new standards for Malayness in the court, the economy, and in Islam.90
85 Anthony Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories o f  Sumatra (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 2005).
86 Alice M Nah and Tim Bunnell, "Ripples o f Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," 
Singapore Journal o f  Tropical Geography 26, no. 2 (2005): p. 251.
87 Interview with Mahmud.
88 Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories o f  Sumatra, p. 337.
89 Leonard Y. Andaya, "The Seventeenth Century Acehnese Model o f  Malay Society," in Reading Asia: 
New Research in Asian Studies, ed. Frans Husken and Dick van der Meij (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), pp. 
83-84.
90 Ibid., p. 86.
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5.3.1 Ethnic Kinship between Acehnese and Malays
The Acehnese have very close ethnic and historical links with the Malays on the Malay 
Peninsula. According to Mahmud, in addition to the historical, religious, cultural and 
blood ties between the ordinary Acehnese and the Malays, links also existed among the 
ruling elites because many of the Malay sultanates on the Malay Peninsula also had 
blood ties with the Sultan of Aceh.91 In other words, according to Mahmud, the 
Acehnese not only share the same roots with the Malays on the Malay Peninsula but 
they are actually “blood brothers” to each other.92 Therefore, as for the Thai Malays, 
Malaysia can also to be considered as the ethnic kin state for the Acehnese. Historically, 
these ties have roots traceable to the early kingdoms (Srivijaya) that ruled the region 
between the eighth and thirteenth centuries. For example, Malay and Sanskrit 
inscriptions found in the Palembang region in Sumatra suggest that present-day 
Malaysia was part of the vast trading site of Srivijaya that had Sumatra as its base.93 
These ties, however, did not end when the early kingdoms were eclipsed, but continued 
until the days of the Acehnese Sultanates.
As put forward by Tengku Malik Mahmud, one of the key pieces of evidence of 
continued strong ties with the Acehnese Sultanates is the latter’s decision to liberate 
Melaka from the Portuguese colonial subjugation by constantly waging war against the 
Portuguese.94 For instance, in 1586, one of the Acehnese Sultans attacked the 
Portuguese in Malacca with an armada of 500 warships and 60,000 marines.95 
According to Mahmud, the Acehnese War against the Portuguese in Melaka weakened
91 Interview with Mahmud.
92 Ibid.
93 Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," 
Southeast Asian Studies 36, no. 1 (2005).
94 Interview with Mahmud. See for instance Dexter, "Historical Analysis o f Population Reactions to 
Stimuli - a Case Study o f Aceh."
95 Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p. 11, di Tiro, 
"The Case & the Cause: National Liberation Front Acheh Sumatra", p. 2.
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the Portuguese substantially, so that it contributed to their inability to expand their 
colonisation beyond Melaka.96 Tengku Malik Mahmud strongly believes that if Aceh 
had not weakened the Portuguese colonial power then, the Portuguese might have 
proceeded to conquer the entire Malay Peninsula, resulting in the conversion of Malays 
to Christianity.97 Notably, Mahmud also strongly believes that the Malays resident on 
the Malay Peninsula should be very grateful to the Acehnese then for protecting them 
from being obliged to convert to Christianity.98
Although the source of Malay identity was actually Melaka, this identity was not 
confined territorially or by descent. As on the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and elsewhere 
in maritime Southeast Asia, the court of Aceh also proudly proclaimed its awareness of 
maintaining Melaka/Malay standards.99 In fact, according to Reid, Aceh was one of the 
birthplaces of the Malay-language Islamic culture, because they appear to have written 
in Malay as far back as “they were able to write”.100 Even when Acehnese texts were 
written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were actually ‘framed’ in a 
context set by Malay and Arabic, whereby the beginning and end of the texts were in 
Malay, with an Arabic exordium.101 As illustrated by Loeb and Heine-Geldem, “Malay 
political culture was reinforced by the profession of Islam, a widely circulating Malay- 
language literature, subscription to similar customs and traditions, loyalty to the 
Sultanates and frequent inter-marriage across the seas”.102 In short, the Malay identity 
was actually based on the standards of language, literature, behaviour laws and Islam
96 Interview with Mahmud.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. Among the main objectives for Portuguese colonialism was the goal to convert the inhabitants in 
the region to Christianity. See Robert Day McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  
Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 2002).
99 Barbara Watson Andaya, "Historicising 'Modernity' in Southeast Asia," Journal ofEconomic and Social 
History o f  the Orient 40, no. 4 (1997).
100 Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden of History in Aceh," p. 303.
101 Mark Durie, "Framing the Acehnese Text: Language Choice and Discourse Structures in Aceh," 
Oceanic Linguistics 35, no. 1 (1996): p. 113.
102 Edwin M. Loeb and Robert Heine-Geldem, Sumatra: Its History and People (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 7-12.
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that were established by a living, vibrant society and not by any sacred command or 
ancestral prescription.103
Aceh had also established a strong presence on the Malay Peninsula during the 
height of power of the Acehnese Sultanates. Historical research has suggested that Aceh 
used not only to conquer pepper-producing areas on both the east and west coast of 
Sumatra, but also to take control of the tin-rich mines of Perak, Kedah, Johor and 
Pahang on the Malay Peninsula.104 In fact, during the first half of the 17th century, Perak 
and Pahang acknowledged the overlordship of Aceh. Although Kedah was then under 
the suzerainty of Ayudhya (Siam), it also pledged allegiance to the Sultan of Aceh.105 In 
addition, genealogical factors have also influenced the ties between the Malay Peninsula 
and Sumatra because a vast majority of the Malays on the Peninsula are 
ethnographically almost indistinguishable from those on Sumatra, particularly those 
hailing from the northeastern part of the island.106 Most of the Malays, particularly 
along the west coast of the Peninsula, can actually claim to be the descendants of 
Acehnese and Minangkabau migrants.107 For example, the Acehnese started to migrate 
to the Malay Peninsula particularly during the conflict with the Dutch that lasted from 
1873 and went on for almost three decades. In fact, the Malay Peninsula became the 
preferred destination among the Acehnese to seek refuge and they subsequently 
established permanent settlements on the Peninsula, especially in the states of Kedah, 
Perak, Penang and Langkawi.108 Given the constitutional definition of “Malay” in 
Malaysia, Acehnese who lived on the peninsula prior to Malayan independence have 
also been categorised as Malays. As a matter of fact, in parts of the Malay Peninsula
103 Andaya, "The Seventeenth Century Acehnese Model o f Malay Society," p. 90.
104 Ricklefs, A History o f  Modem Indonesia since C. 1300, pp. 32-6.
105 Andaya, "The Seventeenth Century Acehnese Model of Malay Society," p. 102.
106 Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," p. 96.
107 Ibid.
108 Nah and Bunnell, "Ripples of Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," p. 251.
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(particularly in the state of Negeri Sembilan), the Malays have long been proud to hail 
from the Sumatran district of Minangkabau, which is regarded as the ‘cradle’ of their 
race.109
Although the Malays in Malaysia, in general, share a common racial grouping 
with the majority of people in Indonesia, there actually exist a number of differences 
between them, especially ethnographic ones. For instance, despite accepting Malay as a 
racial definition for the large majority of the population of Indonesia, the Javanese 
ethnic group view that in terms of an ethnic marker, ‘Malayness’ is only confined to the 
people that inhabit the Riau islands, the Malay Peninsula, and portions of north-eastern 
Sumatra.110 In fact, the representation of all Indonesians as ethnic Malays is 
objectionable to the Javanese who comprise around 50 per cent of the total Indonesian 
population. One of the main reasons for the Javanese wanting to be seen as a distinct 
ethnic group is mainly because many of Indonesia’s political traditions are drawn from 
the legacy of the Majapahit Empire (owing to Javanese political dominance). In fact, 
many Indonesian nationalists see the country as a continuation of the fourteenth century 
Empire, which during its “golden age” also claimed suzerainty over parts of the Malay 
Peninsula.111 The political traditions of the Malays, on the other hand, differ from those 
of the Javanese as their traditions are drawn from the legacy of Srivijaya.112
The different political traditions have resulted in longstanding tension between 
Java and the ethnic Malay world, echoing the historical contestation between Srivijaya 
and Majapahit. Not surprisingly, such differences would also have an impact on the 
terms of affinity between Malaysia and Indonesia as interpreted and understood by their 
leaders. Accordingly, the Javanese, who wield most political power in Indonesia, regard
109 Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," p.97.
110 Liow, The Politics o f  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations, p. 50.
111 Kingsbury, The Politics ofIndonesia, p. 21, Ricklefs, A History o f  Modem Indonesia since C. 1300, p. 
15.
112 Liow, The Politics o f Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations.
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themselves as culturally more sophisticated and superior not only vis-a-vis the Malays 
but also in relation to other ethnic groups in the archipelago.113 In fact, according to 
Shamsul, the Director of the Malay World and Civilization Institute at the National 
University of Malaysia, one of the main reasons why former President Habibie (1998- 
1999) did not even receive the support from his own political party to run in the 
Presidential election was his non-Javanese background.114 President Habibie was the 
first and hitherto the last non-Javanese Indonesian president. According to Kingbury, 
since many Indonesian nationalists perceived their country as the reinterpretation of a 
traditional Javanese empire, none of the other provinces in the country is politically 
equal.115 Instead, Indonesia has become a centrist state, which is based in Jakarta. In 
other words, even if there is a Javanese high-ranking official appointed in the Indonesian 
government, the appointment is made primarily because as a subject of the empire 
he/she is actually expected to serve the Javanese empire.116 Also, it is very unlikely that 
the Javanese people will make a non-Javanese person the head of the Indonesian state.
Clearer evidence of the close relationship between the Acehnese and the Malays 
also emerged when the Indian Ocean Tsunami hit Aceh in December 2004. Malaysian 
humanitarian organisations were the first to arrive in Aceh.117 Despite being hit so badly 
by the tsunami, the Acehnese people notably still felt obliged to organise an official 
“welcoming ceremony” to receive their ‘relatives’ from Malaysia.118 The fact that 
Tengku Malik Mahmud and Acehnese people refer to the Malays as their ‘relatives’
113 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 29, Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, p. 
22 .
114 Interview with Shamsul A.B., 8 April 2007. Former President Habibie is from Makasar, Sulawesi. He 
became the President o f Indonesia not through election but was appointed by President Suharto (1967- 
1998) to lead the transitional government following Suharto’s resignation. However, when Indonesia held 
a presidential election Habibie did not participate in the Presidential election. Officially, he withdrew his 
Presidency nomination after members of Golkar rejected his “accountability speech” that outlined what he 
had achieved when he was leading the transitional government.
115 Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, pp. 8-22.
116 Ibid.
117 Interview with Hassan.
118 Interview with Mahmud.
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shows that despite both people being separated by international borders, the feeling of 
ethnic affinity with the Malays still exists between them. In short, Aceh is a very 
important part of the Malay world, and the relationship between the two is not limited to 
trade relations, customs and traditions, and politico-dynastic contacts, but also includes 
Islamic scholarship.119 Due to the close links with the Malays, Aceh as a region and 
Sumatra in general have long been considered as an integral part of the Malay Peninsula, 
although the ties between the two are normally conceived of as a cultural rather than a 
political entity.120
This section has illustrated the depth of kinship between the Acehnese and the 
Malays, particularly those hailing from the Malay Peninsula. The next section analyses 
the Malaysian government’s approach to the Aceh conflict. The objective is to 
investigate whether ethnic kinship between the Malays and the Acehnese has played a 
role in shaping Kuala Lumpur’s policy and practice towards the conflict in Aceh.
5.4 Malaysia and Indonesia Bilateral Relations
Despite the common perception by most scholars that close ethnic ties bind Kuala 
Lumpur and Jakarta,121 Malaysia’s bilateral relations with Indonesia have been 
problematic at times because historically, the Javanese and the Malays had never been 
united under one administration, but rather belonged to two rival ancient empires. Aceh 
is geographically and spiritually much closer to Malaysia than it is to Jakarta. The 
economic and political interaction between Aceh and the Malay sultanates over the 
centuries has resulted in many Acehnese settling on the peninsula, particularly in Kedah 
and Penang. In fact, several senior Malaysian government officials have Acehnese
119 Christie, A Modem History o f  Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism , p. 141.
120 See Barnard, Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity across Boundaries.
121 Baroto, "Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives," p. 2, Liow, 
The Politics o f  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations.
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roots.122 Due to this close interaction across the straits, most Malaysian Malays perceive 
the Acehnese not only as close neighbours but also acknowledge the fact that there are 
political allegiances between them.123
The following sub-section looks at Malaysia’s security practice towards Sumatra 
before the establishment of GAM in Aceh in 1976.
5.4.1 Approach Towards Earlier Rebellious Movement in Sumatra
Before the formation of the Acehnese ethno-nationalist movement, Malaysia124 was 
reported to have assisted earlier rebellious movements in Sumatra, particularly the 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia - PRRI), which was formed in 1958 by a group of dissident 
politicians and military officers in Sumatra.125 After all, as Liow pointed out, the 
fundamental feature of Peninsula-Sumatra kinship was a shared dislike for Javanese 
dominance.126 The historical and cultural affinity between the Malays and the Sumatrans 
made it generally difficult for the Malaysian government, in which the Malays play a 
leading role, to be neutral in the Indonesian central government’s suppression of their 
Sumatran cousins.127 More importantly, the view that Sumatra is closer to Malaysia than 
to Java has also persistently been shared by the Sumatrans. For instance, following the 
1957-1968 regional rebellion in Sumatra, the Sultan of Deli128 commented that: “We
122 Interview with Hassan. For instance, the former Agriculture Minister and the state o f Kedah’s Chief 
Minister, Sanusi Junid, was a relative of the late Acehnese nationalist leader, Daud Beureueh. He is 
currently the President o f the Acehnese Community in Malaysia. There are also many other Malaysian 
Malays o f Acehnese descent who are heading a number o f important government positions in Malaysia. 
See, Acheh Eye, International Islamic University Malaysia Buka CabangDi Aceh (3 May 2007 [cited 7 
November 2007]); available from http://www.acheh-eye.org/a-eye_news_files/a- 
eye_news_bahasa/news_item.asp?NewsID=5441.
1 3 Interview with Mahmud.
124 It should be noted that at the time o f the PRRI’s rebellion in Sumatra, the name o f the country was still 
Malaya.
125 Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," p. 96.
126 Ibid.: p. 98.
127 Ibid.
128 According to Hassan, Deli was a province under the Sultanate o f Aceh.
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Sumatrans would do better to leave the republic altogether and join Malaya. Most of the 
Sultans are relatives of mine, and one really has so much more in common [compared to 
the Javanese].”'29
Some scholars have suggested that during the period of the rebellion by the 
PPRI, the Malaysian government allowed the rebels to use military facilities in the 
country.'30 More significantly, PRRI rebels and sympathisers were permitted to visit 
Malaysia regularly to publicise their cause.'3' In addition, it was reported that the 
Malays on the peninsula also assisted the rebellion in a private capacity through fund­
raising.'32 Later, when the uprising failed in 1968, the Malaysian government granted 
sanctuary to the leaders of the PPRI in Malaysia and refused requests for their 
extradition by the Indonesian government.'33 Due to this historical background of 
Malaysia’s assistance towards its ethnic brethren across the Straits of Malacca, the 
perception remains that the Malaysian government is likely to continue giving support to 
other rebellious groups from Sumatra. As a result, in the case of the Acehnese rebellion, 
Indonesia has long harboured suspicions that Malaysia discreetly supported the GAM, 
especially since there is evidence in the form of pro-GAM material that quotes Acehnese 
sources in Malaysia and refers to rebels who have fled to Kuala Lumpur.’34
5.4.2 Malaysia’s Assistance to the Acehnese
In 1976, after the outbreak of the conflict in Aceh and especially between 1990 and 
1998, when the Indonesian central government declared the province to be under 
military operations (Operation Red Net), several thousand Acehnese sought asylum in
129 Quoted in James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise: Indonesia's Civil War (London: Cape, 1961), p. 75.
130 Audrey Kahin and George McTuman Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: New Press, 1995), p. 222.
,3' Liow, The Politics o f Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations, p. 98.
132 Ibid.
'33 Baroto, "Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives," p. 151.
134 "Aceh Unrest Leads to Mounting Death Toll," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 January 1991.
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Malaysia.135 Moreover, given the continuing military operations in Aceh, most Acehnese 
decided that it was safer to remain in Malaysia. According to Sulistiyanto, 5,000 
Acehnese refugees sought refuge in Malaysia in the period from 1991 to 1995.136 
Although Malaysia did not grant political asylum to any refugee because the country 
never ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees,137 the Acehnese 
continued to flee to Malaysia. The Acehnese knew that although Kuala Lumpur would 
label them as illegal immigrants, the Malays would still find a way to help them.138 
Moreover, it should be noted that besides Malaysia’s geographic proximity to Aceh, its 
shared culture, and similar language, Malaysia has been the favourite destination for 
Acehnese fleeing their homeland due to the presence of a large and wealthy Acehnese 
diaspora community.139 According to Barber, the estimated population of “rich and 
influential” Acehnese in Malaysia is close to 10,000.140 The fact that Barber highlighted 
the role of the “rich and influential” Acehnese in Malaysia indicates that this community 
enjoys leverage over Malaysia’s approach towards Aceh.
In fact, before 1998, rather than repatriating them, the Malaysian government 
normally granted the Acehnese refugees temporary residency.141 For instance, in 1991, 
when 112 Acehnese refugees142 landed in Penang and Kedah, they were initially 
classified as illegal immigrants, and hence due to be repatriated. When the Malaysian
135See, for example, Dexter, "Historical Analysis o f Population Reactions to Stimuli - a Case Study o f  
Aceh," p. 6, Anja Jetschke, "Democratization: A Threat to Peace and Stability in Southeast Asia," in Asia- 
Pacific Economic and Security Co-Operation: New Regional Agendas, ed. Christopher M. Dent 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 180, Nah and Bunnell, "Ripples o f Hope: Acehnese 
Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," p. 249, Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," p. 442.
136 Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh," p. 442.
137 Refugees International, Malaysia: Acehnese Refugees Face a Triple Threat (2005 [cited 18 April 
2007]); available from http://www.refugeesintemational.org/content/article/detail/5603/.
138 Interview with Hassan,
139 Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 
244.
140 See, for example, Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in 
Aceh, pp. 20-21, Michael Vatikiotis, "Troubled Province," Far Eastern Economic Review (1991).
141 "112 Acehnese Who Fled to Malaysia Can Stay If They Want to, Says Envoy," Straits Times, 1 June 
1991, Dexter, "Historical Analysis o f Population Reactions to Stimuli - a Case Study o f Aceh," p. 6.
142 There was also another wave o f Acehnese refugees that fled to Penang in 1992.
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government began to send back illegal Indonesian immigrants in 1997, the Acehnese 
were still excluded from deportation.'43 Interestingly, despite several requests by the 
Indonesian government to extradite those refugees who were accused of rebelling 
against the Indonesian government, Malaysia sought assistance from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to address the plight of the 
Acehnese refugees.'44 Nevertheless, after a period of intense lobbying by Indonesia, 
Malaysia finally decided to accede to the request by repatriating a small number of the 
Acehnese refugees to Indonesia from 1998 to 2004.145 Malaysia’s decision to repatriate 
Acehnese refugees led to a breakdown of trust between the Acehnese towards Kuala 
Lumpur, particularly among the GAM leadership. According to Mahmud, although the 
GAM leadership knew that the Indonesian government put tremendous pressure on 
Malaysia, they were heartbroken to see Kuala Lumpur comply.'46
Indeed, the level of trust between GAM and the Malaysian government sank to 
such a low that Malaysia was not even invited by GAM to send observers to monitor the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) that was concluded by GAM and the 
Indonesian government on 9 December 2002.147 Rather, GAM and the Indonesian 
government agreed to invite only Thai and Filipino soldiers to work alongside them in a 
Joint Security Commission.'48 According to Mahmud, GAM decided not to invite 
Malaysia because they feared that Malaysia would no longer be a neutral observer under 
the COHA, but rather be biased towards Indonesia.149 According to Syed Jaafar, 
however, the main reason why Malaysia was not invited to participate was because
143 Dexter, "Historical Analysis o f Population Reactions to Stimuli - a Case Study o f  Aceh," p. 6.
144 Interview with Syed Jaafar Albar.
145 Straits Times Interactive, 25 December 1996.
146 Interview with Mahmud.
'47 Ibid.
148 Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 45.
149 Interview with Mahmud.
189
Kuala Lumpur was perceived by the Indonesian government as being pro-Aceh. 150 
While different, Malaysia was thus not regarded as being able to act as a neutral 
observer in the mission. Notably, the policy of repatriating Acehnese refugees back to 
Indonesia was changed again by Kuala Lumpur in the light of the tsunami disaster at the 
end o f2004. According to Mahmud, the tsunami helped the Acehnese by showing the 
world what was really happening in Aceh.151 The tsunami had placed the province in the 
international spotlight - something that GAM was previously unable to achieve through 
its international lobbying efforts. Prior to the tsunami, any news of the social and 
political upheaval in Aceh was only disseminated via the people who fled the province 
to other parts of Sumatra and Malaysia.152 The disaster, however, had generated 
unmatched global humanitarian assistance.153 Malaysia decided not to return the 
Acehnese refugees to Indonesia but allowed them to work in Malaysia. In fact, in 2005, 
the Malaysian government issued between 32,000 and 35,000 work permits to Acehnese 
refugees and migrants, which legalised their stay in Malaysia.154 Interestingly, instead 
of the UNHCR distributing the work permits to the Acehnese refugees, the process was 
handled by the Acehnese community in Malaysia.155 This indirectly shows that the 
Acehnese community in Malaysia does indeed possess considerable influence over the 
Malaysian government. It should be noted that the refugees that originate from Aceh are 
among two groups that are allowed to work in Malaysia.156 It would appear that the 
decision to allow the refugees from Aceh to work in the country stemmed from the view 
of the Malaysian leadership that it was necessary to ease the heavy burden that the
150 Interview with Syed Jaafar Albar.
151 Interview with Mahmud.
152 Nah and Bunnell, "Ripples o f Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," p. 250.
153 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  Peace in Aceh? , pp. 19-20.
154 U.S. Committee For Refugees and Immigrants, Malaysia (2007 [cited 1 November 2007]); available 
from http://www.refugeesusa.org/countryreports.aspx?id=2008.
155 Ibid.
156 The other refugees that are allowed to work legally in Malaysia are the Moros from the Southern 
Philippines.
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Acehnese were facing at the time. In addition, the Malaysian government also offered 
to share its urban planning expertise in the reconstruction of Banda Aceh.157 In fact, 
according to Nah, the intertwined histories as well as geographical proximity appear to 
place Malaysia in an important position for the post-tsunami reconstruction of Aceh.158
There are few estimates on the exact number of Acehnese refugees in Malaysia 
because there are no official statistics. Indeed, Gunaratna claims that in 2001, there 
were merely 2,000 to 3,000 Acehnese living in Malaysia.159 By far the largest total 
number estimated to have sought refuge is that of Ramasamy who has mentioned that in 
2004, there were around 30,000 - 40,000 Acehnese refugees living in Malaysia.160 The 
UNHCR provides statistics on the number of Indonesian refugees in Malaysia for the 
period from 1996 to 2005.161 However, the UNHCR has not specified whether the 
refugees were Acehnese or from other areas of Indonesia because the report only uses 
the term “Indonesia”. Yet, it can be inferred from the report that the Acehnese indeed 
represent the largest number of Indonesian refugees in Malaysia. The figures, however, 
only show the number of refugees that were registered with the UN agency. The 
International Crisis Group (ICG) put the actual number of Acehnese who fled to 
Malaysia much higher, as many of them failed to register with the UNHCR in Kuala 
Lumpur.162 The total number of Acehnese refugees as given by the UNHCR is 
represented in Table 2 below:
157 Nah and Bunnell, "Ripples o f Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," p. 253.
158 Ibid.
159 Rohan Gunaratna, "The Structure and Nature o f GAM," Jane's Intelligence Review 13, no. 4 (2001).
160 P Ramasamy, "Regionalism and Ethno-Nationalist Conflict in Southeast Asia" (paper presented at the 
Conference on Southeast Asia: A Maturing Regional Power?, University o f Essex, March 22 2006).
161 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Trends in Displacement, Protection and 
Solutions (2007 [cited 1 November 2007]); available from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- 
bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf.
162 Crisis Group Asia Briefing N° 40, "Aceh: A New Chance for Peace," (Brussels: 15 August 2005).
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* Refugee population, end of year.
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). 2007. Trends in 
Displacement, Protection and Solutions. In Statistical Yearbook 2005, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf. (accessed 1 November 
2007).
Given that there has been an element of uncertainty on the part of the Indonesian 
government with regards to the real intention of the Malaysian government in aiding the 
Acehnese refugees in the country, the existence of the Acehnese refugees in Malaysia 
created a security dilemma for the Malaysian government. Similar to the case of the 
conflict in southern Thailand, the concept of security dilemma here is also not used in 
the usual context.163 The Indonesian government fears for its territorial integrity 
especially since Malaysia has a history of aiding earlier rebellious movements in 
Sumatra.164 For their part, the Malaysian authorities have had to choose between 
repatriation in order to maintain cordial bilateral relations with Indonesia or granting 
asylum to the refugees so that the Malays’ ethnic brethren would be safe from 
persecution from the Indonesian military. In fact, according to the former Prime
163 For detailed discussion on how ‘security dilemma’ is defined, see Herz, Political Realism and Political 
Idealism: A Study in Theory and Realities, Roe, "The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 
'Tragedy'?.", Wheeler and Booth, "The Security Dilemma."
164 Liow, "Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaya's Relations with Indonesia, 1957-1960," p. 96.
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Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, when the Acehnese sought sanctuary in Malaysia, it was 
difficult for the government to send them back because of Malaysian fears for their 
lives.165 This shows that the Malaysian government is indeed concerned about the 
human security of the Acehnese, especially those who had already sought refuge in 
Malaysia. However, Malaysia was only willing to allow Acehnese refugees to remain in 
Malaysia on condition that they must not be active in supporting or/and undertaking any 
action directed against the Indonesian government.166 It can also be assumed that the 
Malaysian government’s decision not to repatriate the Acehnese to Indonesia was the 
result of a calculation whereby any such repatriation would amount to a very unpopular 
decision with the Malay public that might undermine the credentials of the ruling party 
(UMNO).
5.4.3 Assistance to Gerakan Aceh Merdeka -  GAM
The conflict in Aceh, especially in the 1990s, affected Indonesia’s neighbouring 
countries. However, according to Smith, the conflict did not have immediate strategic 
implications for the ASEAN region.167 This assessment is based on the argument that 
the conflict in Aceh was relatively contained -  with the exception of illegal small arms 
shipments out of Thailand and the apparent funding of GAM from sympathetic elements 
in Malaysia.168 It should be noted that with regard to the illegal arms supply from 
Thailand, it was actually the Malays in Southern Thailand who were responsible for the 
shipments of small arms to Aceh and not the Thai government.169 Officially, the 
Malaysian government did not support the objective of an independent Acehnese state in
165 Interview with Mohamad.
166 Ibid.
167 Smith, "Indonesia's Aceh Problem: Measuring International and Domestic Costs," p. 3.
168 Ibid.
169 Zachary Abuza, "Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia," in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: 
Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2005), p. 52, Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, 
and Implications."
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Sumatra. This becomes clear upon closer analysis of numerous statements made by the
Malaysian leadership on the issue. Above all, the government in Kuala Lumpur had
repeatedly reiterated that the conflict was an Indonesian domestic affair. For example,
Mohamad, during his official visit to Indonesia in March 2000, expressed the Malaysian
government’s full support for Jakarta’s policy with regard to Aceh. Moreover, he made
clear that the Malaysian government would curb any activities in the country in support
of the Acehnese rebels, stating that, “we will not let anybody use Malaysia as a base for
activities which are not good for neighbouring countries such as Indonesia.”170 During
the former Prime Minister’s official visit to Indonesia in March 2000, he expressed the
Malaysian government’s full support for Jakarta’s policy with regard to Aceh.
According to Mohamad,
‘Our stance is that Aceh should be a part of Indonesia. If they want to have 
more autonomy that is up to them to negotiate, but our stance is that Aceh 
should remain part of Indonesia’.171
Before his official visit in 1999, the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Syed 
Jaafar Albar made the very same point when he said that Malaysia wants ‘to see 
Indonesia return to normality, its economy revived and Indonesia’s integrity as a nation 
defended at all times’.172 However, despite such repeated reassurances by the Malaysian 
government that it would uphold its official foreign policy of non-interference in the 
conflict and respect Indonesia’s territorial integrity, there has been actual evidence of 
material support from Malaysia.
Although the Malaysian government advised its citizens not to get involved in 
the conflict, as this kind of support would create embarrassment to the government, the
170 Jakarta Post, 10 March 2000.
171 Ibid.
172 Quoted in Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front 
in the War on Terrorism, p. 180.
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success in achieving this aim has proved very limited.173 As stated in Chapter 2, even if 
government leaders do not want to intervene in ethnic conflict across the border, they 
may not be in a position to restrain the citizens from becoming involved. While there is 
no evidence that the Malaysian government itself was involved in aiding the Acehnese 
other than by providing shelter to refugees, considerable sympathy has existed within 
the country, especially from the ethnic Malays and the Acehnese diaspora, who had 
indirectly helped GAM in order that it could continue its operation against Indonesia. 
It has also been reported that the Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia has been heavily 
involved in sending money, arms, and recruits back to their ‘home’ country.174 Sukma, 
for example, estimated that in Kuala Lumpur alone at least 5,000 Acehnese provided 
GAM with regular donations that made Malaysia the largest source for the movement’s 
‘foreign’ funding.175 GAM used the money to purchase weapons in Cambodia and 
smuggled them through Thailand before sending the weapons to Aceh.176 The shipments 
of the weapons to Aceh were also reported to be made via the Malaysian states of 
Kelantan, Sarawak, and Sabah177 and these were facilitated by GAM members based in 
Malaysia.178 In December 1999, the Indonesian Home Affairs Minister publicly stated 
that Aceh rebels were smuggling weapons from Malaysia and urged that Malaysia
173 Interview with Mohamad.
174 Byman, Trends in Outside Support fo r  Insurgent Movements, p. 41, Schulze, "The Struggle for an 
Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 244.
175 See, Rizal Sukma, CSIS, Jakarta, 24 April 2001, interviewed by Schulze, "The Struggle for an 
Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 258. There are two possible 
explanations for this ‘foreign’ funding from Malaysia. First, as mentioned in the previous section, a 
segment o f the Malays in Malaysia are in fact from the Acehnese descent. Second, there is also Acehnese 
community o f more recent exiles living in Malaysia.
176 Peter Chalk, Light A rms Trading in Se Asia (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2001 [cited 10 August 2006); 
available from http://www.rand.org/commentary/030101JIR.html, Rabasa and Chalk, Indonesia's 
Transformation and the Stability o f  Southeast Asia, p. 6, Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh: 
The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 258.
177 There is a high possibility that the shipments o f weapons through Sabah were facilitated by the 
members o f  the Moro ethno-nationalist organisations in southern Philippines. According to the ICG 
report, 115 Acehnese fighters have been trained in the Philippines. See, Crisis Group Asia Report N° 17, 
"Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," n. 11 p. 3.
178 Chalk, Light Arms Trading in SeAsia, Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in 
Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh," pp. 241-69, "Mahathir's Aceh Dilemma," Straits Times, 22 
December 1999, Rabasa and Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability o f  Southeast Asia, p. 6, 
Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 33.
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should be neutral in the conflict.179 This, however, was immediately denied by the then 
Deputy Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who declared, “What was said 
about our country is very difficult to believe”, adding “Malaysia had no role in any 
activities with the [Aceh separatist] movement.”180 Interestingly, after 1999, the 
Indonesian government did not make any new accusations towards Malaysia. It was 
reported that weapons for GAM came through Malaysia only until the late 1990s.181
In addition, even though GAM’s military capacity was almost paralysed as a 
result of Indonesia’s counterinsurgency operations in 1992, GAM was able to keep their 
military operations alive because Malaysia has been a “useful” place for GAM not only 
for its financial support but also for its new recruits.182 A number of top GAM 
commanders in addition to between 250 and 2000 GAM members were recruited 
primarily from among the Acehnese population in Malaysia.183 These military 
commanders and recruits were given military and ideological training in Libya in the 
late 1980s.184 In 1989, it was reported that between 150 and 800 Acehnese fighters 
trained by Libya sneaked into Aceh via Malaysia and Singapore.185 In fact, the 
Indonesian government claimed that Malaysian identity cards were found on the bodies 
of Acehnese fighters killed in battle.186 GAM fighters seem to have been able to 
organise themselves efficiently in Malaysia mainly due to the fact that GAM’s 
operational command was said to be almost fully transferred to Malaysia, where it
179 "Aceh Rebels Smuggling Weapons from Malaysia," Straits Times, 24 December 1999.
180 "We Have Never Helped Acehnese Rebels: Abdullah," Straits Times, 27 December 1999.
181 Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, p. 152.
182 See, for example, Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in 
Aceh, p. 31, Ross, "Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia", p. 17, Schulze, "The Struggle for an 
Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM."
183 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  Peace in Aceh? , p. 9, Ross, 
"Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia", p. 6.
184 Ross, "Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia", p. 6, Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): 
Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, p. 30.
185 Vatikiotis, "Troubled Province."
186 David McKendrik, "Indonesia in 1991: Growth, Privilege, and Rules," Asian Survey 32, no. 2 (1991): 
p. 109.
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remained until 1998.187 According to Husaini, who himself was given shelter in 
Malaysia for four years before moving to Sweden, although both Malaysia and 
Indonesia have established Interpol cooperation between them, the Malaysian police 
neither arrested nor repatriated Acehnese rebels despite knowing of their whereabouts.188 
The assassination of Zulfahri in Kuala Lumpur severely embarrassed the Malaysian 
government because it indirectly indicated that members of the Acehnese ethno- 
nationalist organisation were moving freely in Malaysia.189
In addition, it should be noted that as in the case of some of the ethno-nationalist 
organisations in southern Thailand, the Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) also had direct 
links with GAM. According to Syed Azman Syed Nawawi, the Head of PAS’s 
International Relations Bureau, the party leadership conducted a series of ‘informal’ 
meetings with the GAM leadership in Sweden.190 The main objectives of these meetings 
were to discuss the ways and means of solving the conflict in Aceh peacefully.191 In 
fact, according to Syed Nawawi, in a number of forums that were organised by 
international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), PAS has actively campaigned 
on behalf of GAM to “expose all injustices” by the Indonesian government in Aceh.192 
Syed Nawawi also claims that following the Tsunami disaster, PAS successfully 
persuaded GAM to negotiate with the Indonesian government, which resulted in the 
signing of the ceasefire agreement at the end of 2004.193 In addition, PAS was 
apparently also instrumental in extending humanitarian assistance to the population in 
Aceh. This included extending help to orphans as well as providing medical supplies
187 See, for example, "Aceh Unrest Leads to Mounting Death Toll.", Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An 
Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p.42.
188 Interview with Hassan.
189 Liow, The Politics o f  Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations, p. 151.





and education.194 According to Mahathir, it was easier for PAS to be more vocal than
the United Malays Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) in highlighting the injustices
committed by the Indonesian authorities in Aceh because it was not the ruling party.195
When it comes to shaping the country’s policies towards the ethno-nationalist movement
in Aceh, Malaysia, on one hand, is actually in a constant quest to balance the interests in
abiding by ASEAN norms, maintaining its cordial bilateral relations with Indonesia and
on the other hand, responding to domestic concerns. The latter is directly related to a
shared identity with the Acehnese.
In short, Malaysia’s approach to the conflict in Aceh can be summarised by
Abuza’s observations,
...for years the primary security threat in Indonesia was that of the 
Acehnese rebels, yet the Malaysians did little to curtail GAM’s (Free Aceh 
Movement’s) activities, including fund-raising, gun running, and transit, 
within their borders. Kuala Lumpur could have offered considerable 
assistance to Jakarta in their three-decade war with the GAM; yet, for the 
most part, the Malaysians turned a blind eye to their activities in 
Malaysia.196
The inaction on the part of the Malaysian government towards Acehnese activities on its 
soil indicates that Malaysia’s security practice in relation to the conflict in Aceh was 
focused on safeguarding the societal security of the Acehnese. The sentiment that 
existed among the ordinary Malays, especially those of Acehnese descent, also affected 
the stance taken by the government itself. At the same time, the government has 
remained concerned about its own stability. As mentioned earlier, many of the Malays 
of Acehnese extraction established permanent settlements, especially in the states of 
Kedah, Perak, Penang and Langkawi.197 As mentioned in the previous case study
194 Ibid.
195 Interview with Mohamad.
196 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible o f  Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), p. 239.
197 Nah and Bunnell, "Ripples of Hope: Acehnese Refugees in Post-Tsunami Malaysia," p. 251.
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chapter, besides commanding a strong support base in Kelantan and Terengganu, PAS 
also has strong political influence in Kedah. This would be among the key reasons why 
the Malaysian authorities did not arrest the leadership and members of the Acehnese 
ethno-nationalist organisation in the country although there was pressure on them to do 
so from the Indonesian government.198 Despite their knowledge of the whereabouts of 
the leadership and members of the Acehnese ethno-nationalist organisation in the 
country, the Malaysian authorities did not take any action against them as the 
government feared that this action would fuel support for PAS. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian authorities tended to ignore these activities as the government decided that 
they were not designed to destabilise Malaysia.
5.5 The Influence o f  ASEAN on Bilateral Relations
In general, all of the ASEAN member states strongly reiterate support for the 
‘sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia.’199 In fact, in 2003, all 
of the member states made a pledge ‘to deny the separatist movement access to means of 
violence through, among all, preventing arms smuggling into Aceh province’200 which 
means that ASEAN states have been willing to extend cooperation to the Indonesian 
government to curb the violence there. Besides being committed to ASEAN, Malaysia 
is also dedicated to ensuring that all other cooperation within ASEAN, such as sub­
regional cooperation, like the Northern Growth Triangle (including North Sumatra), are 
smoothly implemented by all the respective participant countries. Therefore, Malaysia 
has to be very careful not to upset Indonesia when dealing with the Aceh problem.
198 Interview with Hassan.
199 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 179.
200 Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Joint Communique ofthe 36th ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting (2003 [cited 17 April 2007]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/14833.htm.
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As mentioned earlier, two ASEAN member states, the Philippines and Thailand, 
were also involved in COHA. Basically, COHA called for the cantonment or storage of 
GAM weapons, the relocation and reformulation of the role of the Indonesian forces, 
and the establishment of peace zones. The pact, however, unravelled by May 2003 
following the Indonesian government’s declaration of a “military emergency” in 
Aceh.20' Among the issues that have been identified as causing COHA to collapse 
include the refusal of GAM to accept autonomy and to lay down its arms.202 However, it 
should also be noted that the Indonesian police arrested five of GAM’s key COHA 
negotiators before they could attend the final round of negotiations in Tokyo, Japan.203 
Following the December 2004 tsunami, both GAM and the Indonesian central 
government started to negotiate a new peace agreement brokered by the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI), the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) led by the 
former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, which was funded by the EU and several 
European states.204 The intention of the peace talks was to find a comprehensive 
solution to the conflict within the framework of ‘special autonomy’. In August 2005, 
GAM and the Indonesian government signed a comprehensive peace agreement called 
the Helsinki Accord, which provided for an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This 
was led by the EU within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy 
and included personnel from several South East Asian states as well as Norway and 
Switzerland to oversee the implementation of these commitments. The AMM’s tasks 
have included monitoring GAM’s demobilisation and the destruction of its arms,
201 Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  Peace in Aceh, Schulze, The Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization.
202 For full discussion on this issue, see, Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis fo r  
Peace in Aceh, Aspinall and Crouch, The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed.
203 Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden o f History in Aceh," p. 314.
204 It should be noted that the tsunami was not the primary cause for GAM and the Indonesian government 
to return to the negotiating table. It was reported that prior to the natural disaster, both sides had already 
agreed to restart the peace talks. See, for example, Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising 
Basis fo r  Peace in Aceh? , pp. 19-21, Schulze, "Aceh - a Year after the Tsunami: Dealing with 
Destruction," p. 12.
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monitoring the withdrawal of non-organic Indonesian forces, monitoring the 
reintegration of GAM members, monitoring the human rights situation, and ruling on 
disputed amnesty cases.205 The AMM included 130 European personnel and 96 from 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.206
According to Syed Jaafar Albar, Malaysia joined the AMM mainly because the 
country was invited by the EU to participate in the mission.207 However, it should be 
noted that before sending the Malaysian observers to Aceh, Malaysia requested that the 
EU ask the Indonesian authorities whether Malaysian observers were acceptable to 
them.208 In other words, Malaysia participated in the mission only after Indonesia had 
given its explicit consent.209 In a way, this indicates that while the Malaysian 
government was willing to indirectly help the Acehnese within its own borders, the 
government hesitated to extend assistance to the Acehnese rebels in Indonesian territory, 
as this could be seen as an act of interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs. In addition, 
it is worth bearing in mind that Malaysia’s membership of and commitment to ASEAN 
remain its primary foreign policy priority because stability within ASEAN has reduced 
the severity of potential threats to Malaysia from its immediate neighbours such as 
Indonesia.210 In fact, one of the key aims of ASEAN’s founders was to restrain 
Indonesia in its inclination towards Konfrontasi (Confrontation).
5.6 Conclusion
In short, although the Malaysian government’s policy emphasises the importance 
attached to good relations with Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur did not hesitate to deviate from
205 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, pp. 343-44.
206 Ibid.
207 Interview with Syed Jaafar Albar.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Singh, "Malaysia’s National Security: Rhetoric and Substance," pp. 1-25.
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this policy when their ethnic Malay brethren across the Straits of Malacca were in need. 
Consequently, despite repeated pledges by Malaysian government authorities that 
Malaysia has not supported GAM’s cause, it is equally true that Kuala Lumpur has 
proved reluctant to launch crackdowns on Acehnese refugees, or to directly support the 
Indonesian government over Aceh. The government was reluctant to launch a 
crackdown on the Acehnese mainly because it did not want to alienate its own 
population, particularly the Malays, who have been very concerned about the societal 
security of their ethnic brethren.211 In other words, Malaysia’s security practice towards 
the ethno-nationalist movements in Aceh cannot solely be explained by having the same 
religion, primarily because the majority of Indonesians are also Muslims. Rather, there 
is a major distinction in terms of the Malay and the Javanese ethnic identities. In short, if 
the existence of the ethno-nationalist movement in southern Thailand has been the cause 
of occasional irritation in Malaysia’s bilateral relations with Thailand, the same can be 
said of the situation in Aceh with regard to its bilateral relations with Indonesia. This 
holds even though the notion of kinship that often revolves around the idea of ‘blood 
brotherhood’ has been a prominent feature in the discourse of bilateral relations with 
Indonesia.212 Looking at this particular case study, therefore, it can also be concluded 
that ethnic factors do influence Malaysia’s security practice.
211 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 78.
212 Liow, The Politics o f lndonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations, p. 2.
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Chapter 6: Malaysia’s Security Practices Towards the Moro Region
MALAYSIA
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Introduction
The Philippines, just like Thailand and Indonesia, also faces problems from Malay 
ethno-nationalist movements. The Bangsamoro1 rebellion has been the largest and most 
persistent of the armed ethno-nationalist/separatist movements in the southern 
Philippines since 1975.2 It is estimated that over a period of 26 years (1970-1996), the 
conflict has led to more than 100,000 fatalities and left hundreds of thousands more 
injured.3 The rebellion has deep-rooted causes with a strong historical underpinning that 
can be traced as far back as the colonial era. In October 1996, the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) secured a peace agreement with the Moro Nationalist 
Liberation Front (MNLF) whereby the latter was given autonomy to govern some parts 
of the Moro region.4 Nevertheless, the fighting continued. In addition, the GRP signed 
a truce with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in October 2001. Peace talks 
with the MILF however, were suspended in March 2002 due to renewed hostilities 
between the two parties. The resumption of formal talks with the MILF took place in 
Kuala Lumpur in March 2003. However, both parties have yet to sign a peace 
agreement that will end the conflict permanently.
As in the previous two case studies, this chapter will not explore the various 
grievances behind the conflict.5 Rather, it investigates whether Moro kinship with the 
Malays has had any impact on Malaysia’s security practices towards the conflict in the
1 In this chapter the terms Bangsamoro, Malay Muslims, and Moros will be used interchangeably.
2 T an, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 237.
3 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, "Role o f Third Parties in Mindanao Peace Process" (paper presented at 
the International Conference on Peace Building in Asia Pacific: The Role o f Third Parties, Khon Kaen, 
Thailand, 1 - 3 July 2006).
4 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 45.
5 See, for example, Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar, eds., The Mindanao Conflict 
(Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), 2005), Eric U. Gutierrez, Rebels, 
Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon 
City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), Salah Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny 
(Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin Sdn. Bhd, 1999), Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics.
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Moro region. Similar to the previous two case studies, the main argument here is that 
Malaysia’s approach to the conflict in the Moro region is also best understood with 
reference to the framework of a common ethnic identity. The chapter is divided into five 
main sections. The first section [6.1] analyses the Moro ethnic identity and provides an 
overview of the history of the Malay Muslims/Moro ethnic group in the Southern 
Philippines. This section also highlights the differences between Moro and Filipino 
ethnic identities.6 The primary purpose of this section is to illustrate the status of the 
Moro region before it was incorporated into the Republic of the Philippines. As in the 
previous two case studies, the region’s previous status has frequently been cited as one 
of the main justifications for the region to be granted independence. The second section 
[6.2] gives an overview of the ethno-nationalist movement in the Moro region. The 
objective of this section is to explore the goals and particular characteristics of the 
Moros’ ethno-nationalist organisations. The third section [6.3] analyses the close ethnic 
linkages that exist between the Moros and the Malays in Malaysia. In order to set the 
context for an analysis of how ethnic kinship between the Malays and the Moros has 
affected Malaysia’s security practices in relation to the conflict in the Moro region, 
section [6.4] analyses Malaysia’s bilateral relations vis-a-vis the Philippines. The section 
also focuses on how Malaysia has supported the peace agreement between the GRP and 
the Moro ethno-nationalist organisations and the previous stance of the Malaysian 
government in relation to the conflict prior to the agreements. Lastly, the fifth section 
[6.5] discusses the constraints imposed by ASEAN norms and cooperation.
6 Filipinos are the dominant ethnic group in the Philippines.
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6.1 The Moros in Southern Philippines
The Philippines is a massive archipelagic state, with almost 7,100 islands stretching 
1,760 kilometres from north to south and a total land area of around 300,000 square 
kilometres. Despite having a huge number of islands, the country is divided into three 
geographical areas namely Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In terms of the ethnicity of 
its people, like in Malaysia, the Malays constitute the dominant ethnic group. However, 
despite sharing ethnic characteristics with the other Malays in South East Asia, the 
Malays in the Philippines differ from the rest of the Malay Archipelago in terms of 
culture, religion, history and politics.7 The most distinct difference between Malays in 
the Philippines and their brethren in the Malay Archipelago is that they are 
predominantly Christian, while the Malays in the other countries are predominantly 
Muslim. In general, the Malays in the Philippines are divided into three major groups.8 
First, we have the “Filipinos”, who are predominantly Catholic Christian and constitute 
around 92 per cent of the 87 million inhabitants. The second group, the “indigenous 
people” or “Lumad”, represents three per cent of the total population and is concentrated 
in Mindanao and the Cordilleras of northern Luzon.9 Third, the Islamised Malays, 
popularly known as ‘Moros’,10 represent about 3 - 1 0  per cent of the total population. 
They are concentrated in the southern Philippines, especially in Maguindanao, Tawi- 
Tawi, Basilan, Palawan, Lanao del Sur and the Sulu Archipelago."
7 T an, Security Perspectives ofthe Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 222.
8 Ronald J May, "Ethnicity and Public Policy in the Philippines," in Government Policies and Ethnic 
Relations in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1997), p. 321.
9 Ibid.
10 The term Moro will be further analysed in the following section when the chapter analyses the ethnic 
identity o f  these people.
11 The thesis will refer to this territory as the Moro region. See, for example, Abuza, Militant Islam in 
Southeast Asia: Crucible o f  Terror, p. 34, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro 
Resistance: Dynamics of a Persistent Conflict," in The Mindanao Conflict, ed. Kamarulzaman Askandar 
and Ayesah Abubakar (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), 2005), p. 8, 
Thomas M. McKenna, "Saints, Scholars and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism," The 
Pacific Review 15, no. 4 (2002): p. 541.
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According to the Philippines’ Deputy Presidential Advisor on the GRP-MILF 
Peace Process, Undersecretary Nabil Tan, there are no official statistics on the overall 
number of Moros in the Philippines, which has proved a source of continuous 
disagreement between the GRP and the Moros.12 Officially, the government estimates 
that the Moros represent merely 3 -  5 per cent of the total population; however, the 
Moros themselves have claimed that they make up around 10 per cent.13 Historically, 
the Moros have formed the majority in the Moro region. However, as a result of the 
transmigration of Christian Filipinos, particularly in the wake of the government’s 
encouragement to settle in this area, the Moros now only constitute around 20 per cent 
of the total population in their erstwhile homeland.14 In addition, many of the Moros 
have lost their land to immigrant settlers as a consequence of dubious legal transactions 
or outright confiscation.15 The continuing dispossession of the Moros ancestral 
landholdings by the Christian migrant groups has been viewed by the Moros as a threat 
to their societal security and this was one of the main reasons that the Moro ethno- 
nationalist organisations led their struggle against the Philippine government in this 
region.
6.1.1 Moros’ Ethnic Identity
Originally, the term Moro did not refer to any particular ethnic group. The term was 
given to them by the Spanish colonists because like the Moors of North Africa who 
ruled the Iberian Peninsula for centuries, the Malays in southern Philippines are also
12 Interview with Nabil A. Tan (Undersecretary), 22 February 2007.
13 Ibid.
14 Brown, "From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia," pp. 51-77, 
Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao o f the Philippines," 
pp. 441-56.
Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay A rchipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War 
on Terrorism, p. 237.
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Muslim.16 In fact, the term was used by the Spaniards to refer to all the various 
Islamised Malay tribes in the southern Philippines that they were unable to dominate. 
However, according to Collier, it would be difficult ‘to speak of Moros constituting a 
single society and a single nationality’ during the Spanish period as there is no evidence 
that the Malay Muslims did so themselves.17 Actually, the indigenous Malay Muslims in 
the southern Philippines are divided into 13 ethno-linguistic groups. The three largest 
and politically dominant are the Maguindanaon of the Cotabato provinces; the Maranao 
of the two Lanao provinces; and the Tausug of the Sulu archipelago. The remaining ten 
are the Badjaw, Iranun or Ilanun, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kalibogan, Melebugnon, 
Palawani, Sama, Sangil and Yakan.18 In other words, before the arrival of the Spaniards 
in the Philippines, a Moro nation by definition did not exist because the Malay Muslims 
in the Philippines have always been separated from one another in this archipelagic 
nation, due to significant linguistic and geographic distances.19 Interestingly, despite 
belonging to a different ethno-linguistic group, all of them readily agree to be identified 
as ‘Bangsamoro’, because it serves to unite those who are otherwise divided.
The Moro’s identity is founded on several grounds namely; shared common 
racial origins (Indo-Malayan); common religion (Islam); shared history (more than 400 
years of resistance to Spanish colonialism to defend their faith, people and homeland); 
organised government in the form of sultanates, and a defined territory (Mindanao,
16 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines" (paper presented at the SEACSN 
Conference 2004, Penang, Malaysia, 12-15 January 2005), Me Amis, Malay Muslims: The History and 
Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 33.
17 Kit Collier, "Dynamics o f Muslim Separatism in the Philippines," in Violence in Between: Conflict and 
Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia, ed. Damien Kingsbury (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2005), p. 161.
18 See, for example, Jamail A Kamlain, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A 
Discourse on Self-Determination, Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution," (Atlanta: School of Law, 
Emory University, 2003), Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", Macapado A Muslim and Rufa 
Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land o f Promise," in Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition, 
ed. Mara Stankovitch (London: Conciliation Resources, 1999), pp. 10-19.
19 McKenna, "Saints, Scholars and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism," p. 541.
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Palawan and Sulu).20 However, it should be noted that although the Moros speak 13 
languages or dialects, “the various Moro dialects contain derivatives or roots that have, 
beyond doubt, a strong Malay origin.”21 The term Bangsamoro, however, does not refer 
only to the Islamised Malays but also includes the non-Islamised Malays or the 
indigenous people that reside in the Moro region.22 Although there are many ethnic 
similarities between the Moros and the Filipinos - such as belonging to the wider Malay 
race (indeed they are physically indistinguishable) and the fact that the languages and 
dialects spoken by them belong to the same linguistic family - the Moros still perceive 
themselves as being very different from the Filipinos.23 According to Muhammad al- 
Hasan:
We [Moros and Filipinos] are two different peoples adhering to different 
ideologies, having different cultures, and nurtured by different historical 
experiences.24
This feeling of separateness is still strong today, for whenever there are rallies and 
demonstrations, one can read placards saying “We are not Filipinos, we are 
Bangsamoro.”25 In other words, although primordially both the Filipinos and the Moros 
are all Malays, differences in their religion, political and historical backgrounds have led 
the Moros to form an ethnic identity separate from the Filipinos. Filipinos cannot be 
classified as an ‘original’ Malay people because their identity was formed only
20 Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, pp. 19 - 25.
21 Interview with Mohagher Iqbal, 26 February 2007.
22 Interview with Ghazali Jaafar, 26 February 2007, Lingga.
23 Cesar Adib Majul, "Ethnicity and Islam in the Philippines," in Ethnicities and Nations: Processes o f  
Inter-Ethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, ed. S. J. Tambiah, Remo 
Guidieri, and Francesco Pellizzi (Houston: University o f Texas Press, 1988), pp. 364-67.
24 Quoted in Peter G. Gowing, "Of Different Minds: Christian and Muslim Ways o f Looking at Their 
Relations in the Philippines," International Review o f  Missions 265 (1978): p. 78.
25 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, "Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode o f  Self- 
Determination" (paper presented at the Forum on Mindanao Peace, Davao City, Philippines, 28 February 
2002).
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following a process of ‘fertilisation and racial infusion’ with a number of ethnic groups 
such as the Spaniards and Chinese mestizos.26
From the perspective of most Moros, the Philippine state is distant, alien and 
centred on the needs and interests of the national centre in “Imperial Manila” and the 
Christian majority. In short, since the Moros strongly believe that they belong to a 
separate nation by virtue of their distinct identity and the long history of their sultanates 
before the arrival of colonial powers, they claim that they have ‘a right to self- 
determination, including the right to a state’, at least in areas where they are in the 
majority.27
6.1.2 The History of the Moro Ethnic group in the Philippines
Before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1565 (Spain was the first colonial power in the 
Philippines), the Bangsamoro were already organised into a number of different 
sultanates, including Sulu, Maguindanao, Bayan and Butig.28 The Moros’ sultanates 
were established in Sulu by the mid-15th century and in Mindanao before the middle of 
the 16th century.29 During the height of the Sulu Sultanate, its territory covered the Sulu 
Archipelago, parts of Borneo, south Palawan, and parts of Mindanao.30 By comparison, 
the Sultanate of Maguindanao was founded following the divisions of the Sulu Sultanate 
into a number of different sultanates in the second decade of the 16th century. In 1571, 
the Spaniards defeated Raja Suleiman, the first Malay Muslim Sultan in the region of 
Manila.31 In 1578, Spain declared war on the Malay Muslims and successfully defeated
26 Buendia, "A Re-Examination o f Ethnicity and Secessionist Movements in the Philippines and 
Indonesia: The Moros and Acehnese," n. 10, p. 35.
27 Ibid.: p. 9.
28 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 186.
29 McKenna, "Saints, Scholars and the Idealized Past in Philippine Muslim Separatism," p. 541.
30 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, 
Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 191.
31 Aijaz Ahmad, "Class and Colony in Mindanao," in Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim 
Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, ed. Eric U. Gutierrez (Quezon City: Institute for Popular
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them in Luzon, Mindoro, and the Visayas.32 Following this success, the Spaniards 
embarked on a series of military campaigns known as the “Moro Wars” against the 
Malay Muslims in the southern Philippines. Spain attempted to incorporate Mindanao 
into its Philippine colony over the next three centuries until 1898. During this period, 
the Spaniards were able to establish several footholds in Mindanao, particularly in the 
northern and eastern part of the island and in the Zamboanga peninsula.33
Despite successive and largely successful military campaigns, the Spaniards 
failed to completely subdue the Moros. The Moros perceived both the Maguindanao 
and Sulu sultanates as the two most important sultanates in the southern Philippines 
because they were the ones that acted as the main obstacle that prevented the Spaniards 
from colonising the whole of the Moro region. According to some scholars, one of the 
main reasons why the Moros so fiercely resisted the Spaniards and their Christian allies, 
whom they called Indios (Christianised Malays/Filipinos) was because of their fear of 
being forced to convert to Christianity.34 One of the contributing factors that enabled the 
Moros to survive the Spaniards’ military campaigns was because during that period of 
time, they already had a “well-organised administrative and political systems”.35 
Although the Spaniards were unable to fully subdue the Moros, they were quite 
successful in negotiating treaties with particular sultanates. For instance, in 1878, Sultan 
Jama ul-Azam of Sulu signed a peace treaty with the Spanish government agreeing to 
bind his subjects to the Spanish king in exchange for autonomy.36 This, however, did
Democracy, 2000), p. 8, Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the 
Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 186.
32 May, "Ethnicity and Public Policy in the Philippines," p. 324.
33 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land of Promise," p. 10.
34 See, for example, May, "Ethnicity and Public Policy in the Philippines," p. 323, McAmis, Malay 
Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia , p. 90, Yegar, Between 
Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities o f  the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and 
Western Burma/Myanmar, p. 200.
35 Lingga, "Role o f Third Parties in Mindanao Peace Process".
36 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and 
Politics, p. 9.
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not mean that the Moros had surrendered to them. Instead, it was probably one of the 
ways that the Sultan thought he could find a peaceful solution that would enable the 
Moros to preserve their identity and social coherence. According to Marohomsalic, 
even towards the end of Spanish colonisation, the southern Philippines “was still a 
bastion of its many sultanates and principalities, unconquered, unbowed, proud and 
free.”37 Due to the Spaniards inability to exercise effective sovereignty over the Moro 
region, the Moros disputed the handover of their homeland to the United States of 
America (US) in 1898.38
By the time that the US acquired the Philippines following the Treaty of Paris, 
with the exception of Mindanao and a few islands in the Philippine archipelago, the 
Moro population in the country had been either eliminated or converted to Christianity.39 
However, the Americans still had to engage with the Moros in a series of bloody battles 
that consequently allowed the Americans to gain control of western Mindanao and Sulu. 
Like the Spanish, the Americans were not able to fully control the Moro region.40 
Despite resistance from the Moros, the Sultan of Sulu was finally obliged to sign the 
Bates treaty with the US on 20 August 1899, in which the US recognised the sultanate as 
having “protected sovereignty”.41 However, the Americans abrogated the treaty in 1902 
in order to impose a policy of direct rule. This led to the creation of the Moro Provinces 
under the direct control of the colonial government in Manila.42 According to Lingga,
37 Marohomsalic, Aristocrats o f  the Malay Race: A History o f  the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines, p. 77.
38 Eliseo R. Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins o f the MNLF and the 
Politics o f  Moro Separatism," in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Joo-Jock Lim and S. Vani 
(Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), pp. 168-75.
39 Bob East, "The Bangsa Moro: Fighting for Freedom During the War o f Terror: The Muslim 
Independence Movement o f the Southern Philippines" (paper presented at the Social Change in the 21st 
Century Conference, Queensland, 28 October 2005), p. 3.
40 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible o f  Terror, p. 34.
41 E San Juan Jr, "Ethnic Identity and Popular Sovereignty: Notes on the Moro Struggle in the 
Philippines," Ethnicities 6, no. 3 (2006): pp. 398-99.
42 Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao o f the Philippines," 
pp. 441-56.
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the fact that the US created the Moro Provinces indicated that the Americans recognised 
that the Moros had an identity distinct from the Filipinos.43
As observed by Buendia, the “Muslims in the Philippines, at first, took the
peaceful track in carving a nation-state.”44 In 1921, the Moros petitioned the Wood-
Forbes Commission to the effect that they wished to see their territory become a
permanent territory of the United States in the event that the US granted independence
to the Philippines.45 One of the main arguments put forward by the Moros in their
petition seeking to separate their territory from the Philippine state was that the
Philippine Legislature had failed to pass any laws of benefit to Moro people.46 In 1926,
Congressman Bacon of New York introduced a bill for the separation of the Sulu
Archipelago and Mindanao from the Philippines47 However, according to David Jr., “at
this time, the Christian Nationalist Filipinos had established a better relationship with
the Americans” which led the US Congress not to pass the bill.48 In 1935, when the US
announced its intention to grant independence to the Philippines, the Malay Muslims
again drew up a petition called the “Dansalan Declaration” requesting their homeland to
remain under direct control of the US and to be excluded from the proposed
independence.49 The following passage highlights the key points of the petition:
.. .We do not want to be included in the Philippines for once an independent 
Philippines is launched, there would be trouble between us and the Filipinos 
because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived
43 Lingga, "Understanding Bangsamoro Independence as a Mode o f Self-Determination".
44 Buendia, "A Re-Examination o f Ethnicity and Secessionist Movements in the Philippines and 
Indonesia: The Moros and Acehnese," p. 11.
45 J.W Wheeler-Bennett, "Thirty Years o f American-Filipino Relations, 1899-1929," Journal o f the Royal 
Institute o f  International Affairs 8, no. 5 (1929): p. 515.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ricardo A. David Jr, "The Causes and Prospect o f  the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movement" 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), p. 51.
49 Kamlain, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self-Determination, 
Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution.", McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  
Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 91.
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harmoniously together. Our public land must not be given to people other 
than the Moros.. .50
According to Lingga, the Moros made the request in anticipation that the US would 
decolonise its colonies and other non-self governing territories, and expected that the 
Bangsamoro homeland would be granted separate independence.51 Instead, the 
American government implemented a policy of integration of Malay Muslims into 
Christian Filipino society and granted independence to the Republic of the Philippines 
on 4 July 1946.52 In 1961, the Moros tried to resolve peacefully the incorporation of 
their homeland into the Philippine state with Manila. In that year, Congressman Ombra 
Amilbangsa53 filed a bill during the fourth session of the Philippines’s Fourth Congress 
that sought the granting and recognition of the independence of Sulu.54 However, the 
Congress did not take any positive action on the bill because no political support was 
forthcoming, primarily due to the small number of Muslim members of Congress.
The incident on Corregidor Island in March 1968 proved to be the turning point 
for the Moros from a peaceful struggle, which sought the return of their homeland 
region, to a violent insurgency. According to reports, 64 Moro recruits were massacred55 
by their Christian Filipino superiors on Corregidor. Jubair argues that when Jibin Arola, 
the only survivor of the incident, was called by the Philippines’ Joint House-Senate 
Investigation to testify on the incident, he claimed, “They were shot because they
50 Philippine Muslim News (Manila),Vol.2, No.2, July 1968, pp.7-12 quoted in Kamlain, "Ethnic and 
Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self-Determination, Political Autonomy and 
Conflict Resolution."
51 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, "Mindanao Peace Process: The Need for a New Formula," in The 
Mindanao Conflict, ed. Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar (Penang: Southeast Asian 
Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), 2005), p. 35.
52 McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 91.
53 Congressman Amilbangsa was a descendant o f the Sultans o f Sulu. Before he was appointed as a 
Congressman after WWII, he was the Governor for Sulu province.
54 Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, pp. 304-05.
55 There were different figures reported for the number of trainees killed in the incident. See, for example, 
McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 93, 
Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land of Promise," p. 13.
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refused to follow orders to attack Sabah”.56 The judgement made by the court martial to 
acquit the accused military personnel sparked the Moros’ uprising against the GRP.57 
The Moros denounced the verdict as a “whitewash”, and accused the government under 
the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986) of having “criminal 
intentions” and pursued a policy that aimed for the “systematic extermination” of their 
people.58 In short, the Moros feared that their societal security would be seriously 
threatened by the GRP, which consequently led to the establishment of their ethno- 
nationalist organisations.
6.2 The Ethno-Nationalist Movement in the Moro Region 
As a result of the execution of the Bangsamoro recruits and the verdict of the court 
martial, Datu Udtog Matalam, a provincial governor of Cotabato, formed the Muslim 
(later Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) in May 1968.59 The MIM called for 
the outright secession of the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions from the Republic of 
the Philippines ‘in order to establish an Islamic state’.60 In 1969, it was reported61 that 
some of the Moros from MIM’s youth section were sent to receive their military training 
in Malaysia. One of the groups went to the state of Sabah, another group was said to 
have received their training close to the Thai border and others were apparently sent to 
Pangkor Island off the coast of Perak (a state located at the west coast of the Malay
56 Quoted in Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, p. 132.
57 David Jr, "The Causes and Prospect o f  the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movement", p. 62.
58 Ibid.
59 McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 93, 
Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land o f Promise," p. 15.
60 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1998), pp. 144-46.
61 According to reports, these military training received the support o f Sabah Chief Minister, Tun 
Mustapha, with the tacit agreement o f the Malaysian government. However, the Malaysian government 
has never admitted that it has any role in the training o f these youth.
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Peninsula).62 One of the MIM’s “trainees” in Malaysia, Nur Misuari,63 a former 
University of the Philippines’ Political Science lecturer, founded the Moro Nationalist 
Liberation Front (MLNF) in 1969.64 Consequently, the MIM was dissolved in favour of 
the MNLF. Until the early 1980s, support for the MNLF among the Bangsamoro was 
almost universal,65 making the MNLF the official representative for promoting the Moro 
cause through armed struggle, Islamic diplomacy, and peace negotiations.66
6.2.1 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
When the MNLF was first established, its original objective was to form an independent 
Bangsamoro Islamic state. However, it should be noted that although the MNLF names 
Islam as the reason for the struggle, the movement has been consistently classified as 
having a secular nationalist orientation.67 In fact, the MNLF’s decision to expand the 
term ‘Moro’ to include all native inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu whether they are 
Muslim, Christians or Lumad (the indigenous people), especially for those who have 
accepted the distinctiveness of the Moros as a separate nation from that of the Filipinos 
in Luzon and Visayas,68 show that the organisation is ethno-nationalist rather than 
Islamic in nature. Among the areas identified as MNLF strongholds are Sulu, Tawi- 
Tawi, Basilan and the Zamboanga Peninsula. The MNLF also has a strong presence in
62 See, for example, David Hawkins, The Defence o f  Malaysia and Singapore, from AMDA to ANZUK 
(London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1972), pp. 50-52, Marohomsalic, 
Aristocrats o f  the Malay Race: A History o f  the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines, p. 166, Mercado, 
"Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins o f the MNLF and the Politics o f Moro 
Separatism," p. 157.
63 His full name is Nurallaji Misuari
64 Gutierrez, Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern 
Philippines, p. 152.
65 Ahmad, "Class and Colony in Mindanao," p. 25.
66 In July 1975, at the “Sixth Islamic Conference o f Foreign Ministers”, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the 
MNLF was granted the observer status in the Organisation o f Islamic Conferences (OIC). See, for 
example, East, "The Bangsa Moro: Fighting for Freedom During the War o f Terror: The Muslim 
Independence Movement o f the Southern Philippines", p. 7.
67 Soliman M. Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations (Davao City, 
Philippines: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2005), p. 61, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the 
Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 240.
68 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land o f Promise," p. 15.
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parts of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani and South Cotabato. 
The members are predominantly, but not exclusively, from the Tausug, Samal and 
Yakan ethno-linguistic groups.69 In 1986, the MNLF’s Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) was 
estimated to be 10,000 strong and was organised into 10 provincial armies.70 In 
addition, the MNLF’s National Mobile Forces were divided into 4 armies, occupying at 
least 13 permanent camps.71 In 1994, the MNLF was estimated to have 14,080 
fighters.72
The MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement (under the auspices of the Organisation 
of Islamic Conferences - OIC) with the GRP in 1976 following its willingness to settle 
the conflict with the government within the framework of a unitary state and the 
territorial integrity of the Philippines.73 In fact, the OIC was instrumental in making the 
MNLF relinquish its bid to seek an independent Moro state. Following the OIC’s 
pressure and promise to form the Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency, which 
was aimed at extending welfare and relief aid directly to Muslims in the Southern 
Philippines by seeking to improve the Moros’ conditions and enhance their social and 
economic well-being, the MNLF agreed to drop its bid for independence.74 The OIC 
also promised more economic assistance once agreements were reached.75 However, 
despite signing the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, hostilities between the two parties 
resumed after the GRP broke the Agreement when the GRP under President Marcos
69 Ibid., p. 86.
70 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 4.
71 Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern 
Thailand, pp. 192- 93.
72 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 4.
73 Buendia, "A Re-Examination o f Ethnicity and Secessionist Movements in the Philippines and 
Indonesia: The Moros and Acehnese."
74 Lingga, "Role o f Third Parties in Mindanao Peace Process".
75 Ibid.
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implemented its own version of autonomy and established a separate regional 
government.76
In 1996, the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), also known as the 
Jakarta Accord,77 during the administration of Ramos, whose presidency was said to be 
the most successful with regard to negotiating the peace processes with the Moros.78 
With the signing of the FPA, peace between both parties materialised temporarily.79 
Following the signing of the agreement, Misuari was elected governor of the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) comprising the four provinces of 
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur in 1997. Concurrently, he became 
the Chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), 
an executive body representing the three major ethno-religious communities in 
Mindanao: Christians, Muslims and indigenous Lumads.80 The 1996 Peace Agreement 
enabled the integration of some 7,750 MNLF fighters or their next of kin into the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the police force.81 However, in November 2001 
Misuari revolted because he felt he was being eased out of positions of authority, 
especially because he could not secure by legal means a second term as the ARMM 
regional governor.82 After his short-lived rebellion, he abandoned his post as governor 
and escaped to Sabah, Malaysia. However, within weeks the Malaysian police arrested 
him and deported him to Manila. At the time of writing, he is still under house arrest
76 Mohammed Ayoob, The Politics o f  Islamic Reassertion (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 225, Muslim 
and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land o f Promise," p. 17.
77 Peace negotiations under Ramos were held from 1992 to 1996, with exploratory talks in Tripoli and 
Cipanas, Indonesia, four rounds o f formal talks in Jakarta, and nine Mixed Committee Meetings mainly in 
the Southern Philippines.
78 Carmen A Abubakar, "Review o f the Mindanao Peace Processes," Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5, no. 3 
(2004): p. 455.
79 It should be noted that despite signing the FPA, there were incidences where military clashes between 
the AFP and the MNLF fighters took place.
80 Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists, p. 52.
81 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 4.
82 Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 64, Weatherbee, 
International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy, p. 146.
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while awaiting his trial for rebellion charges.83 Dr. Parouk Hussin, the MNLF’s former 
Head of Foreign Affairs (2001-2005), took over Misuari’s position following the 
rebellion. In 2005, Zaldy Ampatuan84 became the Governor of the ARMM, but he has 
no affiliation with the MNLF. Due to Misuari’s rebellion against the GRP and inter- 
factional rivalries within the MNLF85, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has 
become “the main standard bearer of Moro aspiration.”86
6.2.2 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF')
Originally, the MILF was called the New MNLF when it separated from the MNLF 
shortly after the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement in 1978.87 The former vice chairman 
of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat, founded the New MNLF. Salamat was also reported to 
be among the Moro youths who were trained in Malaysia in 1972.88 The proclamation of 
the establishment of the MILF was made in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1984. In August 
2003, following the death of Salamat, Al-Haj Murad Ibrahim, the MILF Vice Chairman 
for Military Affairs and Chief of Staff of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) 
became the chairman. Unlike Salamat, Murad was secularly educated, with a degree in 
civil engineering from a local Philippine university.89 In fact, the other top two leaders
83 Kamlain, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self-Determination, 
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84 Zaldy Ampatuan is a descendant of the royal clan o f  Maguindanao.
85 The MNLF is now split into four factions: the Misuari group, the anti-Misuari Executive Council o f 15 
(EC-15), the anti-Misuari Islamic Command Council (ICC), and the pro-Misuari group o f Alvarez Isnaji. 
See, for example, Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 65.
86 Andrew T. H. Tan, "The Indigenous Roots o f Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao," in 
After Bali: The Threat o f  Terrorism in Southeast Asia, ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan 
(Singapore: Institute o f Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 112.
87 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and 
Politics, p. 12, Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 61.
88 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 5, McAmis, 
Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 95.
89 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 5.
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of the MILF -  Ghazali Jaafar and Mohagher Iqbal -  are also from the secular elite, and, 
like the MNLF leader, Misuari, they were Moro students in the late 1960s.90
Historically, the MILF split from the MNLF due to a clash of interests between 
the two leaders; Salamat’s conflict with Misuari was neither a simple “clash of 
personalities” nor merely an instance of “contrasting modes of leadership.”91 The 
difference was that for Salamat, the political leadership was about executing or 
implementing policies, which were determined by a group of Islamic scholars (Ulamas). 
Misuari, on the other hand, perceived policy-making to be the responsibility of the 
political leadership that would from time to time seek guidance from Islamic scholars.92 
In other words, the Islamic scholars play a more significant role for the leadership of the 
MILF.93 As stated by Mohagher Iqbal, the Secretary General of the MILF, while the 
MNLF has no clear ideology, the MILF, on the other hand, uses Islam as its ideology.94 
Although Islam is invoked as its ideology and has “served as a rallying call and focal 
point of resistance”95 vis-a-vis the GRP, this does not mean that the MILF is an Islamic 
or even an Islamic fundamentalist organisation.
According to some scholars, the MILF uses Islam to advance certain political 
interests, which are aimed at enticing Muslim support both domestically and 
internationally - although it is principally a nationalist and territorial organisation.96 
Analysing the comments made by the top MILF leaders themselves actually supports 
this perception of the MILF. According to Ghazali Jaafar, the MILF Vice Chairman of
90 Miriam Coronel Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict" 
(paper presented at the SEACSN Conference 2004, Penang, Malaysia, 12-15 January 2005).
Eric U. Gutierrez, "The Reimagination of the Bangsa Moro: 30 Years Hence," in Rebels, Warlords, and 
Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, ed. Eric U. Gutierrez and 
Institute for Popular Democracy (Philippines) (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), p. 
320.
92 Ibid.
93 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land of Promise," p. 86.
94 Interview with Iqbal.
95 Tan, "The Indigenous Roots o f Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao," p. 112.
96 Interview with Rizal G. Buendia, 24 February 2007, Tan (Undersecretary). See, for example Tan, "The 
Indigenous Roots o f Conflicts in Southeast Asia: The Case o f Mindanao," p. 112.
220
Political Affairs, the main reason why the organisation was renamed MILF was that they 
wanted to avoid confusion with the original MNLF.97 According to Iqbal, the 
organisation separated from the MNLF because that organisation had abandoned the 
self-determination of the Moro people.98 Instead of seeking genuine autonomy, the 
MNLF considered allowing itself to be integrated within the GRP.99 The MILF has 
taken on the task of continuing the struggle to regain the Bangsamoro’s freedom and 
independence. However, the MILF is only seeking independence in areas where the 
Moros are in a majority; i.e. the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Lanao del Sur 
and Maguindanao, the cities of Marawi, Cotabato and Isabela.'00
Another important difference between the two organisations is in terms of the 
make-up of their respective members, who are broadly divided according to their ethno- 
linguistic groups. For instance, the main ethno-linguistic group making up the MILF 
are the Maguindanaos from Central Mindanao, whereas for the MNLF it is the Tausugs 
from Sulu.'01 The difference in terms of the ethno-linguistic make-up, especially among 
the Maguindanaos and Tausugs, indicates that the historical influence of the sultanates 
of Maguindanao and Sulu remains strong. In other words, the Moros are still very tribal 
and disunited, with their liberation front being divided along ethno-linguistic lines.102 
According to Jaafar, since 2003 the MILF has therefore started to reorganise, aiming to 
attract more members among the Tausugs.103 After all, the MILF is supposed to 
represent all the Bangsamoro people, including the indigenous people.104 This suggests
97 Interview with Jaafar.
98 Interview with Iqbal.
"Ibid.
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102 Interview with Buendia.
103 Interview with Jaafar.
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that the split between the two Bangsamoro organisations occurred not because of 
religion but rather because of ethno-linguistic differences among the Moros.105
The MILF is highly organised and capable of forming a government if 
circumstances permitted.106 According to Von A1 Haq, the Chairman of the MILF 
Coordinating Committee on The Cessation of Hostilities, the chairman, and the three 
Vice-Chairmen in charge of the Military Affairs, Political Affairs, and Internal Affairs 
head the MILF.107 In addition, the organisation also has at least seven standing 
committees that are responsible for Information, Foreign Affairs, Religious Affairs 
(Da ’wah), Social Welfare Community (Women’s Affairs), Economic and Development, 
Health, and Education.108 However, according to East, besides having the seven 
committees, as listed above, the MILF also has additional committees on intelligence, 
communications, and transport.109 The Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) is 
divided into Divisions, Battalions and Composites, including guerrilla forces. In 1994, 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) estimated the BIAF’s strength at 5,420 
fighters. By comparison, in December 1999, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes claimed 
that the MILF was 15,690 strong, an apparent increase of almost 300 per cent on 1994 
estimates.110 Having demonstrated a capacity to wage interminable warfare, the MILF 
signed a truce with Manila under the Arroyo administration in October 2001.
Peace talks were, however, suspended in March 2002 due to renewed hostilities 
between the two parties. The resumption of formal talks with the MILF took place in 
Kuala Lumpur in March 2003. Since then, the two parties have met for exploratory talks
105 Kamlain, "Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self-Determination, 
Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution," p. 61.
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110 Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Moro Resistance: Dynamics o f a Persistent Conflict," p. 5.
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on eight occasions. All the talks were held in Kuala Lumpur. Among the issues being 
negotiated are those of land redistribution, recognition of Syariah law, rehabilitation of 
war-ravaged areas, and the implementation of previous agreements sealed by the MNLF 
and the government.111 Following the temporary suspension of MILF’s secessionist 
agenda, another Moro organisation claims to be the champion for the Moros in order to 
achieve “an independent Islamic state” for them, this being the Bearer of the Sword 
(Abu Sayyaf Group -  ASG).112
6.2.3 The Abu Sawaf Group (ASG)
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a Tausug who participated as a mujahideen in the 
Afghan war in the late 1980s, founded the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in 1992.113 It was 
initially called the Harakatul Islamia, which was later changed to Abu Sayyaf. 114 
Abdurajak was killed in a shootout with the police in December 1998. His younger 
brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, became the titular head of the ASG following the killing of 
Abu Sabaya in 2002 and the capture of Ghalib Andang in 2003.115 In September 2006, 
Khadaffy was believed to have died after he apparently became involved in a clash with 
the AFP.116 Currently, it is reported that the ASG is under the leadership of Radullan 
Sahiron.117 Some scholars have suggested that the main objective of the ASG is to create 
an Independent Islamic State in Mindanao.118 However, according to Buendia, “apart
111 San Juan Jr, "Ethnic Identity and Popular Sovereignty: Notes on the Moro Struggle in the Philippines," 
p. 405.
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from slogans and propaganda released in the press, there exists no reliable and verifiable 
information that substantiates their demands for an Islamic state.”119 Rather, the group is 
better known for its criminal and terrorist activities in the Philippines. Among the ASG 
activities that consequently brought them international notoriety are the kidnapping of 
21 foreign tourists on Sipadan Island, Sabah, Malaysia on 23 April 2000 and the 
bombing of a super ferry in Manila Bay in 2004, where more than 100 passengers 
died.120 In fact, according to official sources in the Philippines, the ASG are both 
“ terrorists” and “ bandits”  who pose a major threat to the security of the Philippine 
state and who are probably linked to A1 Qaeda terrorists.121
The ASG is reported to draw its members from those who were originally 
affiliated with both the MILF and the MNLF but became unhappy with their 
leadership.122 It is also reported that the ASG has links with certain elements within the 
MILF.123 However, the MILF has strongly denied any connections with the ASG.124 In 
fact, the MILF has openly condemned the criminal activities of the ASG such as 
bombings, assassinations, extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom, which are perceived as un- 
Islamic and doing a disservice to the religion.125 In short, the ASG is not regarded as a 
Moro ethno-nationalist organisation but only as a terrorist organisation that specialises
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in kidnapping-for-ransom and bombing.126 However, the existence of this group 
complicates efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Moro problem in the Southern 
Philippines. In fact, the ASG is also considered to be one of the major obstacles to 
tackling the Mindanao conflict through its terrorist and lawless activities.
6.2.4 Analysis of the Moro’s Ethno-Nationalist Organisations
Despite having multi-dimensional elements in their identity, Islam has been highlighted 
by the Moro ethno-nationalist organisations as the defining and unifying concept 
because this element has been the strongest factor in binding together all the thirteen or 
so ethno-linguistic groups. In line with the Moro ethno-nationalist organisations’ efforts 
to establish a new Moro nation, the organisations’ leaders adopted the prefix Bangsa, the 
Malay term for a nation, to their identity (Bangsamoro - Moro nation) which implies that 
it is this identity that forms the backbone of the new and distinct nation.127 According to 
Dr. Parouk Hussin, a former ARMM Governor and former Head of Foreign Affairs for 
MNLF,128 despite the split between the MNLF and the MILF, both organisations are 
always united whenever there are serious issues concerning the interests of the 
Bangsamoro.129 The cooperation between the two main Moro organisations is confirmed 
by the Secretary General of the MILF, Mohagher Iqbal, saying that the MILF and the 
MNLF have indeed been holding a series of bilateral dialogues.130 A1 Haq said that the 
MILF was very optimistic that both organisations would be reunited soon, as the split
126 However, it should be noted that there is a report that indicates an attempt by the ASG’s leadership at 
“reasserting the organisation as a legitimate national liberation organisation.” For further details, see, 
Ibid.
127 Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land of 
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in December 2006.
129 Interview with Dr. Parouk Hussin, 20 February 2007.
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reflected simply an internal problem within the Bangsamoro people.131 An example that 
indicated that both organisations could work together despite having a different 
“ideology” was the signing of a unity agreement between them in August 2001 in 
Putrajaya, Malaysia.132 The agreement has enabled both organisations to reach a 
common understanding and to coordinate their efforts for the cause of the Bangsamoro 
struggle.133 In fact, following the signing of the agreement, the leaders of the MNLF 
have been advising the MILF on how to outwit politically the GRP, because the MNLF 
has had more experience dealing with the GRP in a series of peace agreements.134
In short, rather than looking at the conflict in the Moro region as a war over 
religion or more specifically a clash between Islam and Christianity, Moro resistance is 
basically a Bangsamoro nationalist/national liberation struggle to free themselves from 
the Philippines, and their claimed homeland from Filipino colonialism and oppression. 
Even most MILF members tend to view their struggle more in terms of a ‘semi- 
conventional war’ of liberation rather than a religious-based insurgency.135 In fact, even 
the GRP admits that its conflict with the Moros is not due to religious issues but due to 
the Moros’ perception that they are not getting a fair share in governance.136 While 
Islam is used as the major vehicle to unite the different Moro ethno-linguistic groups, 
their struggle against the GRP is due to their determination to preserve their Malay 
identity.137 Despite converting to Islam, all the Moro ethno-linguistic groups retained 
much of their pre-Islamic beliefs, which indirectly mean that the religion played a
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132 Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 18.
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secondary role in comparison to the 13 distinct ethno-linguistic identities that continued 
to divide the community.138 Although the Moro ethno-nationalists organisations, 
particularly the MILF, have benefited from foreign ideological and material support 
from radical global jihadi network such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,139 the MILF 
leadership has not echoed the pan-Islamic agenda of these groups that aimed to bring 
into realisation of a region-wide Islamic state.140 In other words, international Islamic 
solidarity is very much a secondary consideration to the more immediate goal of 
independence or greater autonomy for the Moro people in their own homeland.141 
Another common characteristic of all these organisations is that, like the ethno- 
nationalist organisations in southern Thailand and Aceh, both the Moro ethno-nationalist 
organisations have “linkages” with Malaysia. The next section therefore analyses in 
general terms the perception of the Moros towards the Malays in Malaysia and vice 
versa and examines whether ethnic kinship ties exist among the Moros and the Malays.
6.3 Relations between Bangsamoro and the Malays in Malaysia 
According to Marohomsalic, “the Moro, by physical character and culture, belongs in 
general to the Malay race and the Malay culture”.142 In fact, the Moros identify 
themselves as belonging to the “Dunia Melayu” (Malay World).143 However, unlike the 
Thai Malays and the Acehnese whose ethnic kinship ties with the Malays in Malaysia 
are more extensive, those between Malays in Malaysian and in the Moro region are not
138 Peter G. Gowing, Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day 
Publishers, 1988), Suzaina Kadir, "Mapping Muslim Politics in Southeast Asia after September 11," The 
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so obvious. One needs to go back to the history of the Moros to find out about their 
links with the Malays in Malaysia. Geographic location is one of the possible reasons 
why the Moros developed close ties with the Malays in Malaysia, particularly those 
living in the Southern Philippines, on the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. 
Both Mindanao and the Sulus are located along historical trade routes, thus facilitating 
contact and communication with other Malay principalities in the region.144 
Consequently, like the Thai Malays and the Acehnese, many of the Moros have been 
moving to Malaysia (Sabah) and returning to the southern Philippines without any 
restrictions. Similarly, Malaysians (those from Sabah) have travelled freely to the Moro 
region.145 In general, the ties between the Moros and the Malays in Malaysia can be 
traced to the similarities they share concerning religion, cultural practices and the social 
structure within their societies. In fact, the Moros share the same sense of identity with 
their brethren in Malaysia whereby like the Malays, “to be a Moro is to be a Malay 
Muslim”.146 Due to the common religion shared between the Moros and the Malays in 
Malaysia, there is a common feeling of solidarity between them, although the Filipino 
Christians also belong to the Malay ethnic group. Consequently, this had led the Moros 
to readily identify themselves closely with the Malays and naturally, to look towards 
their ethnic brethren in Malaysia for support.147 In other words, Malaysia is seen by the 
Moros as their ethnic kin state.
144 Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines".
145 Ma. Luisa D Barrios-Fabian, "Case Study o f Zamboanga City (Forced Migration Area)," in PIDS 
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6.3.1 Ethnic Kinship Between Bangsamoro and Malaysian Malays
The anthropologist, H. Otley Beyer, states “the Mohammedan Empire of Malacca and 
its successors had an active part to play in the cultural history of Sulu”.148 Historically, 
the first ruler of Sulu was Rajah Baginda who hailed from Minangkabau, Sumatra.149 As 
illustrated in Chapter 3, the Malays regard Minangkabau as the cradle of their race. 
From Sulu, the Malay sultanate expanded and by 1475, Sherif Muhammed 
Kabungsuwan founded another Malay sultanate in Mindanao.150 Kabungsuwan was 
from the royal family of Johor, a Malay sultanate on the Malay Peninsula.151 According 
to Shamsul, the Director of the Malay World and Civilization Institute at the National 
University of Malaysia, there are still today very strong ties between members of the 
Malay royalty in Malaysian states and the Moro royalty.152 In addition, both of their 
societies are structured in accordance with the Datu system, a pre-Islamic institution.153 
In the Datu system, among the positions that are similar to the ones in Malaysia are 
those of the Datu Bendahara, Datu Maharajah-lela, Datu Tumanggung and many 
others.154 These positions or titles are conferred upon respected members of society by 
the respective Sultans in Malaysia or by the Sultans in the Moro region.
The incorporation of Sabah into the Federation of Malaysia further strengthened 
Bangsamoro ethnic ties with the Malays in Malaysia because the people in Sabah are 
linked to the Sulu Sultanate ethnically, historically and geographically. In addition, 
Sabah has also indirectly played a major role in the reasons why the Moros formed their
148 Quoted in McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge o f  Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia,
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ethno-nationalist movements. In 1962, the GRP had made a claim that Sabah was part 
of its territory on the basis that the Sultan of Sulu had only ‘leased’ not ‘ceded’ Sabah to 
the British North Borneo Company in 1878, after which it passed on to the British 
Crown.155 Therefore, the GRP felt that when Britain left Sabah, the territory ought to 
have reverted to the Philippines, the “reversionary heir of the Sultan of Sulu” rather than 
becoming part of the Malaysian Federation.156 As part of a wider clandestine operation 
that aimed to infiltrate Sabah as a prelude to military invasion, the Philippine 
government provided military training to the young Moro recruits on Corregidor 
Island.157 As mentioned in the previous section, the Moro recruits were executed 
following their refusal to follow orders to attack Sabah. The decision made by the Moro 
recruits was based on their belief that the Malaysians were their “brothers” and they did 
not have any quarrel with them.158 In short, due to common ethnic identity as is the case 
with the Malays in Southern Thailand and the Acehnese - the Moros also have strong 
ties of ethnic kinship with the Malays in Malaysia.
This section has illustrated the depth of ethnic kinship between the Moros and 
the Malays in both Sabah and the Malay Peninsula. The next section analyses the 
Malaysian government’s approach to the conflict in the Moro region. The objective is to 
investigate whether ethnic kinship ties between the Malays and the Moros have played a 
role in shaping Kuala Lumpur’s policy and practice towards the conflict in the Moro 
region.
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6.4 Malaysia and the Philippines Bilateral Relations
The previous two case studies illustrated that ethnic minority issues have affected 
Malaysia’s relations with Thailand and Indonesia and indeed, as discussed below, the 
same applies to Malaysia’s relations with the Philippines. In addition, Malaysia’s 
bilateral relations with the Philippines since 1962 have been clouded because of 
Manila’s territorial claim to Sabah. Some scholars suggest that one of the main reasons 
for Malaysia’s involvement in the conflict in the Moro region is its desire to retaliate 
against President Marcos’ sponsorship in 1968 of military training on Corregidor for an 
intended separatist rebellion in Sabah.'59 Whether or not the Malaysian government 
provided assistance to the Moros in order for the government to retaliate against the 
GRP is uncertain, as Kuala Lumpur has never publicly admitted its involvement in the 
Moro struggle. One thing is certain, however: Malaysian assistance gave the essential 
incentive to the Moro separatists and exposed their issue to the international 
community.”160 For instance, in 1972, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, endorsed the Moro case submitted to him and asked King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia and President Qaddafi of Libya to help in persuading other OIC member 
states to support it when he was the Secretary General of the body in 1972.'61 In 
addition, despite acknowledging that the conflict in the Moro region was the 
Philippines’ internal affair, Malaysia repeatedly expressed concerns over the Moros’ 
plight, especially during the height of the conflict in the 1970s. In fact, Dr. Parouk 
Hussin stated that Malaysia had been in the forefront of rendering support to the
159 See, for instance, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the 
Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 238, Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims of Southeast 
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Bangsamoro for many years primarily because Malaysia is very concerned about its 
ethnic kin.162
6.4.1 Malaysia’s Assistance to the Moros
According to the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar, “the 
feeling of affection towards the Moros and the view that they are indeed part of us are 
the main motivating factor and the driving force for the Malaysia government to ensure 
the well-being of the Malays”163 in the Moro region. One of the examples to indicate 
that the Malaysian government is indeed concerned about their ethnic brethren’s societal 
security in the Moro region is the decision to allow the Moros to seek shelter in the 
country. For instance, in the 1970s, when the fighting between the GRP’s security 
forces and MNLF worsened, thousands of Moros are reported to have fled to Malaysia. 
At one stage, approximately 100,000 Moros landed in Sabah, where they were given 
food and shelter.164 Like the number of refugees from Aceh, there are also few existing 
estimates on the exact number of Moro refugees in Malaysia. In 1994, even when there 
were less serious clashes between the GRP and Moro ethno-nationalist movement, it 
was reported that many of the Moros ventured to Sabah in search of greener pastures, 
leading to an illegal immigrant population estimated at 600,000 people.165 As o f2002, 
as many as 500,000 Moros are estimated to have sought refuge in Malaysia to escape the 
long-standing conflict between Moros’ ethno-nationalist organisations and the AFP.166 
However, according to the leaders of the Filipino community in the Philippines, the 
number of these immigrants has already exceeded the one million mark, which makes
162 Interview with Hussin.
163 Interview with Syed Jaafar Albar.
164 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Viewpoints (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1978), 
p. 137.
See Vinasithamby Dharmalingam, "The Shadow Life o f Filipinos in Sabah," Asiaweek 20, no. 16 
(1994): pp. 34-39.
166 Barrios-Fabian, "Case Study o f Zamboanga City (Forced Migration Area)," p. 12.
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them the “biggest concentration of Filipino illegal immigrants in any part of the 
world”.167
The latest statistics available from the United Nations High Commissioners for 
Refugees (UNHCR) are for the total number of Filipino refugees from 1998 -  2002. 
This is shown in Table 3 below.168







* Refugee population, end of year.
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR). 2007. Trends 
in Displacement, Protection and Solutions. In Statistical Yearbook 2002, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics/opendoc.pdf. (accessed 1 November 
2007).
However, it should be noted that the numbers only represent those who actually 
registered with the UN Agency. In addition, like in the case of the refugees from Aceh, 
UNHCR did not specify whether the refugees were Moros because the report only uses 
the term “Philippines”. It can be inferred from the report that the Moros indeed 
represented the largest number of Filipino refugees to Malaysia. Notwithstanding their 
number, the Moro population is reasonably well accommodated in Sabah. For instance, 
in 2005, the Malaysian government is reported to have continued to allow some 68,600 
Moro refugees from the conflict of the 1970s to work in Malaysia.169 The permission to
167 Kamal Sadiq, "When States Prefer Non-Citizens over Citizens: Conflict over Illegal Immigration into 
Malaysia," International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005): p. 108.
168 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Trends in Displacement, Protection and 
Solutions.
169 U.S. Committee For Refugees and Immigrants, Malaysia.
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work legally in Malaysia is only granted to refugees from Moro and Aceh. In addition, 
according to Tan, around 300,000 of the Moros in Sabah have been given Malaysian 
citizenship by the Sabah state government.170
Interestingly, despite the large number of Moro refugees and illegal immigrants, 
they are accommodated reasonably well by Kuala Lumpur. However, it should be noted 
that one of reasons that the Malaysian government is ever willing to extend assistance to 
the Moros whenever they are in need is due to the leverage that the Moros have on the 
Malaysian government, especially on the federal government. Unlike in other 
Malaysian states, where the Malays have had political dominance since Malaysia was 
created, this was not the case in Sabah. Rather, the Christian Kadazan in Sabah 
successfully ruled the state for two electoral terms from 1985 - 1994.171 In order to 
ensure that the Malays achieved political dominance in Sabah, the federal government 
has not only allowed a large number of Moros to settle in Sabah, but has also given them 
Malaysian citizenship.172 As a result of the federal government policy to increase the 
pool of Malay Muslim electoral votes by encouraging large-scale immigration of Malay 
Muslims from the Moro region, the BN coalition political party managed to gain control 
of the Sabah state government in 1994, and has ruled the state ever since.173
At present, it is been reported that about one third of the population in Sabah are 
Moro descendants.174 Subsequently, the Malaysian government has to ensure that the
170 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 233.
171 A.B., "A History of Identity, an Identity o f a History: The Idea and Practice of'Malayness' in Malaysia 
Reconsidered," p. 364.
172 See for example, Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 47, Tan, "Armed Muslim 
Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," p. 277, Tan, Security 
Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, 
p. 139.
73 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Sadiq, "When States Prefer Non-Citizens over Citizens: 
Conflict over Illegal Immigration into Malaysia."
174 Soliman M. Santos, "Malaysia's Role in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front," in The Mindanao Conflict, ed. Kamarulzaman Askandar and 
Ayesah Abubakar (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), 2005), p. 65.
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interests of these people are served. In other words, if Kuala Lumpur wants to ensure 
that UMNO continues to rule Sabah, the interests of the Moro descendants have to be 
taken seriously. These may include extending assistance to the Moros in the southern 
Philippines and also include turning “a blind eye to the anti-Philippines activities”175 in 
Sabah. Among the assistance rendered to the Moros in the region by the Malaysian 
government is providing capacity-building support to the Bangsamoro Development 
Agency (BDA) through its Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP).176 
These programmes were given to the Moros in anticipation that the Moros would be 
able to govern their own region one day. The BDA, which was created as a result of the 
peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF, is mandated to determine, lead and 
manage relief, rehabilitation and development of the conflict-affected areas of 
Mindanao. Malaysia is organising training programmes for the Moros with a view to 
building management and leadership capacity among the group.177
6.4.2 Malaysia’s Assistance to the Ethno-Nationalist Organisations 
According to Jubair, the former Chief Minister of Sabah, Mustapha Harun (1967-1975) 
was the Malaysian leader, at least at the state level, who extended concrete help to the 
Moros.178 In fact, it was reported that the formation of the MNLF and the intensifying 
Moro struggle within the GRP was to some extent aided by the independent initiatives 
of Mustapha.179 Mustapha was known to allow Sabah to be used by the Moros as their 
training camp, supply depot, communication centre and sanctuary, besides encouraging
175 Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,"
F76277-Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 87.
177 Interview with Othman Razak, 20 February 2007.
178 Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, p. 174.
179 Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, p. 180.
235
them to migrate to Sabah.180 In addition, Mustapha was also reported to have allowed 
members of the MNLF to acquire motorboats in Sabah that were to be used to smuggle 
arms and ammunition to the rebels in Mindanao and to bring casualties back to Sabah 
for treatment.181 The assistance rendered to the Moros enabled them to elevate the level 
of conflict from a fight for equality and justice, to a war of liberation demanding self- 
determination. One of the main reasons why Mustapha came to the rescue of the Moros 
was his sense of identity with the Moros.182 The Malaysian government, on the other 
hand, denied that it offered support to the Moros, but at the same time, Kuala Lumpur 
did not stop Mustapha from extending such support.183
However, assistance to the Moros from Sabah was seriously affected following 
Mustapha’s resignation as Sabah’s Chief Minister in 1975. Mustapha resigned from the 
post following the ruling party’s (Barisan Nasional -BN) decision to accept defectors of 
his party, who formed the People's Racially-United Front of Sabah (Berjaya), as a 
member of the BN while ruling that Mustapha’s party, the United Sabah National 
Organization (USNO) was no longer a member.184 This move was apparently made as 
an effort by the ruling party to oust Mustapha from power for he was suspected of 
wanting to secede and contemplate the founding of a new state that would include 
Sabah, Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu.185 Although Mustapha was no longer in power 
after 1975, GRP officials continued to accuse Malaysia of assisting the Moro ethno- 
nationalist organisations. For instance, in October 1980, the GRP accused Malaysia of
180 See, for example, Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  
Southern Thailand, p. 139, Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies o f  Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas o f  
Smaller Asian States, pp. 165-66, Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: 
Islamic Brotherhood Versus National Interests," p. 226, David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and 
Decay, Politics and International Relations o f Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 
163.
181 Abdul Samad and Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue o f Sabah," pp. 558-59.
182 Mustapha claimed that he was a distant relative o f the Sultan o f Sulu. His mother was a Tausug and,
therefore he was as much a Moro as the rest o f his brethren.
183 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao Land o f Promise," p. 94.
184 R.S. Milne, "Malaysia and Singapore, 1975," Asian Survey 16, no. 2 (1976): p. 189.
185 Ibid.
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tolerating secessionist Moro training camps in Sabah, and that it was acting as a supply 
base.186 In November 1981, former Philippine Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile 
referred to “anti-government activities” in Sabah, primarily of the Philippine Democratic 
Socialist Party, which was using the state as a “southern backdoor: commuting between 
Sulu and Sabah.”187
In short, although it seems that some of Malaysia’s high-level officials have been
involved in supporting the Moro, it is uncertain whether the support was given officially
by the Malaysian government itself. Nevertheless, according to Tan,
“While there is some evidence that certain Islamic groups in Malaysia have 
been involved in aiding the Moro, it also does appear that the Malaysian 
government had simply not actively prevented them from doing so, in 
recognition of the potentially serious domestic fallout from its local Muslim 
constituency”.188
Basically, there are at least two “Islamic groups” from Malaysia that are known to have
been offering assistance to the Moros; the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia
(Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia -  ABIM) and the Islamic Party of Malaysia {Partai
Islam Se-Malaysia -  PAS). The activities carried out by ABIM include sponsoring the
Moro students to study in Malaysia and sending medical support, such as supplying
artificial limbs and medicine.189 With regard to PAS, according to Syed Nawawi,
besides being active campaigners on behalf of GAM, the Islamic Party are also doing
the same for the MILF to “expose all injustices” by the GRP in the Moro region in a
number of forums that have been organised by international Non-Governmental
organisations (NGOs).190 In addition, PAS was also instrumental in extending
humanitarian assistance to the Moros such as helping orphans, providing medical
186Paridah Abdul Samad, "Internal Variables o f Regional Conflicts in ASEAN's International Relations," 
The Indonesian Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1990): pp. 173-74.
187 Abdul Samad and Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue o f Sabah," p. 559.
188 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 29.
189 Interview with Hussin.
190 E-mail from Syed Nawawi.
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supplies and improving education.191 Interestingly, as argued by Tan, the Malaysian 
government has to date not prevented such assistance to the Moros.192 In other words, 
looking at this context, the Malaysian government is indeed concerned about the human 
security of the Moros, although the government itself is not extending any assistance.
However, assistance from Malaysia towards the Moro ethno-nationalist 
organisations can be said to have been significantly “reduced”, especially during the 
administrations of President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and President Fidel Ramos 
(1992-1998). Indeed, during her time in power, President Aquino successfully signed 
the Jeddah Accord with the MNLF in January 1987, which saw an agreement on a long­
term ceasefire that was generally respected by both the MNLF and the AFP forces until 
the end of Aquino’s presidency in 1992.193 Significantly, it should also be noted that 
during the administration of Aquino, the GRP formally withdrew their claim to Sabah 
by not mentioning Sabah or asserting a territorial claim in its 1987 constitution. 
However, when Aquino submitted a bill to Congress in November 1987 that would have 
made the Philippines formally renounce Sabah, Congress did not act on it.194 Despite not 
resolving the Sabah issue, Malaysia is said to have played an instrumental role in the 
signing of the FPA between the MNLF and the GRP in 1996. Syed Serajul Islam 
claimed that the Ramos administration only agreed to enter peace talks with the MNLF 
after the Malaysian government urged them to do so.195 In part, this reflected a more 
mature attitude from the Malaysian government on the Sabah issue. President Ramos 
was reported to be aware that since the founding of the MNLF, the organisation had had
191 Ibid.
192 Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second Front in the 
War on Terrorism, p. 29.
193 See, for example, Buendia, "A Re-Examination o f Ethnicity and Secessionist Movements in the 
Philippines and Indonesia: The Moros and Acehnese.", Collier, "Dynamics o f Muslim Separatism in the 
Philippines," p. 168.
194 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible o f  Terror, p. 37.
195 Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines," 
p. 455.
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a cordial relationship with Malaysia196 and Malaysia had been persistently extending 
support to their ethnic kin. In addition, he apparently believed that Malaysia possessed 
leverage over the Philippines mainly because the GRP was also aware that a large 
number of Filipinos were working in Malaysia and their remittances contributed to the 
foreign exchange of the Philippines.197 When President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) 
came into power, the GRP signed an “agreement of intent” with the MILF, which 
embodied both parties’ commitment “to pursue talks on the substantive issues” of the 
Mindanao conflict in 1998.198 However, the peace talks were suspended by the MILF 
following Estrada’s “all-out-war” against them.199 Following the AFP’s military 
campaign against the MILF, it was reported that Hashim Salamat took refuge in 
Malaysia.200
6.4.3 Malaysia’s Role in the GRP-MILF Peace Talks
After President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office in January 2001, she sought 
assistance from Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to return to 
the negotiation table.201 Following the MILF’s willingness to accept Malaysia’s 
mediatory role, Malaysian officials were sent to meet the Chairman of the MILF to 
persuade him to resume peace talks. In the event, on 24 March, 2001 the MILF and 
GRP signed an agreement for the resumption of peace talks in Kuala Lumpur. 
Interestingly, all of the parties involved espoused different reasons for resuming the
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "Back to War in Mindanao: The Weaknesses o f a Power-Based Approach to 
Conflict," Philippine Political Science Journal 21, no. 44 (2000): p. 118.
199 Ronald J May, "Muslim Mindanao: Four Years after the Peace Agreement," Southeast Asian Affairs 
(2001): p. 272, Santos, "Malaysia's Role in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front," p. 54.
200 May, "Muslim Mindanao: Four Years after the Peace Agreement," p. 270.
201 The MILF withdrew from negotiation with the GRP in June 2000 following the former Philippine 
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s “all-out-war” against the MILF, which featured the Philippine 
military’s capture o f all the MILF’s fixed camps, including its main camp, Abubakar. President Arroyo 
assumed office after President Estrada was deposed by EDSAII, the second people power revolution.
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peace talks. Arroyo sought Malaysian assistance primarily because the GRP knew hat 
due to links between the Malaysian government and the MILF, Kuala Lumpur might be 
able to influence the MILF on the question of a return to the negotiating table. The 
MILF, on the other hand, gladly agreed to Malaysia’s mediatory role given that they had 
been asking Malaysia for all sorts of political and religious advice anyway.202 Othman 
Razak, the Special Advisor to the Malaysian Prime Minister on the GRP-MILF Peace 
Process, has argued that the MILF believes that Malaysia will be able to help to ensure 
that negotiations with the GRP are fair.203
As for Malaysia, according to Secretary Silvestre Afable, the Chairman of the 
Philippine Government Peace Panel for Talks with the MILF and Presidential 
Communications Director, it is in the Malaysian national interest to ensure that the 
peace talks go smoothly and real peace is achieved as soon as possible.204 Any 
disturbance in the peace talks is considered to have direct implications for Malaysia’s 
national security. There are a number of issues in this regard. First, Sabah remains the 
most common destination for Moros fleeing their home whenever violence erupts in the 
region.205 Second, Malaysia is concerned about potential weapons smuggling. There are 
at least 70,000 weapons in the southern Philippines, which could easily find their way to 
Sabah.206 Therefore, Malaysia is very much concerned with ensuring that these weapons 
will be surrendered to government authorities in the Philippines.207 This goal predates 
9/11. Third, Malaysia is also concerned about transnational crime that originates from 
the Moro region. Zakaria Abd. Hamid of the Prime Minister’s Department, when
202 Interview with Iqbal. According to Dr. Syed Azman Syed Nawawi, Head o f PAS International Bureau, 
although the Malaysian government is the official mediator in the peace negotiations, the MILF also 
always referring to them on many various related issues.
203 Interview with Razak.
204 Interview with Silvestre Afable Jr., 22 February 2007.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid. It should be noted that the first two issues are from the perspective o f the Philippine government 
on why Malaysia wanted peace to be attained in the Moro region. For a detailed discussion on the issue 
o f light weapon trade in Southeast Asia see, Chalk, Light Arms Trading in SeAsia.
207 Interview with Afable Jr.
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delivering his opening remarks during the second formal peace talks on 24 July 2001, 
said:
As a close neighbour, we watch closely the events in south 
Philippines. And lately is has become part of our national interest.
The prolonged conflicts and instability have turned Mindanao into a 
breeding ground for the undesirable elements such as the Abu 
Sayyaf Group and also staging points for other transnational crime 
syndicates. This has raised security concern not only to the 
countries of the region but also to the international community.208
In short, due to the security threat that Malaysia has to counter as a result of the 
prolonged conflict in the Moro region, Malaysia is keen to participate in bringing 
stability and peace to the Moro region.
Since the GRP requested that Malaysia facilitate the peace talks, Malaysia has 
hosted eight exploratory talks in the country. In fact, Malaysia’s role as third party 
facilitator209 has been said to constitute the most important ever international 
involvement in the GRP-MILF peace negotiations.210 Besides serving as a host, 
Malaysia’s facilitation also involves the following: 1) acting as go-between conveying 
positions of the parties, 2) providing a conducive atmosphere and facilities; 3) being 
present in the talks to witness any commitments and understandings; 4) helping to 
bridge differences by shuttling between the parties; 5) acting as an administrator of the 
talks; and 6) recording and keeping minutes of discussions and other protocols.211 In
208 Remarks by Datuk Zakaria Abd. Hamid, Prime Minister’s Department, Malaysia during the Opening 
Ceremony o f the Second Round o f the GRP-MILF Formal Peace Talks on July 21,2001 at Guoman, Port 
Dickson, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia quoted in Santos, "Malaysia's Role in the Peace Negotiations 
between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front," p. 63.
209 According to Secretary R. Ermita, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, the Philippines, in the 
case o f Malaysia’s role as ‘third-party facilitator’ in the GRP-MILF peace process means that Malaysia’s 
representative is present in the talks to help bridge differences if there are problems during sessions, and 
doing this during breaks by shuttling between the parties. In addition, Malaysia, as the third party 
facilitator o f the peace process is expected to be a witness to important commitments or understandings, 
some of which may not have been put in writing. Quoted in Ibid., p. 58.
210 Besides Malaysia, the US through its agency, United States Institute o f Peace (USIP) is also an 
international party that is involved in the GRP-MILF peace negotiations. See, for example, East, "The 
Bangsa Moro: Fighting for Freedom During the War o f Terror: The Muslim Independence Movement o f  
the Southern Philippines".
211 Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 87.
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effect, Malaysia’s role o f facilitation has been moving towards mediation.212 Malaysia
has been giving suggestions and also promotion towards a certain direction for both the
GRP and the MILF in order to resolve the conflict in the Moro region. According to
Santos, these suggestions include the following political parameters:
Suggesting the framework of the Philippine Constitution, Tripoli 
Agreement, and Jakarta Accord; respect for Philippine territorial integrity 
and sovereignty; no secession or independence; assurance of the rights of 
the Moros as citizens; MNLF-MILF unity may complement existing 
solutions; and for the Moro movement to combat radicalism and the militant 
tendency.213
According to Afable, Malaysia’s role as mediator is important for the peace talks given 
that Malaysia -  besides being a facilitator -  has also provided crucial advisory and 
consultative support.214 Malaysia’s advantage is that its officials know the situation of 
the Moros very well and are able to create confidence and trust in the peace process 
among the conflicting parties.215 Even when the parties have problems and are not 
talking to each other, the Moros will talk to the Malaysian mediators and the Malaysians 
will convey the message to the GRP and vice versa.216 In fact, according to Dr. Parouk, 
if it had not been for Malaysia, the peace process between the GRP and the MILF would 
have long since collapsed.217
In addition to acting as the mediator/facilitator in the peace talks, Malaysia also 
leads the International Monitoring Team (IMT) tasked with keeping track of the 
ceasefire in Mindanao and overseeing the process of rehabilitation and development in
212 Mediation includes, amongst other things, devising or promoting a solution, loosening the tension 
between the parties, creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiation, being an effective channel o f  
information, and providing the parties with suggestions. See, J. G. Merrills, International Dispute 
Settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 34-35,41.
213 Soliman M. Santos, "Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions " in Working Papers (Washington D.C: East- 
West Center, 2005), p. 23.
214 Interview with Afable Jr.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Interview with Hussin.
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the southern Philippines.218 The IMT was created as the result of the Implementing 
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement, signed on 7 
August, 2001, which called on the OIC to provide ceasefire monitors that would be 
assisted by both the GRP and MILF. However, due to technical problems, the OIC did 
not take direct action. Subsequently, in its effort to ensure that peace be attained in the 
region, Malaysia decided to lead a team that also comprised representatives from Brunei 
and Libya, and officially arrived in Mindanao in October 2004. The IMT is an 
independent body working in conjunction with a number of GRP and MILF units. To 
preserve its independence, the IMT is not affiliated with the Malaysian government 
representatives who are responsible for facilitating peace negotiations in Kuala Lumpur. 
Rather, it is an operation headed by the Malaysian Army that works together with the 
Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP), the GRP’s body 
entrusted to overseeing the negotiations and ceasefire with the MILF. Originally, the 
mandate of the IMT was to be in the southern Philippines for only a year.219 However, 
since neither party has signed any peace agreement, Malaysia decided to extend its tour 
of duty. According to Othman Razak, the Malaysian government has paid the observers 
allowances of RM 10 million (US$ 2.7 million) a year.220 This, however, does not 
include other necessary expenditure to maintain its army personnel there. In other 
words, the cost of maintaining the personnel is very high, at least by Malaysian 
standards. This shows that Malaysia is very committed and keen to see that a peaceful 
solution to the conflict can be achieved.
2,8 See, for example, Ayesah Abubakar, "Keeping the Peace: The International Monitoring Team Mission 
in Mindanao," in The Mindanao Conflict, ed. Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar (Penang: 
Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), 2005), p. 91, Michael O. Mastura, "A Time for 
Reckoning for the Bangsamoro People," in Discussion Paper (Cotabato City, Philippines: Institute of 
Bangsamoro Studies, 2001). Interview with Razak.
219Abubakar, "Keeping the Peace: The International Monitoring Team Mission in Mindanao," p. 92. 
Interview with A1 Haq.
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6.5 The Influence o f ASEAN on Bilateral Relations
As a member of ASEAN, Malaysia has always supported the national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Philippines. In fact, under the principle of non-interference 
within ASEAN, all member countries are committed to the principle of not supporting 
neighbouring opposition movements, particularly the ethno-nationalist organisations 
operating in its member countries. However, as analysed in this chapter, on several 
occasions this principle has been ignored in practice by Malaysia. It should be noted 
that the principle has not been disavowed, but has acted as an important restraint against 
support to insurgents escalating to “intolerable levels”.221 Malaysia is continuously 
looking for avenues to render assistance to the Moros and yet not be seen to be in 
violation of the principle of international law and the key regional norm, which is non­
interference in other ASEAN members’ internal affairs. In this case, it can be said that 
the Malaysian government’s policy agenda towards the Moro has focused increasingly 
on long-term goals, primarily through economic aid and cooperation as a means for 
obtaining their security. For example, Malaysia is among the most active members in the 
formation of the BIMP-EAGA (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines -  East 
ASEAN Growth Area) that includes the Southern Philippines (Mindanao island and the 
province of Palawan), East Malaysia (the states of Sabah and Sarawak and the federal 
territory of Labuan), the provinces of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya in 
Indonesia, and the whole of Brunei.222 Since its inception in 1994, BIMP-EAGA has 
developed rapidly.223 Such effort has allowed for economic growth in the less developed
221 John Funston, "ASEAN and the Principle o f Non-Intervention -  Practice and Prospects" (paper 
presented at the Council o f Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 7th Comprehensive Security Working 
Group Meeting, Seoul, 1-2 December 1999), pp. 3-4.
222 It should be noted that the idea to create this subregional cooperation in these areas was initiated by 
President Fidel Ramos.
223 Pushpa Thambipillai, "The ASEAN Growth Areas: Sustaining the Dynamism," The Pacific Review 11, 
no. 2 (1998): p. 258.
244
areas, especially in Mindanao.224 It has been recognised that strong support by the four 
participating governments and the active role of the private sector has contributed to the 
rapid development of the BIMP-EAGA.225 Although the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
reduced the capability of most of its member countries to sustain and promote further 
economic growth within the region, recent economic indicators show that these 
economies are reviving.226
6.6 Conclusion
In short, as in the previous two case studies, the Malaysian government’s policy also 
emphasises good relations with the Philippines government. However, since the Malay 
ethnic group played a leading role in Malaysia’s politics, the government leaders and 
also the general Malay public could not afford just to ignore the difficulties that their 
ethnic brethren were facing in the Moro region. The chapter has provided supportive 
evidence that ethnic factors do play a major role in explaining the issue of Malaysian 
security practice towards the Moros. However, in the case of the conflict in the Moro 
region, Malaysia has the opportunity to play a larger role than in the conflicts in 
southern Thailand and Aceh. This is because in the case of the southern Philippines, the 
Malaysian government was invited by the GRP to act as the facilitator for peace talks 
between the parties in conflict. This invitation shows that the Philippines government 
believes that Malaysia can play a positive role in finding a solution to the conflict, 
despite having close links with the Moros organisations. Obviously, the GRP issued the 
invitation because while they know that Malaysia is very concerned about the conflict,
224 For the impact o f BIMP-EAGA on the Moro region’s economy especially in terms o f its export, see, 
Larry N. Digal and Milva Lunod, "Impact o f BIMP-EAGA on Mindanao Exports," Barrwa 1 no. 1 (2004).
225 Thambipillai, "The ASEAN Growth Areas: Sustaining the Dynamism," p. 257.
226 See, for example, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Technical Assistance fo r  Strengthening 
Subregional Cooperation in the Transport Sector o f  the EA GA and the IMT-GT Regions (2001 [cited 26 
April 2007]); available from http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/r5_02.pdf, Ishak Yussof and 
Mohd Yusof Kasim, "Human Resources Development and Regional Cooperation within BIMP-EAGA: 
Issues and Future Directions," Asia-Pacific Development Journal 10, no. 2 (2003).
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the GRP strongly believes that Malaysia is not interested in seeing the disintegration of 
the Philippines. In fact, this was the main reason why the GRP has “allowed” Malaysia 
to play a bigger role in the peace process from being just a facilitator to moving towards 
becoming a mediator.
Apart from its other national interests, particularly those of an economic nature, 
Malaysia is very interested in helping to find a peaceful solution to the conflict because 
Kuala Lumpur wants to ensure the societal security of its ethnic brethren in the 
Philippines and not just the wellbeing of particular leaders. Indeed, this had been 
proven by the arrest and deportation of the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, after he escaped 
to Malaysia following his unsuccessful rebellion in 2001. The willingness of the 
Malaysian government to continuously provide training programmes aimed at increasing 
the Moros’ capacity for administrating their own region in the future and its 
preparedness to accept refugees/migrants from the southern Philippines also show that 
Malaysia is indeed willing to extend assistance to Malays outside its territorial 
jurisdiction. Looking at this particular case study, therefore, it can again be concluded 
that ethnic factors do indeed play a major role in Malaysia’s security practice.
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Chapter 7: Assessment and Conclusions
Introduction
The thesis has two main objectives. The first is to analyse whether ethnic considerations 
have any impact on Malaysian security practices, especially in relation to the conflicts in 
southern Thailand, Aceh and in the Moro Region. The second purpose is to analyse 
whether the preservation of the interests of ethnic Malays,1 which has been identified as 
one of Malaysia’s national security objectives, is only pursued within the parameters of 
the country’s domestic politics or is also a feature of Malaysian foreign/security policy. 
It should be noted that both objectives are interrelated. If the second purpose is pursued, 
then so too is the first. Based on the analysis of Malaysia’s security practices in all three 
areas of conflict - southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro Region - the thesis concludes 
that in the case of Malaysia, ethnicity has a major impact on Kuala Lumpur’s security 
practices in relation to all of these conflict areas. In fact, the Malay elite’s perception of 
national security is not only limited to striving for the protection of the country’s core 
values, which include the political stability of the country, the survival and well-being of 
the people, and the state’s territorial integrity, but also extends to securing the societal 
security of its ethnic kin across international boundaries. Ethnicity implies a sense of a 
shared common descent that ties people by notions of kinship, political solidarity vis-a- 
vis other groups, shared customs, language, religion, values, morality and etiquette.2 As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, striving for societal security involves a society attaining the 
ability to maintain its essential character, such as its traditional patterns of language,
1 See, for instance; A.B., "Bureaucratic Management o f Identity in a Modem State: "Malayness" In 
Postwar Malaysia," pp. 135-50, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages 
in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 129.
2 Weber, Mills, and Gerth, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
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culture, religious and national identity and customs under changing conditions and 
possible or actual risks.3 It also involves protecting the physical survival, economic 
wellbeing and, in some instances, an ethnic group’s political rights in their homeland. 
However, when it comes to identifying the core security referents in the case of 
Malaysia, the thesis demonstrates that the pursuit of the societal security of the ethnic 
Malays in these conflict areas is closely interlinked with the security of the Malaysian 
government itself.
This concluding chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section 
[7.1] reviews the main findings of this thesis. The second section [7.2] begins by 
analysing the implications of the empirical conclusions for the literature. The primary 
purpose of this section is to highlight the shortcomings of the literature when explaining 
Malaysia’s security practices towards the ethnic conflicts in southern Thailand, Aceh 
and the Moro region. This section also summarises Malaysia’s security practices in 
relation to the conflicts in southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro region. The main 
objective of this sub-section is to compare and contrast all of the approaches taken by 
the Malaysian government in relation to these ethnic conflicts. The third section [7.3] 
discusses this thesis’ contribution to the literature. Finally, the fourth section [7.4] 
attempts to outline tentatively the future development of Malaysia’s security practice in 
these conflict areas. This section also attempts to outline the prospects of ASEAN, 
particularly with respect to its norms of non-interference among member states.
7.1 Main Findings
This thesis has shown that Malaysia’s security practice towards the ethnic conflicts in 
southern Thailand, Aceh, and in the Moro Region is best understood with reference to
3 Buzan, People, States and Fear: A n Agenda fo r International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 19, 
Waever, "Societal Security: The Concept," pp. 17-40.
248
the importance that shared ethnicity has played for Malaysian policy-makers. Indeed, 
the thesis argues that the primary influence underpinning the country’s security practice 
is ethnic identity. This point applies to Malaysia’s bilateral and regional relationships. 
To this end, this thesis illustrates in detail the close ethnic ties that the Malay political 
elite see between the Malays in Malaysia and those Malay groups who are located 
outside Malaysia’s international borders. This perception of strong ethnic ties is rooted 
in longstanding and extensive historical relations. What is important is that ethnic 
considerations have lead the Malaysian government to engage either directly or 
indirectly in conflicts where the Malays are caught up in southern Thailand, Aceh and 
the Moro region. As analysed in all of the case study chapters, Kuala Lumpur has not 
only extended support and assistance to ordinary Malay people in the respective conflict 
areas, but also to some extent to their ethno-nationalist organisations. As analysed in the 
respective case study chapters, Malaysia has maintained close relations with almost all 
of the key ethno-nationalist organisations operating in the conflict areas. For instance, 
as analysed in Chapter 4, most of the Thai Malays’ ethno-nationalist organisations were 
either founded or had their bases in Malaysia, particularly during the initial period of 
their establishment.4 Chapter 5 has shown that although the Acehnese ethno-nationalist 
organisation was not formed in Malaysia, the country can still be perceived as having 
had a close link with the Acehnese ethno-nationalist organisation, mainly because the 
Acehnese organisation had almost fully transferred their operational command to 
Malaysia where it remained until 1998.5 As discussed in Chapter 6, both the Moro
4 Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern Thailand, 
p. 108, Mahyiddin, "Letter to Barbara Whittingham Jones Dated 14 March 1948.", Pitsuwan, Islam and 
Malay Nationalism: A Case Study o f  the Malay-Muslims o f  Southern Thailand, p. 229.
5 See, for example, "Aceh Unrest Leads to Mounting Death Toll.", Barber, Aceh: The Untold Story: An 
Introduction to the Human Rights Crisis in Aceh, p.42.
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ethno-nationalist organisations, the MNLF and the MILF, also have close relations with 
Malaysia. In fact, the MNLF can be considered as having been established in Malaysia.6
It should also be noted that Malaysia’s security practices towards these ethnic 
conflicts are influenced by a combination of factors, ranging from domestic political 
pressures to affective and instrumental motivations.7 As outlined in Chapter 1, affective 
motivations relate to considerations of justice, as well as humanitarian, ethnic and 
religious concerns. They may also fmd expression in the leadership’s ideological 
affinity with the ethno-nationalist organisations.8 Instrumental motives for supporting 
the ethnic kin group, on the other hand, are linked to the promotion of its own self 
interest.9 In the case of Malaysia, although there are various types of motivation, the 
thesis argues that the Malaysian government’s main motivation to assist its ethnic kin 
has been interlinked with other concerns - particularly humanitarian and religious issues. 
The thesis, however, argues that these assistances were not due to the Malaysian 
government leadership’s ideological affinity with the ethno-nationalist organisations. 
As analysed in all the case study chapters, the assistance provided serves only to protect 
the societal security of the Malay minority; it does not involve supporting either their 
irredentist or separatist leanings. For instance, Chapter 4 argues that one of the main 
reasons why the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations had to change their 
objective from wanting to join Malaysia to seeking independence was due to the lack of 
support from the Kuala Lumpur government for their irredentist demands. Chapter 5 
has shown that the Malaysian government only agreed to allow the Acehnese refugees to 
seek shelter in the country if they did not actively support and/or undertake any action
6 See, for example, Hawkins, The Defence o f  Malaysia and Singapore, from AMD A toANZUK, pp. 50-52, 
Marohomsalic, Aristocrats o f  the Malay Race: A History o f  the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines, p. 166, 
Mercado, "Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins o f the MNLF and the Politics o f  
Moro Separatism," p, 157.
7 Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics," pp. 551-82.
8 Heraclides, The Self-Determination o f  Minorities in International Politics, n. 3 p. 52.
9 Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, n. 4, p. xvi.
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directed against the Indonesian government.10 In the case of the conflict in the Moro 
region, it can also be seen that the Malaysian government does not have an ideological 
affinity with the Moros. As analysed in Chapter 6, the Malaysian government, as the 
mediator/facilitator of the GRP-MILF peace process, has even been promoting the idea 
that the MILF should not be demanding secession or independence from the GRP.11 In 
short, despite the fact that the Malaysian government has been concerned about the 
societal security of its ethnic kin, this concern does not come to the extent of violating 
the territorial integrity of its neighbouring countries.
Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates that instrumental motives have also 
influenced Malaysia’s security practice. As examined, the mishandling of these 
conflicts by the Malaysian government in order to achieve the societal security of their 
ethnic brethren would have had a negative impact on the ruling government’s ability to 
preserve its political hegemony. The thesis argues that both the major ethnic Malay- 
based political parties (UMNO and PAS) have been voicing serious concern regarding 
the fate of their ethnic kin caught up in conflict outside Malaysia, in part to boost their 
popularity, especially in those states that border on the conflict areas. This phenomenon 
is due to the fact that the Malays living along these borders tend to be particularly 
concerned about the security situation experienced by their ethnic kin. Therefore, while 
the Malaysian government seeks to maintain good relations with all of its neighbours, it 
also needs to cater for the actual and perceived domestic pressures in order to extend 
assistance to the ethnic Malays in neighbouring countries. In addition to boosting the 
ruling political party’s popularity amongst the Malay ethnic group, there are also other 
specific interests that influence Kuala Lumpur’s security practices, especially in 
southern Thailand and the Moro region. As for the former, Malaysia has been interested
10 Interview with Mohamad.
11 Santos, "Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions ", p. 23.
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in seeking assistance from the Thai Malay organisation to help the Malaysian armed 
forces suppress the communist insurgency operating against the Malaysian government 
from the Thai side of the border. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, the military 
cooperation with the Thai Malays had contributed to the CPM’s decision to halt their 
insurgency against the Malaysian government in 1989.12 However, in the Moro region, 
Malaysia’s interest has been to retaliate against the Philippines for attempting to invade 
Sabah.13 As highlighted in Chapter 6, the GRP under the administration of President 
Marcos aimed to invade Sabah by sponsoring military training to the Moro recruits on 
Corregidor Island in 1968.14 Table 4 summarises the factors that have influenced 
Malaysia’s security practice towards all the respective conflict areas.













- V V - V
Aceh - V V - -
Moro Region - V V V
12 Interview with Khan.
13 Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, p. 132, Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao 
Land o f Promise," p. 13.
14 See, for instance, T an, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the Second 
Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 238, Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: 
Islamic Brotherhood Versus National Interests," p. 226.
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7.2 Implications o f  the Empirical Conclusions fo r  the Literature
Some scholars argue that since the ethno-nationalist movements in all of the respective 
countries are religiously motivated, Malaysia has offered assistance to them because the 
Malays in Malaysia (and also those in the Malaysian government) share a common 
religion with them.15 This thesis, however, suggests that in their relations with all of the 
key ethno-nationalist organisations in southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro region, the 
Malaysian decision makers have been more motivated by consideration of a shared 
ethnic identity than by religion. The same applies to the ethno-nationalist movements. 
In the case of the Thai Malays, Chapter 4 has shown that although Malays in southern 
Thailand have increasingly embraced a Muslim identity, they have done so for 
instrumental reasons only. In effect, by emphasising religion, they hoped to be able to 
expand their support base, especially among the global Muslim community. Essentially, 
the calculation has been that a larger support base within the international community, 
particularly from the Muslim world, would increase the probability of the Thai 
government succumbing to their political demands. Despite there being a religious 
factor in this conflict, the main motivation for the struggle remains Malay nationalism.16
As for the Aceh conflict, Chapter 5 has shown that even though Islam has been 
an important identity marker for the Acehnese population, it was difficult to attribute 
GAM’s struggle solely to religion because this ethno-nationalist organisation was 
neither explicitly Islamic nor did it pursue Islamist political aspirations.17 Scholars tend 
to explain the conflict in religious terms primarily because Aceh has a history of
15 See, for example, Rabasa and Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability o f  Southeast Asia, p. 
82, Wardhani, "External Support for Liberation Movements in Aceh and Papua", Weatherbee, 
International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy, p. 34.
16 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 98, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad.", Liow, Muslim Resistance 
in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics.
17 For views that GAM is not an Islamic organisation, see, for example, Gershman, "Is Southeast Asia the 
Second Front?," p. 67, Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy o f  a Separatist Organization, 
p. 7.
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rebelling against the central government in order that their province be governed by 
Islamic law. In fact, the movement led by GAM is based on the Acehnese ethnic 
group’s determination to be free from Javanese control.
Lastly, with respect to the Moros, Chapter 6 has discussed that religion has been 
used only as the major vehicle to unite the very different Moro ethno-linguistic groups. 
Unlike the Thais of Malay descent18 and the Acehnese, both of whom were historically 
ruled by one sultanate, the Moros experienced rule under at least two major different 
sultanates that were founded by different ethno-linguistic groups. However, despite 
their different historical backgrounds, the Moro also organised themselves politically to 
struggle against the central government in order to preserve their Malay identity, very 
much like the Malay movements in southern Thailand and Aceh.19 The Islamic factor, 
therefore, deserves to be downplayed. Indeed, Islam has only been utilised by all three 
ethno-nationalist movements as one of the most convenient and powerful tools to attain 
political ends, the unity of the people, and their nationalist aspirations. Thus, the thesis 
argues that while Islam should be regarded as an important factor in explaining how 
these ethno-nationalist movements have succeeded in sustaining their struggle against 
their respective governments, religion per se cannot explain satisfactorily the cause of 
their struggle. Instead, the key to the origins of these struggles are identity needs or 
specifically fear about losing ethnic identity. This claim holds especially true in the case 
of Indonesia, where Islam is the dominant religion in the country.
As analysed in all of the case study chapters, the heavy-handed, often insensitive 
attempts by the respective governments to impose “national” values have tended to 
reflect the values of the dominant group. They have resulted in resentment among 
ethnic Malays and the latter’s fear of losing their own identity to what they have
18 With an exception o f the province of Satun.
19 See, for example, Gopinath, "International Aspects o f the Thai Muslim and Philippine Moro Issues: A 
Comparative Study," pp. 125-47, Jha, Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia and Quest fo r  Identity, p. 68.
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perceived as “foreign values”. In other words, they have been concerned greatly with 
the perceived threat to what the Copenhagen School terms societal security. The thesis 
has demonstrated that in each of the conflict areas under discussion, the Malay 
communities challenge their respective governments for related but analytically distinct 
reasons. As analysed in Chapter 4, the Thais of ethnic Malay descent decided to form 
their ethno-nationalist organisations to conduit a struggle in protest at Bangkok’s 
policies, which alienated them socially, culturally and religiously within the country. 
Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Acehnese formed their ethno-nationalist 
organisation following the Indonesian government’s decision to withdraw the special 
status given to their province, an act that was viewed as an attempt by the Javanese to 
“colonise” Aceh. By contrast, as shown in Chapter 6, the Moros organised themselves 
against Manila as a result of perceiving that their physical existence was under threat in 
the wake of the Corregidor affair. In short, what all of these Malay communities have in 
common is that they shared a sense of acute threat to their societal security posed by 
their respective governments.
The thesis has also shown that although the Malays in Malaysia share a common 
religion with their ethnic kin in neighbouring conflict areas, religion is not the main 
motivation for Malaysia to offer assistance to them. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that religion is one of the main elements of Malay ethnic identity. As argued, in order 
for any individual to be categorised as Malay, the individual must be Muslim. Despite 
being one of the core elements of Malay ethnic identity, religion has, however, never 
occupied a central position in Malaysia’s foreign policy. In fact, Malaysian policy 
makers have never pretended to be dedicated to the Islamic cause internationally.20 
Therefore, the argument that religion is the main motivation underpinning Malaysia’s
20 Abu Bakar, "Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: The First Three Decades (1957-1987)," p. 17.
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support towards the Malays across its borders is not persuasive. As the current analysis 
has shown, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which dominates the 
ruling coalition government in Malaysia, is a Malay ethno-nationalist political party 
whose main objective is to protect the interests of the Malay ethnic group. As argued, 
one of the ethnic group’s interests is in fact to ensure that its ethnic kin’s security is not 
threatened.21 Therefore, even international boundaries do not cause members of ethnic 
groups to ignore the condition of their ethnic kin.22 This thesis has revealed that the 
Malays in Malaysia do maintain strong ethnic, historical and political links with their 
brethren. These extensive ties among the Malays have been the major factor that has 
motivated the Malaysian government’s concern about the societal security of their ethnic 
brethren. This concern consequently shapes the country’s security practices towards all 
of the respective conflict areas.
In addition, this thesis has highlighted the differences between the Malays in 
Malaysia and the dominant ethnic groups in Indonesia (Javanese) and in the Philippines 
(Filipinos). As discussed in the respective case study chapters, although both of these 
ethnic groups can be classified as belonging to the larger Malay ethnic group according 
to the anthropological definition, they are not however, perceived by the Malays in 
Malaysia as part of their ethnic group. This is primarily due to the lack of common 
ethnic identity and historical linkages between the Malays and both the Javanese and the 
Filipinos. Whilst the Javanese have a long history of enmity towards the Malay and 
have never viewed themselves as belonging to the Malay ethnic group, the Filipinos lack 
one of the core elements of Malay identity according to the Malaysian government’s 
definition of what constitutes a Malay: namely, that a Malay must be Muslim. 
Therefore, this thesis claims that Malaysia’s assistance rendered to the people in all of
21 Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," pp. 89-103.
22Carment and James, "Two-Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in 
the Balkans and South Asia pp. 521-54.
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these conflict areas is actually due primarily to their ethnic linkages rather than their 
religious similarity.
Some scholars have argued that even if the Malaysian government is concerned 
about the plight of its ethnic brethren in the region, the government would not interfere 
in these conflicts because as a member of ASEAN, the government has given a higher 
priority to the principle of territorial sovereignty especially among fellow member 
states.23 Furthermore, one of the key objectives of ASEAN’s norms is to ensure that 
member states adhere to the principle of non-interference. It is also maintained that as 
one of the founders of this regional organisation, Malaysia remains committed to 
upholding its basic principles. In fact, this argument has some validity in the sense that 
Malaysia has indeed never officially criticised these principles, even though sometimes 
these policies might be perceived by the Malaysian government as allowing for the 
suppression of the Malay ethnic minority in the conflict areas discussed in the thesis. In 
fact, Malaysia’s decision to rigorously adhere to the regional norm whereby member 
states do not criticise each other publicly can be credited as being one of the main 
reasons why Malaysia has not been involved in any interstate armed conflicts with its 
neighbours since the establishment of ASEAN. In short, the claims made by these 
scholars appear well-founded since ‘ASEAN’ has been quite successful in restraining its 
member states from interfering, and members have encouraged each other to settle their 
disputes in a peaceful manner. However, it should also be noted that in spite of the 
Malaysian government’s tendency to refrain from publicly criticising regional 
governments, on several occasions, the government did become involved in a “war of 
words” with its neighbours. This is mainly due to the Malaysian government’s decision
23 See for example; Carment, "Managing Interstate Ethnic Tensions: The Thailand-Malaysia Experience," 
p. 16, Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  Southern 
Thailand, p. 202, Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy, pp. 171-205, Weatherbee, International 
Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle fo r  Autonomy, p. 34.
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to extend both passive and active support to their ethnic kin in the conflict areas and to 
their respective ethno-nationalist movements.
The policy of not criticising its neighbours openly, however, does not mean that 
Malaysia is not concerned about its ethnic brethren. As the thesis has shown, although 
the Malaysian government highly regards the principle of territorial integrity, the 
government has not failed to offer assistance to the ordinary members of the Malay 
ethnic group and also to all the major ethno-nationalist organisations in Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Interestingly, in spite of the Malaysian government 
offering such assistance, the latter has not caused/engendered any serious interstate 
tension between Kuala Lumpur and its neighbouring countries, and has neither led these 
conflicts to deteriorate nor fomented major interstate tensions, let alone war. In other 
words, in contrast to popular perceptions by many scholars whereby third party 
involvement by a kin state tends to lead to intensified interstate strife,24 the experience of 
Southeast Asian countries is that in the case of ethnic conflicts in the region, the third 
party involvements did not intensify interstate conflict. However, it should be noted that 
there are incidences whereby both Bangkok and Jakarta did engage with Malaysia in a 
‘war of words’. However, these incidences are limited to a series of accusations by both 
governments, who ‘perceived’ that Malaysia had been playing a role in supporting the 
ethnic Malay minority in southern Thailand and Aceh. These accusations by both 
governments, however, did not have any negative impact on their diplomatic relations 
with Malaysia. Therefore, the thesis suggests that the existence of a regional grouping 
such as ASEAN should be taken into account in order to explain the formulations of 
foreign/security policy of kin states’ toward conflicts involving its ethnic brethren across 
international boundaries. One of the main reasons for the region remaining peaceful
24 See, for example, Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign 
Policy Behavior.", Ryan, "Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations," pp. 24-28.
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despite Malaysia’s engagement in all of the three conflicts is because of cooperation 
between Malaysia and all the three respective countries to tackle the problem. 
Obviously, if all of the respective governments believe that Malaysia has the intention of 
either intensifying these conflicts or even aiming at disintegrating their countries, none 
of these governments would come to any agreement with Malaysia on these issues. In 
other words, the main objective of Malaysia’s engagement in these conflicts is to seek 
peaceful solutions to the conflicts; it is not interested in violating the territorial integrity 
of the countries involved.
7.2.1 Malaysia’s Assistance Via ASEAN and Bilateral Cooperation
As analysed in the thesis, Kuala Lumpur has been offering assistance to these Malays 
via bilateral cooperation with all the respective countries and also through the 
framework of ASEAN itself. However, it should be noted that Malaysia had never 
agreed to enter into any joint cooperation with any of the respective governments that 
aims to suppress these movements. Malaysia has been engaging with all of the 
respective governments within the framework of ASEAN to develop various economic 
programmes, such as the Growth Triangle initiative, that aim to uplift the economic 
status of Malays in each of the conflict areas. Significantly, such assistance is targeted 
towards all Malays in the respective conflict areas rather than at particular ethno- 
nationalist organisations.
Malaysia’s Assistance Via ASEAN Cooneration
Within ASEAN, Malaysia has been a member to two of the Growth Triangle initiatives 
that incorporate all of the conflict areas under discussion in this thesis: (1) the Indonesia- 
Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) which includes southern Thailand and 
Aceh; and (2) the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines -  East ASEAN
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Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) that includes the Moro region. At the time of writing, 
neither growth triangles has achieved their intended objectives, which among others is to 
improve the living standards of the people residing in those areas. As discussed in the 
thesis, all of these conflict areas are either among the least developed areas in their 
respective countries or perceived as not benefiting from their province’s wealth.25 The 
establishment of the growth triangles is not only aimed at accelerating economic growth 
in all the respective areas but also at reviving the economic and cultural ties between 
neighbouring regions. As discussed in the thesis, historically, all of these conflict areas 
had extensive trade links with some of the states in Malaysia.26 One of the main reasons 
why the growth triangle has not produced any positive results is due to suspension of 
their economic activities following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. All of the countries 
in this subregional arrangement only decided to revive the growth triangle initiatives in 
January 2007 when the respective leaders signed the two subregional agreements at the 
ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Philippines.27 Therefore, it is too early to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the growth triangles in achieving their objectives.
Malaysia’s Bilateral Cooperation With Thailand. Indonesia and the Philippines 
Bilaterally, the level of cooperation extended to Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila has 
differed. Although the Malaysian government has extensive bilateral cooperation with 
Thailand and the Philippines, it does not, however, have such cooperation with the 
Indonesian government. In the case of the conflict in Southern Thailand, although the 
Malaysian government has not been involved in any peace process, both governments
25 See, for example, Chalk, "Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, 
Mindanao, and Aceh," pp. 241 -69, Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global 
Issues, p. 42, Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences since 2001," pp. 
21-43, Singh, "The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia," pp. 47-68, Tan, "Armed 
Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications," pp. 267-88.
26 See, for example, King, "The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle: How the South Was 
Won...And Then Lost Again," pp. 93-108, Lingga, "Muslim Minority in the Philippines", Reid, An 
Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories o f  Sumatra, p. 337.
27 "ASEAN Summit: Thailand Signs Regional Trade Pact," The Nation, 16 January 2007.
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have implemented various programmes targeted towards the Malays in Southern 
Thailand. As discussed in Chapter 4, among the bilateral cooperation that has been 
established between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok is the Joint Development Strategy 
(JDS) which like the IMT-GT, also aims to foster economic cooperation between 
Thailand's southern provinces and Malaysia's northern states. The establishment of the 
JDS has resulted in the creation of ‘Task Force 2010’. So far, the Task Force has been 
very active in coordinating assistance from Malaysia to southern Thailand. However, 
the Task Force has not been effective in restoring peace in southern Thailand. One of 
the main reasons for its ineffectiveness in this area is due to the fact that the Task Force 
overlooked the fact that economic issues are not the key reason that Thai Malays 
continue their struggle through their ethno-nationalist organisations.28
As discussed in Chapter 6, in the case of the conflict in the Moro region, 
Malaysia has the opportunity to play a larger role than in the conflicts in Southern 
Thailand and Aceh. This is because in this conflict, the Malaysian government was 
invited by the GRP to act as the facilitator for the peace talks between the parties in 
conflict. The invitation extended by the GRP to Malaysia has focused on KL mediating 
the peace talks between them and the Moro ethno-nationalist organisation (MILF).29 In 
addition, Malaysia has also been providing capacity-building support to the Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA) through its Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme 
(MTCP).30 The BDA, since May 2002, has been mandated to manage the development 
in all of the MILF areas.31 All of these kinds of cooperation with the Philippines
28 Interview with Khan.
29 Santos, "Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions ", p. 23.
30 Santos, Dynamics and Directions o f  the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, p. 87.
31 Crisis Group Asia Report N° 80, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace 
Process," p. 32.
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government indicate that the GRP believes that Malaysia is able to play a neutral role in 
finding a solution to the conflict, despite having close links with the Moro organisations.
By comparison, the bilateral cooperation regarding the conflict between Kuala 
Lumpur and Jakarta is limited to the issue of deportation of Acehnese refugees. 
However, as argued in Chapter 5, such cooperation came about following a period of 
intense lobbying by Indonesia vis-a-vis the Malaysian government. One of the factors 
contributing to the lack of bilateral relations between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta aimed 
at solving the conflict in Aceh, is the Javanese perception of the Malays in Malaysia. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Javanese in Indonesia regard themselves as culturally more 
sophisticated and superior not only vis-a-vis the Malays, but also in relation to other 
ethnic groups in the archipelago.32 Therefore, the Javanese tend not to initiate any kind 
of cooperation with the Malaysian government whom they view as inferior, especially 
when it comes to solving their own domestic affairs. In fact, as the thesis has shown, the 
Indonesian government did not initiate the invitation to Malaysia to participate in the 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). Rather, Malaysia’s participation in the AMM was 
due to a recommendation made by the European Union, which was later agreed to by the 
Indonesian government. The thesis argues that due to its ethnic ties and the concern 
about the societal security of the Acehnese, the Malaysian government willingly 
participated in the AMM, which aimed at achieving peace in the province.
In many ways, the Malaysian government’s bilateral cooperation with Jakarta is 
limited to the repatriation of Acehnese refugees. There is no incidence where the 
members of the Acehnese ethno-nationalist movements are being deported by the 
Malaysian government. However, Malaysia did repatriate members of the Thai Malay 
and the Moro ethno-nationalist organisations. However, this kind of cooperation with
32 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 29, Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, p. 
22 .
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both Bangkok and Manila was not continuous, but only implemented on an “ad hoc” 
basis with both governments. As the thesis has demonstrates, the Malaysian 
government only deported members of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisation in 
1998 where it involved the leader of the New PULO and its military commander. With 
regard to the cooperation with Manila, the Malaysian government arrested and deported 
the founder of the MNLF in 2001. This was also the first and (until the writing of this 
thesis) the last where Malaysia deported the key leader of a Moro ethno-nationalist 
organisation. Although Malaysia did deport ordinary citizens to Indonesia, the UMNO- 
led government, however, has not done the same with the ordinary refugees from 
Southern Thailand and the Moro region. Therefore, it can be deduced that the support 
given is due to concern for the societal security of its ethnic brethren that results from 
the government’s awareness of the neighbouring governments’ stance towards these 
Malays, rather than because of the ethno-nationalist organisations’ irredentist or 
separatist leanings.
Table 5 summarises the assistance provided by Malaysia through the framework 
of ASEAN and also through its bilateral cooperation with all the respective 
governments.
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• Deporting some of the leaders 
of the Thai Malay ethno- 
nationalist organisations
• Task Force 2010/Technical 
Training






• Aceh Monitoring 
Mission (AMM)*







• Engage in Peace Process
• Deporting the leader of the 
MNLF
• Bangsamoro Development 
Agency (BDA)
* This mission was led by the European Union.
In addition to multilateral and bilateral cooperation that aimed to extend 
assistance to their ethnic kin, Malaysia also initiated a number of approaches 
unilaterally. However, according to scholars, this form of extending assistance to their 
ethnic brethren is said to be limited to welfare-oriented programmes.33 This thesis has 
found that besides welfare-oriented programmes, some of the assistance given is in fact 
due to Malaysia’s political concern towards its ethnic brethren. Therefore, to suggest
33 Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims of Southeast Asia: Islamic Brotherhood Versus National 
Interests," p. 217.
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that Malaysia did not offer tangible assistance to the respective ethno-nationalist 
organisations is inaccurate. However, it should be emphasised again that the Malaysian 
government does not support the ethno-nationalist organisations in their objective to 
seek independence. The assistance rendered to its ethnic kin is primarily the result of 
the government’s concern for their societal security. As analysed in all the case study 
chapters, the members of the Malay ethnic minority in the conflict areas feel that in 
addition to their ethnic identity, their political rights in their own homeland are also 
being threatened by the respective central government. In fact, as the thesis has shown, 
the establishment of these ethno-nationalist organisations was a response to their 
respective government’s unfavourable policies towards them.
7.2.2 Malaysia’s Unilateral Assistance to its Ethnic Kin
The extent of Malaysia’s unilateral assistance in response to these conflicts has varied. 
The Malaysian government has utilised various channels and approaches to ensure the 
societal security of the Malays across its international boundaries. Among the 
government’s various approaches, it is possible to distinguish four main responses, 
which are: (1) accepting the Malay refugees from conflict areas, (2) offering a safe 
haven to members/leaders of the ethno-nationalist organisations, (3) offering small scale 
military assistance, and lastly, (4) offering assistance via NGOs, opposition political 
party (PAS) and diaspora communities. As mentioned before, the assistance provided 
serves only the protection of the societal security of the Malay minority; it does not 
involve supporting either their irredentist or separatist leanings. It should be noted that 
there are both similarities and differences in terms of the type of assistance offered to 
Malays in each conflict area.
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Accepting the Malay Refugees from Conflict Areas
Although Kuala Lumpur had a policy that no Indochinese refugees who land in 
Malaysia can expect to become settlers,34 the policy towards refugees from these 
conflict areas differs remarkably. In fact, the thesis demonstrates that with regards to 
the refugees that originated from all of the conflict areas in the region, the Malaysian 
government has been fairly accommodating. As analysed in all of the case study 
chapters, not only is Kuala Lumpur generally willing to offer shelter, the government 
has also decided to ignore the request made by all the respective governments to 
repatriate systematically all of the refugees originating from the respective conflict 
areas. In addition, in certain cases Kuala Lumpur has even offered Malaysian 
citizenship to refugees, especially those who have been living in the country for some 
years. Although the number of these refugees is high, they have always been allowed to 
gain entry to Malaysia, especially when the conflicts become more violent. However, 
the Malaysian government’s willingness to accept these refugees does not only stem 
from the government being concerned about their human security. The influx of 
refugees who share a common ethnic identity with the Malaysian Malays is also viewed 
by the government as one of the ways to help boost the demographic strength of Malays 
vis-a-vis the large Chinese and Indian minorities in the country, besides ensuring that 
Malays achieve and maintain political dominance, especially in a state like Sabah.35 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, preserving Malay dominance in the country remains the primary 
goal of Malaysian domestic security objectives.
34 See, Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects," pp. 48-49.
35 See for example, Cribb and Narangoa, "Orphans o f Empire: Divided Peoples, Dilemmas of Identity, and 
Old Imperial Borders in East and Southeast Asia," p. 175, Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War 
ASEAN, p. 47, Tan, "Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and 
Implications," p. 277, Tan, Security Perspectives o f  the Malay Archipelago: Security Linkages in the 
Second Front in the War on Terrorism, p. 139.
266
Offering a Safe Haven to Members/Leaders of the Ethno-Nationalist Organisations
In addition to allowing the ordinary Malays from conflict areas to seek refuge in the 
country, Kuala Lumpur, in principle, has also been willing to accept or grant a safe 
haven to the members of all of the respective ethno-nationalist organisations. This 
decision provides evidence that the Malaysian government is indeed concerned about 
the security of its ethnic brethren. As explained by the former Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, “it was difficult for the government to send them back because Malaysia 
fears for their lives”.36 Although they were all granted a safe haven, the differences were 
in terms of the locations where they were given sanctuary. As analysed in Chapter 4, 
the Thai Malays were given a safe haven mainly in the northern part of Malaysia, 
particularly in the state of Kelantan, and Terengganu. Concerning the conflict in Aceh, 
Chapter 5 has shown that the Acehnese were allowed to find refuge along the western 
coast of the Malay Peninsula, especially in Kedah, Perak, and Penang. As regards the 
Moros, as discussed in Chapter 6, almost all refugees were given shelter in Sabah. In 
other words, Malay refugees have been given sanctuary in Malaysian states that are 
nearest to their homeland. The Malaysian government’s decision to provide partisan 
support to the Thai Malays, Acehnese, and the Moros in these parts of Malaysia is 
linked to efforts to placate the concerns of the local population. This shows that the 
Malaysian government has conceded that the stronger the ethnic ties are, the more 
pressure there is on the government to play an active role in the conflict areas either to 
help in achieving peace or extending assistance to the ethnic Malay minority.
Although the members of the ethno-nationalist organisations who have been 
granted sanctuary in Malaysia are requested by the Malaysian government not to take up 
activities against their respective governments,37 the fact that they were permitted a safe
36 Interview with Mohamad.
37 Ibid.
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haven indicates that Malaysia was concerned about their human security. However, it 
should be noted that there were a number of incidences whereby leaders of ethno- 
nationalist organisations were repatriated to their respective countries. While the 
Malaysian government had deported a number of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist 
leaders and also the founder of the MNLF, it had never repatriated any of the Acehnese 
ethno-nationalist leaders. In the case of the leaders of Thai Malay ethno-nationalist 
organisations, as Chapter 4 has discussed, three PULO leaders were deported by the 
Malaysian government in 1998. The decision to deport these leaders was closely linked 
to the country’s economic interest. It was reported that Thailand had threatened to
•»o
suspend economic cooperation with Malaysia. Since Malaysia was experiencing 
economic downturn as a result of the Asian financial crisis, the government had to 
concede to the Thai’s threat. However, it should be noted that since that event whereby 
PULO leaders had been deported, the Malaysian government has been extremely 
reluctant to repatriate any other Thai Malay ethno-nationalist leaders. This is mainly 
due to the domestic political fallout in Malaysia following the alleged mistreatment of 
the Thai Malay leaders in Thai detention.39
With respect to the case of repatriation of the founder of the MNLF, Nur 
Misuari, the Malaysian government decided to arrest and deport Misuari mainly due to 
his revolt against the GRP in 2001, which was perceived by the government as an 
attempt to destabilise the Moro region. As discussed in Chapter 6, the peace agreement 
in 1996 between the GRP and the MNLF was actually brokered by the Malaysian
38 Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN, p. 29, Kingsbury, The Politics o f  Indonesia, p. 
22 .
39 In fact, in November 2006, General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the Thai military commander who led the 
military coup in September 2006, admitted that the Thai government during Thaksin’s administration had 
executed the leaders o f the Thai Malays ethno-nationalist deported to Thailand from Malaysia. See, for 
example, "Thaksin Had Rebels Killed," The Star, 28 November 2006.
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government.40 The arrest of Misuari, however, created a diplomatic tussle between 
Malaysia and the Philippines over his extradition. The GRP feared his presence in the 
Philippines would affect the ongoing elections in the ARMM. The Malaysian 
government, on the other hand, was concerned about the implications of detaining 
Misuari in the country for a longer period, as Malaysia is the home to a large number of 
refugees from the Moro region. As the result of the GRP failure to bring Misuari back 
to the Philippines before 24 December, 2001 the deadline given by the Malaysian 
government, the government threatened to turn him over to a third country.41 
Consequently, the Philippines took possession of Misuari in January 2002.42
Military Assistance
This thesis has argued that Kuala Lumpur has also given military assistance to ethno- 
nationalist organisations. However, it was suggested that this assistance has been 
limited to the ethno-nationalist organisations in southern Thailand and the Moro region. 
Although there were reports that some of the weapons procured for GAM where sent to 
Aceh through Malaysia, there is no evidence that these activities were either supported 
or known about in advance by the Malaysian government. However, military assistance 
has been made available both to the Thai Malays and the Moros only sporadically. The 
rationale for providing this assistance seems to have differed over time. As for the Thai 
Malay organisations, assistance was given in return for the agreement to help the 
Malaysian armed forces to suppress the communist insurgency operating against the 
Malaysian government from the Thai border. Above all, this assistance was only limited
40 Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani o f Thailand and Mindanao o f the Philippines," 
p. 455.
1 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible o f  Terror, p. 218.
42 Ibid.
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to the supply of military equipment.43 In contrast, the assistance offered to the Moros 
was made available in apparent retaliation to the Philippines’ attempt to infiltrate Sabah 
as a prelude to military invasion.44 However, it should be noted that Kuala Lumpur has 
never publicly admitted its involvement in the Moro struggle. The military assistance 
rendered to the Moros was more extensive than that offered to the Thai Malays because 
in addition to providing military equipment, the Moros were also given military 
training.45 Following the success of the Malaysian government in securing a peace 
agreement with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) to end its insurgency in 1989 
and the Philippine government’s decision to formally withdraw their claim on Sabah by 
not mentioning Sabah or asserting a territorial claim in its 1987 constitution, Malaysia 
terminated this type of assistance. In other words, the military assistance provided to 
both the Thai Malay and Moro ethno-nationalist organisations had two different 
objectives. As for the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisations, the assistance was 
provided to assist Malaysia in tackling the communist insurgency. By comparison, the 
assistance for the Moros was given in order to put pressure on the Philippine 
government to ‘drop’ its claim to Sabah. Although the Philippine Congress never acted 
on the bill that was submitted by President Aquino in 1987 that would have formally 
renounced Philippine claims to Sabah, since then, and until at least the time of writing of 
this thesis, the GRP has not brought up the issue of the Sabah claim. In short, despite 
small scale military assistance provided by Malaysia to these ethno-nationalist 
organisations, there is no evidence to indicate that Malaysia did so in order to undermine
43 Pitsuwan, "The Ethnic Background o f Issues Affecting Bilateral Relations between Malaysia and 
Thailand," p. 324.
44 Jubair, Bangsamoro, a Nation under Endless Tyranny, p. 132, Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, "Mindanao 
Land o f Promise," p. 13.
45 See, for example, Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros o f  Southern Philippines and the Malays o f  
Southern Thailand, p. 139, Morrison and Suhrke, Strategies o f  Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas o f  
Smaller Asian States, pp. 165-66, Wan Abdul Latif, "Malaysia and the Muslims o f Southeast Asia: 
Islamic Brotherhood Versus National Interests," p. 226, Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and 
Decay, p. 163.
270
the territorial integrity of either country. Rather, it was done in order to protect its own 
territorial integrity from apparent foreign threats.
Assistance via NGOs. Opposition Political Party and Diaspora Communities 
Besides extending direct support to its ethnic brethren outside Malaysia, the UMNO-led 
government has also provided “passive support” to them. This support has involved the 
Malaysian government not restraining the assistance made available to the Malays in 
these conflict regions either by its citizens, particularly from the Malay ethnic group, the 
respective diaspora communities living in the country, the state governments, non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) and even the Malay-based opposition party. As the 
cases examined in the thesis demonstrated, the support offered by the above-mentioned 
has taken the form of funding, advice and help with representing their cause in 
international fora. In other words, although the government is aware of the assistance 
given out by Malay civil society to its ethnic brethren, no action has been taken against 
the people concerned or the organisations involved. The practical support rendered by 
Malay individuals or organisations are normally not classified as official support by the 
government, and thus would normally not be viewed as constituting interference in other 
members’ domestic affairs.
As the thesis has shown, this kind of support has been “tolerated” in all of the 
conflict areas in which ethnic Malay people have been caught up. For instance, besides 
extending humanitarian assistance, the Malay-based opposition party, PAS, has been 
actively playing the role of spokesman for the Thai Malay ethno-nationalists over the 
years, besides regularly voicing its concern in international fora about the conflicts in 
Aceh and the Moro region. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Kelantan state 
government, under the administration of PAS, has been identified as the prime supporter 
of the Thai Malay ethno-nationalist organisation. With regard to the Malaysian NGOs’
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participation in extending humanitarian support to the Malays in these conflict areas, the 
most active of these is the Malaysian Youth Islamic Movement (.Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia -  ABIM). There is also an NGO based in Malaysia, the Perdana Global Peace 
Organisation (PGPO), who have been very active in mediating peace talks between the 
Thai Malays ethno-nationalist organisations and the Thai government. In fact, the 
mediation occurs with the full knowledge of the Malaysian government and has 
produced a number of successful outcomes, such as the appointment of a Thai Malay as 
the Governor of Yala in November 2006, the commitment made by the Thai government 
to introduce the Malay language into the curriculum of public schools in southern 
Thailand46 and the agreement for the Thai government to use the Malay language as the 
medium of instruction in 200 schools in Thailand’s southern provinces.47 Lastly, the 
thesis shows that the Malaysian government has allowed diaspora communities to 
extend assistance to the ethno-nationalist organisations from their respective area of 
conflict especially in the case of Aceh. As analysed in Chapter 5, it has also been 
reported that the Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia has been heavily involved in sending 
money, arms, and recruits back to their ‘home’ country.48
Indeed, although much of the assistance is not coming officially sanctioned by 
the Malaysian government, it can still be considered part of Malaysia’s security practice. 
This is mainly due to the fact that it is almost impossible to render these types of 
assistance to these organisations or to the respective conflict areas without the 
knowledge of the security agencies, or specifically, the federal government. After all, 
most assistance offered by respective state governments, NGOs and opposition political 
party tend to be in the public domain because it is in their best interest that their
46 "Malay Muslim Is Yala Head."
47 Interview with Mahathir.
48 Byman, Trends in Outside Support fo r  Insurgent Movements, p. 41, Schulze, "The Struggle for an 
Independent Aceh: The Ideology, Capacity, and Strategy o f GAM," p. 244.
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assistance to the Malays in the conflict areas is made public. As discussed earlier, this 
enables them to boost their popularity at least amongst the Malay ethnic group in the 
country. However, it should be noted that the same argument could not be applied in the 
case of the alleged smuggling of weapons through Malaysia. Malaysia is divided by the 
South China Sea into two geographical entities: the Malay Peninsula (formerly referred 
to as West Malaysia) and East Malaysia (comprised of Sarawak and Sabah). This 
separation requires the government to patrol long coastlines and defend large maritime 
territories, which presents a daunting security challenge.49 The border at the Straits of 
Malacca, alone, has continued to be the site of an active smuggling trade throughout the 
twentieth century: “the long coastline and the fringing mangrove swamps has, over the 
centuries, provided shelter for entire navies of smugglers and pirates.”50 Similarly, the 
coastline of Sabah runs almost 250 miles and its proximity to several islands in 
Philippine waters allows for easy travel across state boundaries. There are almost 200 
small islands off Sabah’s east coast, of which only 52 are inhabited.51 The Sulu Sea, 
which has been identified as a pirate’s haven, separates Sabah from the Philippines and 
in some places it takes less than 20 minutes by boat to reach Sabah’s waters from the 
Philippines.52 In other words, while the Malaysian government is aware of the activities 
of most of the actors in the country that offer assistance to its ethnic kin, the same 
argument cannot be applied with the problem of weapons smuggling.
Table 6 summarises the similarities and differences of how the Malaysian 
government has approached all of the conflicts involving their ethnic brethren in 
Southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro region.
49 Andrew T. H. Tan, "Malaysia's Security Perspectives," in Working Paper No. 367 (Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, 2000).
50 Carl A Trocki, "Borders and the Mapping o f the Malay World" (paper presented at the Association of 
Asian Studies Annual Meeting, San Diego, California, 9-12 March 2000).
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The aim of Malaysia’s Assistance towards the Malays in the Conflict Areas 
As an ethnic kin state, the Malaysian government has to fulfil its responsibility to extend 
help when the ethnic Malay brethren across its international boundaries are in need. 
However, the assistance extended to the Malays in the conflict areas is limited to an 
extent where it is highly unlikely to lead to interstate conflict. In fact, the thesis argues 
that the main objective of Malaysia’s security practice towards the Malays in those 
conflict areas is to secure the societal security of the Malays’ ethnic kin rather than to 
destabilise the territorial integrity of its neighbouring countries. As analysed in the case 
study chapters, the Malaysian government’s policy has been to emphasise the good 
bilateral relations with the respective governments, along with sound multilateral 
relations among the ASEAN members. In fact, the thesis has shown that the Malaysian 
government has not hesitated to offer to cooperate with all the neighbouring
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governments to address the respective conflicts whenever all the governments concerned 
are seen to be at least partially accommodating to the requests of the Malays in their 
country.
7.3 Contribution to the Literature
The thesis has made four main contributions. First, it contributes to literature on the 
influence of the ethnic factor on Malaysia’s security practice. The thesis has shown that 
in the case of Malaysia, ethnicity not only has a role in the domestic securitisation 
process or the country’s ethnic politics, but also influences the country’s external 
security outlook. Indeed, this thesis has shown that ethnic affinity has impacted on 
Malaysia’s domestic and international security practice. The thesis has also shown that 
Malaysian political leaders - as leaders of a kin state - are influenced by a combination 
of factors: political pressures from constituencies and affective and instrumental 
motivations in conflicts where ethnicity is prominent. In other words, the thesis has 
maintained the claim made by various scholars that in conflicts where ethnicity is 
prominent, the leaders in kin states are influenced by a combination of factors such as 
political pressures from constituencies and affective and instrumental motivations that 
lead them to offer assistance to their ethnic kin caught up in conflicts.53 And in the effort 
to secure the ethnic kin’s societal security, there are various ways and means that kin 
states could extend support, which range from providing advice, arms, money, a safe 
place to organise and train to offering various types of diplomatic assistance, including 
representing their cause in international fora.54
53 Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics," pp. 551-82, Heraclides, The Self-Determination o f  
Minorities in International Politics, n. 3 p. 52, Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign 
Policy, and International Conflict, p. 168.
54 Gurr and Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics.
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Second, the thesis contributes to the research of the role of ethnicity in 
international relations, especially in Southeast Asia. This thesis has shown that ethnicity 
has a role in shaping the behaviour of the state in its interaction with other states. In 
this regard, ethnicity has been proven to be one of the important contributing factors that 
may determine the condition of bilateral relations among the countries in Southeast 
Asia. Also, this thesis sustains the claims that ties between an ethnic group and its 
disadvantaged kin help to explain a state’s policies towards conflict crises.55 However, 
this thesis also shows that the argument whereby an ethnic group which is dominant or 
has been in an advantaged position, is more hostile toward a country which is 
disadvantaged or even persecutes ethnic kin,56 is not necessarily sustained with reference 
to Southeast Asia. This thesis provides evidence that the existence of a regional 
grouping like ASEAN is able to play a role in minimising the inter/intra-regional 
tension, especially between bordering countries. In fact, since ASEAN was established, 
there has been no incidence of a member country settling their disputes by military 
force.
Third, the thesis illuminates a dimension of the international politics in Southeast 
Asia on which light is not shed very often. Despite ASEAN member states having 
established security cooperation either multilaterally or bilaterally, ethnic ties have an 
impact on the effectiveness of such cooperation. For instance, as shown in the thesis, 
Malaysia has not cooperated with any of its neighbouring countries in suppressing the 
ethno-nationalist movements that exist in southern Thailand, Aceh and the Moro region, 
and also has not agreed to requests to treat these ethno-nationalist movements as
55 Saideman, "Explaining the International Relations o f Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus 
Ethnic Ties," pp. 721-53.
56 See, for example, Davis and Moore, "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign 
Policy Behavior," pp. 171-94, Davis, Jaggers, and Moore, "Ethnicity, Minorities and International 
Conflict," pp. 148-63, Moore and Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," pp. 89-103.
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enemies. Many of the scholars (especially among the neo-realists) do not agree that this 
factor has a role among the small states.57 This thesis has also maintained the claim that 
in order to explain small state foreign policy, scholars should look to domestic 
institutional choices rather than international determinants,58 although there are 
suggestions that the foreign policies of small states should be best explained by simply 
examining structural/systemic rather than domestic level factors. In this context, 
domestic politics - particularly the interest of the dominant ethnic group - has been one 
of the major factors in shaping a country’s foreign security practice. Lastly, the thesis 
contributes to the literature on the interaction of ethno-nationalist movements with 
national governments that they are in conflict with, and with supporter governments.
7.4 Prospect fo r  Future Developments
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Malaysian government through its main political party in 
the National Front (Barisan Nasional - BN), the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), has promoted the interests of the Malay ethnic group by implementing a wide 
range of policies and rules to influence various sectors in ways that are favourable to 
them.59 One of the main reasons why the government has been practising these policies 
is mainly due to the fact that the Malays maintain political hegemony in the country. 
Given that the Malay ethnic group dominate the country’s political life, Malaysia’s 
security practices are consequently shaped in such a way that they are designed to
57 See, for example, Hey, Small Slates in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, Pace, 
"Small States and the Internal Balance of the European Union," pp. 107-19.
58 Elman, "The Foreign Policies o f Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard."
59 See, for example, Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 50-78, 
Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 53, Horowitz, "Cause and 
Consequence in Public Policy Theory: "Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia"," pp. 249- 
87.
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accommodate and promote Malays’ ethnic interests.60 As the thesis has analysed, one of 
their ethnic interests is to secure their ethnic kin from threat from their respective 
governments. Based on the political dynamics in Malaysia, therefore, it is very likely 
that the Malaysian government will remain committed to assisting its ethnic kin when 
the latter’s societal security is at stake in neighbouring countries. For instance, in the 
case of southern Thailand, it is very likely that Malaysia will agree to participate in and 
offer assistance to any programmes initiated by the Thai government designed to reduce 
the grievances among the Thai Malays. However, at the same time, it is very unlikely 
that the government in Kuala Lumpur will pressure the Thai government to seek 
political reconciliation with the Thai Malay movement, as this would be seen as 
interfering in Thai domestic affairs, an action which is against the norm of ASEAN’s 
non-interference principle.
Although the principle of non-interference in ASEAN is expected to remain as 
one of the core principles within this regional organisation, there is the possibility the 
principle may be modified slightly in order to allow member states to engage with the 
domestic affairs of others, especially if the issues concerned have a spillover effect on 
other states. After all, there have already been a few attempts to do just this. For 
instance, in 1997, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called 
for a new policy of “constructive intervention”.61 This was followed by the 
recommendation by the then foreign minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, that ASEAN 
member states adopt a policy of ‘flexible engagement’.62 However, both of these 
suggestions were rejected in favour o f ‘enhanced interaction’, which also in fact was not
60 Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," p. 517.
61 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects, p. 167.
62 Funston, "ASEAN and the Principle o f Non-Intervention - Practices and Prospects," p. 18.
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fully accepted by all member states.63 Although it seems that member states tend to 
linger behind the principle of non-interference, the fact that discussion over this 
principle has taken place indicates that they are willing to address the principle and to 
modify it.64 It is expected that once all of the arrangements that are aimed at integrating 
the members’ economic activities, such as the aforementioned growth triangles, have 
been successful - which in turn will make them interdependent on each other - members 
of ASEAN would be very likely to be receptive to the idea of adopting a principle that 
allowed them to interfere in others’ domestic affairs in order to protect each other’s 
interests. Having said that, the principle of non-interference is not expected to be totally 
discarded by ASEAN, as this principle has played a very prominent role in ensuring the 
region remains peaceful, and free from any armed conflict among member states.
In the case of Aceh, with the signing of the Helsinki Peace Accord in 2005, the 
province held local elections in December 2006 in which GAM not only won 15 out of 
19 districts but also the provincial governorship,65 and Aceh has been relatively free 
from any violence conflict. Although at least a temporary peace has been achieved, the 
Malaysian government is expected to continue to offer assistance to the 
Acehnese/GAM. This assistance is expected to focus on developing the province. In 
addition, the Malaysian government is very likely to offer assistance to bolster Acehnese 
human resources, perhaps similar in intent and design to those offered to the Thai 
Malays. As for the conflict in the Moro region, although the peace talks mediated by 
Malaysia have not produced any positive results to date, Malaysia’s commitment to 
ensure the societal security of the Malays’ ethnic brethren in the Moro region is likely to
63 For detailed discussions on the issue o f ‘constructive intervention’, ‘flexible engagement’ and enhanced 
intervention’, see Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and 
Prospects, pp. 167-90.
64 Funston, "ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention - Practices and Prospects," p. 21.
65 Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°61, "Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh," (Jakarta/Brussels: 22 March 
2007).
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remain strong. Malaysia will retain the role as a facilitator as long as both parties 
welcome its participation. In short, as long as Malaysia remains an ethnocratic state in 
which the government promotes the interests of the Malay ethnic group, it will continue 
to fulfil its perceived responsibility as an ethnic kin state to all the Malays in the 
conflict.
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Appendix 1: List of Interviews
Dr. Zaini Abdulllah, Foreign Minister of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka -  GAM): 9 September 2006, Stockholm, Sweden.
Dato Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, Thailand’s Honorary Consul at Langkawi, Royal 
Thailand Consulate: 6 March 2007, Selangor, Malaysia.
Secretary Silvestre Afable Jr., Chairman, The Philippine Government Peace Panel for 
Talks with the MILF and Presidential Communications Director: 22 February 2007, 
Manila, the Philippines.
Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar, Foreign Minister of Malaysia: 21 December
2006, London, United Kingdom.
Von A1 Haq, Chairman, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Coordinating Committee on 
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Appendix 2: Declaration of Independence of Aceh-Sumatra
y
Secretariat General
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDEPENDENT ACHEH SUMATRA
Executive Office: P.O .Box 36634 Houston, TX 77236 USA, Legislative Office: P.O Box 95, 129 22 Hegersten Sweden 
Secretariat General: P.O Box 20041 World Square, Sydney NSW 2002 Australia Representative: P.O Box 35034 Wellington 6009 New Zealand
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF ACHEH-SUMATRA 
Acheh, Sumatra, December 4,1976
To The peoples O f The World:
We, the people o f Acheh, Sumatra, exercising our right o f self-determination, and protecting our historic 
right o f eminent domain to our fatherland, do hereby declare ourselves free and independent from all 
political control o f  the foreign regime o f  Jakarta and the alien people o f  the island o f  Java.
Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent sovereign State since the 
world begun. Holland was the first foreign power to attempt to colonize us when it declared war against 
the sovereign State o f  Acheh, on March 26, 1873, and on the same day invaded our territory, aided by 
Javanese mercenaries. The aftermath o f  this invasion was duly recorded on the front pages o f  
contemporary newspapers all over the world. The London, TIMES, on April 22, 1873, wrote: "A 
remarkable incident in modern colonial history is reported from East Indian Archipelago, A 
considerable force o f  Europeans has been defeated and held in check by the army o f native state... the 
State o f  Acheh. The Achehnese have gained a decisive victory. Their enemy is not only defeated, but 
compelled to withdraw. "THE NEW YORK TIMES, on May 6th, 1873, wrote: "A sanguinary battle has 
taken place in Aceh, a native Kingdom occupying the Northern portion o f the island o f Sumatra. The 
Dutch delivered a general assault and now we have details o f  the result. The attack was repulsed with 
great slaughter. The Dutch general was killed, and his army put to disastrous flight. It appears, indeed, to 
have been literally decimated." This event had attracted powerful world-wide attention. President 
Ulysses S.Grant o f the United States issued his famous Proclamation o f  impartial Neutrality in this war 
between Holland and Acheh.
On Christmas day, 1873, the Dutch invaded Acheh for the second time, and thus begun what 
HARPER'S MAGAZINE had called "A Hundred Years War o f Today", one o f  the bloodiest, and 
longest colonial war in human history, during which one-half o f  our people had laid down their lives 
defending our sovereign State. It was being fought right up to the beginning o f world war II. Eight 
immediate forefathers o f the signer o f  this Declaration died in the battlefields o f that long war, 
defending our sovereign nation, all as successive rulers and supreme commanders o f  the forces o f  the 
sovereign and independent State o f  Acheh, Sumatra.
However, when, after World War II, the Dutch East Indies was supposed to have been liquidate, - an 
empire is not liquidated if its territorial integrity is preserved, - our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, was not 
returned to us. Instead, our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to the Javanese - their ex­
mercenaries, - by hasty flat o f  former colonial powers. The Javanese are alien and foreign people to us
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Achehnese Sumatrans. We have no historic, political, cultural, economic or geographic relationship with 
them. When the fruits o f Dutch conquests are preserved, intact, and then bequeathed, as it were, to the 
Javanese, the result is inevitable that a Javanese colonial empire would be established in place o f that of 
the Dutch over our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra. But, colonialism, either by white, Dutch, Europeans or 
by brown Javanese, Asians, is not acceptable to the people o f Acheh, Sumatra.
This illegal transfer o f sovereignty over our fatherland by the old, Dutch, colonialists to the new, 
Javanese colonialists, was done in the most appalling political fraud of the century: the Dutch colonialist 
was supposed to have turned over sovereignty over our fatherland to a "new nation" called "indonesia". 
But "indonesia" was a fraud: a cloak to cover up Javanese colonialism. Since the world begun, there 
never was a people, much less a nation, in our part o f the world by that name. No such people existed in 
the Malay Archipelago by definition o f ethnology, philology, cultural anthropology, sociology, or by 
any other scientific findings. "Indonesia" is merely a new label, in a totally foreign nomenclature, which 
has nothing to do with our own history, language, culture, or interests; it was a new label considered 
useful by the Dutch to replace the despicable "Dutch East Indies", in an attempt to unite administration 
o f their ill-gotten, far-flung colonies; and the Javanese neo-colonialists knew its usefulness to gain 
fraudulent recognition from the unsuspecting world, ignorant o f the history o f the Malay Archipelago. If 
Dutch colonialism was wrong, then Javanese colonialism which was squarely based on it cannot be 
right. The most fundamental principle o f international Law states: Ex injuria jus non oritur. Right cannot 
originate from wrong!
This illegal transfer o f sovereignty over our fatherland by the old, Dutch, colonialists to the new, 
Javanese colonialists, was done in the most appalling political fraud of the century: the Dutch colonialist 
was supposed to have turned over sovereignty over our fatherland to a "new nation" called "indonesia". 
But "indonesia" was a fraud: a cloak to cover up Javanese colonialism. Since the world begun, there 
never was a people, much less a nation, in our part o f the world by that name. No such people existed in 
the Malay Archipelago by definition o f ethnology, philology, cultural anthropology, sociology, or by 
any other scientific findings. "Indonesia" is merely a new label, in a totally foreign nomenclature, which 
has nothing to do with our own history, language, culture, or interests; it was a new label considered 
useful by the Dutch to replace the despicable "Dutch East Indies", in an attempt to unite administration 
of their ill-gotten, far-flung colonies; and the Javanese neo-colonialists knew its usefulness to gain 
fraudulent recognition from the unsuspecting world, ignorant o f the history o f the Malay Archipelago. If 
Dutch colonialism was wrong, then Javanese colonialism which was squarely based on it cannot be 
right. The most fundamental principle o f international Law states: Ex injuria jus non oritur. Right cannot 
originate from wrong!
We, the people o f Acheh, Sumatra, would have no quarrel with the Javanese, if  they had stayed in their 
own country, and if  they had not tried to lord it over us. From now on, we intend to be the masters in our 
own house: the only way life is worth living; to make our own laws: as we see fit; to become the 
guarantor o f our own freedom and independence: for which we are capable; to become equal with all the 
peoples o f the world: as our forefathers had always been. In short, to become sovereign in our own 
fatherland!
Our cause is just! Our land is endowed by the Almighty with plenty and bounty. We covet no foreign 
territory. We intend to be a worthy contributor to human welfare the world over. We extend the hands of  
friendship to all peoples and to all governments from the four comers o f the earth.
In the name o f the sovereign people o f Acheh, Sumatra.
Tengku Hasan M.di Tiro
Chairman, National Liberation Front o f Acheh, Sumatra, and Head o f State.
Acheh, Sumatra, December 4, 1976
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Appendix 3: Helsinki Accord 2005
* * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AND
THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT
f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The Government o f Indonesia (Gol) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a 
peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.
The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government o f the Acehnese 
people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of  
the Republic o f Indonesia.
The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the 
rebuilding o f Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed.
The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust.
This Memorandum o f Understanding (MoU) details the agreement and the principles that will guide the 
transformation process.
To this end the Gol and GAM have agreed on the following:
1 GOVERNING OF ACEH
1.1 Law on the Governing of Aceh
1.1.1 A new Law on the Governing o f Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into 
force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006.
1.1.2 The new Law on the Governing o f Aceh will be based on the following principles:
a) Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors o f public affairs, which will be 
administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the 
fields o f foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal 
matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies o f which belong to the 
Government o f the Republic o f Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.
b) International agreements entered into by the Government o f Indonesia which relate to 
matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the 
consent of the legislature o f Aceh.
c) Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature o f the Republic o f Indonesia will be 
taken in consultation with and with the consent o f the legislature of Aceh.
d) Administrative measures undertaken by the Government o f Indonesia with regard to 
Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent o f the head o f the 
Aceh administration.
1.1.3 The name of Aceh and the titles o f senior elected officials will be determined by the legislature 
o f Aceh after the next elections.
285
1.1.4 The borders o f Aceh correspond to the borders as o f 1 July 1956.
1.1.5 Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn.
1.1.6 Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions and customs of 
the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal requirements o f Aceh.
1.1.7 The institution o f Wali Nanggroe with all its ceremonial attributes and entitlements will be
established.
1.2 Political participation
1.2.1 As soon as possible and not later than one year from the signing o f this MoU, Gol agrees to and 
will facilitate the establishment o f Aceh-based political parties that meet national criteria. 
Understanding the aspirations o f Acehnese people for local political parties, Gol will create, 
within one year or at the latest 18 months from the signing o f this MoU, the political and legal 
conditions for the establishment o f local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament. 
The timely implementation o f this MoU will contribute positively to this end.
1.2.2 Upon the signature o f this MoU, the people o f Aceh will have the right to nominate candidates 
for the positions o f all elected officials to contest the elections in Aceh in April 2006 and 
thereafter.
1.2.3 Free and fair local elections will be organised under the new Law on the Governing o f Aceh to 
elect the head of the Aceh administration and other elected officials in April 2006 as well as the 
legislature o f Aceh in 2009.
1.2.4 Until 2009 the legislature o f Aceh will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent o f  
the head of the Aceh administration.
1.2.5 All Acehnese residents will be issued new conventional identity cards prior to the elections o f  
April 2006.
1.2.6 Full participation o f all Acehnese people in local and national elections will be guaranteed in 
accordance with the Constitution o f the Republic o f Indonesia.
1.2.7 Outside monitors will be invited to monitor the elections in Aceh. Local elections may be 
undertaken with outside technical assistance.
1.2.8 There will be full transparency in campaign funds.
1.3 Economy
1.3.1 Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. Aceh has the right to set interest rates 
beyond that set by the Central Bank o f the Republic o f Indonesia.
1.3.2 Aceh has the right to set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities. Aceh has the right to 
conduct trade and business internally and internationally and to seek foreign direct investment 
and tourism to Aceh.
1.3.3 Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea 
surrounding Aceh.
1.3.4 Aceh is entitled to retain seventy (70) per cent o f the revenues from all current and future 
hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory o f  Aceh as well as in the 
territorial sea surrounding Aceh.
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1.3.5 Aceh conducts the development and administration o f all seaports and airports within the 
territory o f Aceh.
1.3.6 Aceh will enjoy free trade with all other parts o f the Republic o f Indonesia unhindered by taxes, 
tariffs or other restrictions.
1.3.7 Aceh will enjoy direct and unhindered access to foreign countries, by sea and air.
1.3.8 Gol commits to the transparency o f the collection and allocation of revenues between the Central 
Government and Aceh by agreeing to outside auditors to verify this activity and to communicate 
the results to the head o f the Aceh administration.
1.3.9 GAM will nominate representatives to participate fully at all levels in the commission 
established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR).
1.4 Rule of law
1.4.1 The separation o f powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary will be 
recognised.
1.4.2 The legislature o f Aceh will redraft the legal code for Aceh on the basis o f the universal 
principles o f human rights as provided for in the United Nations International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1.4.3 An independent and impartial court system, including a court o f appeals, will be established for 
Aceh within the judicial system o f the Republic o f  Indonesia.
1.4.4 The appointment o f the Chief of the organic police forces and the prosecutors shall be approved 
by the head o f the Aceh administration. The recruitment and training of organic police forces and 
prosecutors will take place in consultation with and with the consent o f the head o f the Aceh 
administration in compliance with the applicable national standards.
1.4.5 All civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh will be tried in civil courts in Aceh.
2 HUMAN RIGHTS
2.1 Gol will adhere to the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
2.2 A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh.
2.3 A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian
Commission o f Truth and Reconciliation with the task o f formulating and determining 
reconciliation measures.
3 AMNESTY AND REINTEGRATION INTO SOCIETY
3.1 Amnesty
3.1.1 Gol will, in accordance with constitutional procedures, grant amnesty to all persons who have 
participated in GAM activities as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days o f  the 
signature o f this MoU.
3.1.2 Political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict will be released unconditionally as soon 
as possible and not later than within 15 days o f the signature o f this MoU.
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3.1.3 The Head o f the Monitoring Mission will decide on disputed cases based on advice from the 
legal advisor o f the Monitoring Mission.
3.1.4 Use o f weapons by GAM personnel after the signature o f this MoU will be regarded as a 
violation o f the MoU and will disqualify the person from amnesty.
3.2 Reintegration into society
3.2.1 As citizens o f the Republic o f Indonesia, all persons having been granted amnesty or released 
from prison or detention will have all political, economic and social rights as well as the right to 
participate freely in the political process both in Aceh and on the national level.
3.2.2 Persons who during the conflict have renounced their citizenship o f the Republic o f Indonesia
will have the right to regain it.
3.2.3 Gol and the authorities o f Aceh will take measures to assist persons who have participated in 
GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society. These measures include 
economic facilitation to former combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A 
Reintegration Fund under the administration o f the authorities o f Aceh will be established.
3.2.4 Gol will allocate funds for the rehabilitation o f public and private property destroyed or 
damaged as a consequence o f the conflict to be administered by the authorities o f Aceh.
3.2.5 Gol will allocate suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities o f Aceh for the 
purpose o f facilitating the reintegration to society o f the former combatants and the 
compensation for political prisoners and affected civilians. The authorities o f Aceh will use the 
land and funds as follows:
a) All former combatants will receive an allocation o f suitable farming land, employment 
or, in the case o f incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities o f  
Aceh.
b) All pardoned political prisoners will receive an allocation o f  suitable farming land, 
employment or, in the case o f incapacity to work, adequate social security from the 
authorities o f Aceh.
c) All civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict will receive an 
allocation o f suitable farming land, employment or, in the case o f incapacity to work, 
adequate social security from the authorities o f Aceh.
3.2.6 The authorities o f Aceh and Gol will establish a joint Claims Settlement Commission to deal 
with unmet claims.
3.2.7 GAM combatants will have the right to seek employment in the organic police and organic 
military forces in Aceh without discrimination and in conformity with national standards.
4 SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
4.1 All acts o f violence between the parties will end latest at the time o f the signing o f this MoU.
4.2 GAM undertakes to demobilise all o f its 3000 military troops. GAM members will not wear 
uniforms or display military insignia or symbols after the signing o f this MoU.
4.3 GAM undertakes the decommissioning o f all arms, ammunition and explosives held by the 
participants in GAM activities with the assistance o f the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). 
GAM commits to hand over 840 arms.
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4.4 The decommissioning o f GAM armaments will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be 
executed in four stages and concluded by 31 December 2005.
4.5 Gol will withdraw all elements o f non-organic military and non-organic police forces from 
Aceh.
4.6 The relocation o f non-organic military and non-organic police forces will begin on 15 September 
2005 and will be executed in four stages in parallel with the GAM decommissioning 
immediately after each stage has been verified by the AMM, and concluded by 31 December 
2005.
4.7 The number o f organic military forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation is 14700. The 
number o f organic police forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation is 9100.
4.8 There will be no major movements o f military forces after the signing o f  this MoU. All 
movements more than a platoon size will require prior notification to the Head o f the Monitoring 
Mission.
4.9 Gol undertakes the decommissioning o f all illegal arms, ammunition and explosives held by any 
possible illegal groups and parties.
4.10 Organic police forces will be responsible for upholding internal law and order in Aceh.
4.11 Military forces will be responsible for upholding external defence of Aceh. In normal peacetime 
circumstances, only organic military forces will be present in Aceh.
4.12 Members o f the Aceh organic police force will receive special training in Aceh and overseas 
with emphasis on respect for human rights.
5 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION
5.1 An Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) will be established by the European Union and ASEAN 
contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the implementation o f the commitments 
taken by the parties in this Memorandum of Understanding.
5.2 The tasks o f the AMM are to:
a) monitor the demobilisation o f GAM and decommissioning o f its armaments,
b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops,
c) monitor the reintegration o f active GAM members,
d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field,
e) monitor the process o f legislation change,
f) rule on disputed amnesty cases,
g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations o f the MoU,
h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.
5.3 A Status o f  Mission Agreement (SoMA) between Gol and the European Union will be signed 
after this MoU has been signed. The SoMA defines the status, privileges and immunities o f the 
AMM and its members. ASEAN contributing countries which have been invited by Gol will 
confirm in writing their acceptance o f and compliance with the SoMA.
5.4 Gol will give all its support for the carrying out of the mandate o f the AMM. To this end, Gol 
will write a letter to the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries expressing its 
commitment and support to the AMM.
5.5 GAM will give all its support for the carrying out o f  the mandate o f the AMM. To this end, 
GAM will write a letter to the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries expressing its 
commitment and support to the AMM.
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5.6 The parties commit themselves to provide AMM with secure, safe and stable working conditions 
and pledge their full cooperation with the AMM.
5.7 Monitors will have unrestricted freedom o f movement in Aceh. Only those tasks which are 
within the provisions o f the MoU will be accepted by the AMM. Parties do not have a veto over 
the actions or control o f the AMM operations.
5.8 Gol is responsible for the security of all AMM personnel in Indonesia. The mission personnel do 
not carry arms. The Head o f Monitoring Mission may however decide on an exceptional basis 
that a patrol will not be escorted by Gol security forces. In that case, Gol will be informed and 
the Gol will not assume responsibility for the security o f this patrol.
5.9 Gol will provide weapons collection points and support mobile weapons collection teams in 
collaboration with GAM.
5.10 Immediate destruction will be carried out after the collection o f weapons and ammunitions. This 
process will be fully documented and publicised as appropriate.
5.11 AMM reports to the Head o f Monitoring Mission who will provide regular reports to the parties 
and to others as required, as well as to a designated person or office in the European Union and 
ASEAN contributing countries.
5.12 Upon signature o f this MoU each party will appoint a senior representative to deal with all 
matters related to the implementation o f this MoU with the Head o f
Monitoring Mission.
5.13 The parties commit themselves to a notification responsibility procedure to the AMM, including 
military and reconstruction issues.
5.14 Gol will authorise appropriate measures regarding emergency medical service and 
hospitalisation for AMM personnel.
5.15 In order to facilitate transparency, Gol will allow full access for the representatives o f  national 
and international media to Aceh.
6 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
6.1 In the event o f disputes regarding the implementation o f this MoU, these will be
resolved promptly as follows:
a) As a rule, eventual disputes concerning the implementation o f this MoU will be 
resolved by the Head o f Monitoring Mission, in dialogue with the parties, with all 
parties providing required information immediately. The Head o f Monitoring Mission 
will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.
b) If the Head o f Monitoring Mission concludes that a dispute cannot be resolved by the
means described above, the dispute will be discussed together by the Head o f  
Monitoring Mission with the senior representative o f each party. Following this, the
Head of Monitoring Mission will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.
c) In cases where disputes cannot be resolved by either of the means described above, the 
Head of Monitoring Mission will report directly to the Coordinating Minister for 
Political, Law and Security Affairs o f the Republic o f Indonesia, the political leadership 
o f GAM and the Chairman o f the Board o f Directors o f the Crisis Management 
Initiative, with the EU Political and Security Committee informed. After consultation 
with the parties, the Chairman o f the Board o f Directors o f the Crisis Management 
Initiative will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties.
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I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Gol and GAM will not undertake any action inconsistent with the letter or spirit o f this 
Memorandum of Understanding.
Signed in triplicate in Helsinki, Finland on the 15 o f August in the year 2005.
On behalf o f the Government o f the Republic o f Indonesia, On behalf o f the Free Aceh Movement,
As witnessed by
Martti Ahtisaari
Former President o f  Finland
Chairman o f  the Board o f  Directors o f  the Crisis Management Initiative 
Facilitator o f  the negotiation process
Hamid Awaludin
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